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INTRODUCTION

A.

The Use of Social Science Research
in Litigation

Courts on occasion refer to sources outside the trial record to establish
"'constitutional facts."' This is not a new practice, not a practice that began with
Brown v. Board of Education2 nor even a practice that is confined to school
desegregation litigation.3 Justice Harlan's use of medical and social science data
in Lochner v. New York 4 in 1905 marks one of the earliest attempts to introduce
non-legal material. 5 This was shortly followed by Muller v. Oregon, a case involv*
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Several memoranda by attorneys who have been or are litigating these issues, or who are close
students of such litigation, were prepared for the Conference on The Courts. Social Science, and
School Desegregation, held in August 1974 in South Carolina. The memoranda presented various
views of the issues courts presently face in school desegregation litigation. This article has drawn on
the insights provided in those memoranda, although the authors bear the final responsibility for
the interpretations and conclusions in this article.
The contributors, whom the authors gratefully acknowledge, were Derrick A. Bell. Jr., Professor
(if Law. Harvard University; Norman J. Chachkin, Staff Attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund. Inc.; J. Harold Flanner, Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights undei
Law; Owen NI. Fiss, Professor of Law, Yale University; Harold Horowitz, Professor of Law. University of California at Los Angeles; Sanford Jay Rosen, Legal Director, and Carlos Alcala, Interim
Director of Educational Litigation, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund; and
William L. Taylor, Director, The Center foi National Policy Review.
I. For the difference between adjudicative facts and legislative or constitutional facts see 2 K.
DAvis, ADMINISIRATIVE LAW TRtAI iSE § 15.03 (1958). See also Hart & McNaughton. Evidence (oid
haference in the Law, 87 DAEDALUS 41 (1958).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Some have suggested that the Supreme Court's use of social science as evidence in Brown was
an unprecedented innovation, thus explaining the fierce debate over the propriety of using such
evidence in a legal opinion. See, e.g., P. ROSEN, TiE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL ScIENCE 169-70
(1972). Perhaps, however, the outcr that was raised was due to the fact that the case was not a
relatively non-controversial one of low visibility (e.g.. an antitrust case involving the imroduction of
extensive economic data), but a case capable of overturning the social structure of the South, based
on segregation and racism.

4.
5.

198 U.S. 45 (1905),
See P. BRE-sr, PROCESS OF CONsrirUIONAL DECISION MAKING 938-39 (1975).
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ing a maximum hour law for women, in which Louis Brandeis filed a 113-page
brief in support of the law's constitutionality, drawing upon such sources as
surveys, government statistics, factory reports, and the opinions of doctors,
employers, and employees. 6 The so-called "Brandeis Brief" was cited with approval by the Court.7 Since then, the courts have frequently resorted to non-

legal research to support legal conclusions. Trademark and antitrust litigation,
for example, have been areas long dominated by empirical social science evidence. Empirical social science data and research also have been cited in cases
involving the death penalty, 8 six-man juries," legal insanity rules, 10 and the use
of test scores and education credentials for employment. It Social science data
6. Brief on behalf of the people, prepared by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark,
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
7. 208 U.S. at 419-20 n. 1.Professor Paul Freund would distinguish the "Brandeis Brief" from
the use of psychological and sociological research in Brown on the ground that the Brandeis Brief
was used to support legislation-and thus was in line with the usual presumption of constitutionality.
In Brown, however, extra-legal evidence was used to attack legislation. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME
COURT OF "tHE UNirED STArES 152 (1961).
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that
"[w]hat few experiments have occurred . .. indicate that there is no discernible difference between
the results reached by the two different-sized [6-man and 12-man] juries," id.at 101, citing six
sources which were not based on empirical research by social scientists but on the experience of
lawyers and judges in reduced jury jurisdictions. Justice White continued in Williams: "In short,
neither currently available evidence nor theory suggests that the 12-man jury is necessarily more
advantageous to the defendant than a jury composed of fewer members." Id. at 101-02. As an
example of "theory," the Justice cited H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462-63, 488-89
(1966) for the proposition that "jurors in the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced
by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them." 399 U.S. at 101 n. 49. Justice White
concluded that:
If a defendant needs initially to persuade four jurors that the State has not met its burden
of proof in order to escape ultimate conviction by a 12-man jury, he arguably escapes by
initially persuading half that number in a six-man jury; random reduction, within limits,
of the absolute number of the jury would not affect the outcome.
399 U.S. at 102 n. 49.
It is of interest to note that one of the authors of the study cited by justice White has since
written with regard to use of this data from The American Jury: "Itis only fair to point out that the
findings were quite different" from the way in which they were stated by Justice White. Zeisel, ...
And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 719 (1971).
Zeisel noted that the study suggested that for a juror to hold out against a majority, it was necessary for him to have a companion. Thus although the odds are the same at five to one or ten to
two, at ten to two the dissenters will hold out a much higher percentage of the time than if one
juror is alone at five to one. Id. at 719-20.
10. In Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the D.C. Court of Appeals
relied in part upon articles on legal insanity by psychiatrists and other medico-legal writers, id. at
870-74, in deciding that the traditional M'Naghten title for determining the availability of the
defense of insanity in a criminal case (defendant presumed sane unless suffering from a disease of
the mind such that he did not know the difference between right and wrong) should be abandoned
for a new rule: whether or not the "unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect." 214 F.2d at 875. The court recently reconsidered the Durham rule governing the insanity
defense and replaced it with the test given in § 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court relied in part on a study by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission showing that 58 per cent of white applicants
passed a batters of intelligence tests including that used by Duke Power Company, while only 6 per
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and research findings were even brought to bear on the racial area before
Brown. The Supreme Court struck down state court enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants in 1948.12 While it is not apparent in the Supreme Court's
opinion, sociological material was introduced at every stage-from the initial
trial through the argument before the Supreme Court. t 3 In a case concerning
the refusal of the University of Texas Law School to admit blacks,14 anthropological evidence of the relationship between intelligence and race was introduced at the trial. 1"
In a substantial number of these cases, judges unfamiliar with the
methodology of social science research have attempted unsuccessfully to assimilate complex data which were equivocal and ambiguous. Ambiguity has led to
misunderstanding, and often to misinterpretation and misuse of the research

introduced into evidence. t Courts have disagreed as to the weight to be assigned social science research findings, l7 just as social scientists themselves have
cent of black applicants passed. Id. at 430 n. 6. The Supreme Court held that these data established
a prima facie case of discriminatory employment criteria, thereby shifting the burden to the
Company to show that its requirements Were significantly related to a successful job performance, a
burden which the Company was unable to meet on the basis of the evidence introduced. Id. at 431.
Similarly, in Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975), two studies were used to establish a prima facie case of the racially disproportionate impact of the Federal Service Entrance
Examination (FSEE). Id. at 982-83. These studies showed that the passing rate on the FSEE for
those having attended predominantly black colleges was between 12.4 per cent and 8.6 per cent,
while for those having attended predominantly white colleges itwas between 60.2 per cent and
42.1 per cent. Id. at 982.
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13. Kohn, Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact, and Constitutional Law, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
136, 137 (1960).
14. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
15. Kohn, supia note 13. at 140.
16. See, e.g., Levin, Education, Life Chances and the Courts: The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39
LAW, & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 217 (1975); Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science Along the
Judiciarys Constitutional Law Frontier, 66 Nw.U.L. REV.455, 460-61 (1971).
17. In the capital punishment decision, Furman v.Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),Justice Douglas,
concurring, cited Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIrE & DELINQUENCY 132
(1969) and H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 474 (1967) for statistics
showing that blacks
Were executed more frequently than Whites. 408 U.S. at 250 in.15. Justice Marshall. also concurring, cited T. SELLINs, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1959) as showing that murders do not increase when capital
punishment is banned or decrease in areas that impose the death penalty, 408 U.S. at 348-50. atnd,
citing other studies, argued that '[i]n light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no
alternative but to conclude that capital punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent
effect." 408 U.S. at 354. Concurring also, Justice Stewart-relying upon H. BEDAU, supia-purported to show that the evidence of the deterrent effect of the death penalty is so inconclusive
that it is insufficient to support the conclusion that the death penalty is not justified. 408 U.S. at
307-08. Justice Powell, dissenting, also drew upon these studies to show the contradictory nature of
the evidence of both the deterrent effect of the death penalty and the possible discrimination involved in its imposition. 408 U.S. at 434-50, 454-56.
The only justice to directly controvert the assertion that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily
was Chief Justice Burger, who stated in his dissent that the assertion had "no empirical basis." 408
U.S. at 389, citing for support of the contrary proposition, Note, A Stud) oj the Calilornia PenaltN
Jury in First-Degree-MurderCases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969) and H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra
note 9. See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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differed as to the scientific validity of the same studies. The net result of this
attempted union of law and social science understandably has been unsatisfactory for jurists and social scientists alike. Mutual distrust has often been the
result, and valuable insights have been lost or denied as judges and juries have
sought to separate hard fact from educated speculation.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the host of problems which
presently prevent the effective application of social science research to the
judicial process. There are numerous articles which deal with those problems.1 8
It is enough for our purposes that courts have considered and will continue to
consider social science evidence in an attempt to discern the factual and legal
truth of school desegregation questions. This article surveys the legal issues
presently confronting courts as they decide school desegregation cases, and
the extent to which social science research has been brought to bear on those
issues.
B.

Social Science and the Footnote
Eleven Debate

When Brown was decided, there was considerable debate concerning the
extent to which the Supreme Court's opinion rested upon the social science
evidence cited in footnote eleven of the Brown opinion, 19' rather than upon
principles of law.2 0 The strongest voice to challenge the import of footnote
2 1
eleven was that of Edmond Cahn:
1

Would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of other Ameri-

cans-rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records . . . . [S]ince the behavioral sciences are so Very
young, imprecise, and changeful, their findings have an uncertain expectancy

of life. Today's sanguine asseveration may be cancelled by tomorrow s new
revelation-or new technical fad.
18. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 16; Hazard, Limitations on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the
Law, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 71 (1967); Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of Social Science
Research in the Legal Process, 1973 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 815.

19.
20.

Brown v.Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n. 11 (1954).

See, e.g., C. SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 158-62 (1954); W. WORKMAN,
THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH, 26, 30, 197 (1960); Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review
and Appraisal oJ Their Testimony in Litigation. 54 MICH. L. REV. 953.(1956); Sutherland, The American
Judiciamy and Racial Desegregation, 20 MODERN L. REV. 201 (1957); CahnJursprudence,30 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 150 (1955); Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REV.
224 (1959); Black, The Laufulness o the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
21. Cahn, supra note 20, at 157, 167. See also Cahnjurisprudence,31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182 (1956).

Professor Kalven has noted that:
His [Professor Cahn's] fear was that scientific fact having been tendered on the issue, the
merits would be thought to stand or fall with it, so that a shift tomorrow in the fashions of
science would force a shift in the conclusions about segregation.
Professor Kalven, however, found that fear
unfoinded not because the scientific fact might not change, but because it has become
clear that neither we nor the Court rested our conviction as to the evils of racial segregation on the scientific proof. That judgment had deeper and perhaps less rational sources.
Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING
AMERICA

56, 66 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
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Some lower courts did attempt to do what Professor Cahn had feared. A
federal district court in Georgia believed that the question presented in
Brown-whether segregation of children in public schools is harmful-was a
question of fact rather than of law. The judge therefore permitted evidence,
much of which was developed after 1954, to be introduced in an attempt to
show that

22

the separation of Negro and white children in the public schools was not
determined solely by race or color but rather upon racial traits of educational
significance as to which racial identity was only a convenient index. . . . [and
that the] differences in specific capabilities, learning progress rates, mental
maturity, and capacity for education in general . . . as well as differences in
physical, psychical and behavioral traits . . . were ... of such magnitude as to
make it impossible for Negro and white children of the same chronological age
to be effectively educated in the same classrooms.

The court found, on the basis of the evidence submitted, that both white and
3
black students would be seriously injured by integration and that
[w,]hatever psychological injury may be sustained by a Negro child out of his
sense of rejection by white children is increased rather than abated by forced
intermixture, and this increase is in direct proportion to the number and extent of his contacts with white children.

The Fifth Circuit, however, peremptorily reversed the district court,24 and this
25
problem rarely surfaced again in such blatant form.
22. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 668 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
23. 220 F. Supp. at 684.
24. 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
[N]o inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [Brown v. Board of
Educ.] even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to its
facts or as to the law. . . . We do not read the major premise of the decision of the
Supreme Court . . . as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented. We read it as
proscribing segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that separate
but equal schools for the races were inherently unequal. This being our interpretation of
the teaching of that decision, it follows that it would be entirely inappropriate for it to be
rejected or obviated by this court.
Id. at 61.
25. But see Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 232 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Miss. 1964),
which permitted evidence to be introduced to show that separate schools were not injurious, but
instead were advantageous to pupils of both races. Id. at 244-50. Such testimony included that of
seven "distinguished" scientists as "to the existence of such differences between the two groups to
constitute a rational basis for separate schooling"-differences between the races in IQ and in
cranial capacity and brain size. Id. at 246-47. Evidence was also introduced that the "mixing" of the
races in the same school is injurious. Id. at 245. Although District Judge Mize expressed the
opinion that this evidence "cifies] out for a reappraised and complete reconsideration of the
findings and conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in the Brown decision," he nevertheless granted the plaintiff's prayer for an injunction, feeling bound by the Fifth Circuit's prior
holding in Stell v. Savannah-Chathan County Bd. oJ Educ. Id. at 255.
Judge Wisdom, speaking for the Fifth Circuit on appeal, stated that "[t]hese cases tax the
patience of the Court." 357 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 384 U.S. 961 (1966). In firmlx
rejecting any further attempts "to overturn Brown on a factual showing," Judge Wisdom declared
that the inherent inequality of segregated schools was now a legal principle no longer open to
question. Id.
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Since Brown, the courts have continued to refer to social science research in
segregation cases, although more frequently in regard to questions concerning
the nature and extent of the remedies to be applied, rather than whether
segregation is a constitutional violation per se. As the legal questions of school
desegregation have become more and more complex (compared to the relatively clear and simple issue presented in Brown), social science research has
become less certain and more debatable-or at least it seems so to many lawyers
and judges."6
The increasing lack of unanimity on the Court may be a reflection of the
growing complexity of the issues. Swaim v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education2 7 marked the end of the unbroken line of unanimous Supreme Court
decisions in school desegregation which began with Brown. The cracks in the
wall of unanimity first appeared in two cases which followed Swann by only a
little over a year-after eighteen years of unanimity in school desegregation
28
cases. Chief Justice Burger dissented in Wright v. Council of the City oJ Emporia,
joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. The same four concurred
only in the result in United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education.29
The crack widened into a sizable fissure with Keyes v. School District No. 1
(the Denver case)."' Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion; the Chief
Justice concurred in the result. Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court,
but in a separate opinion reprimanded the majority for continuing the de
facto-dce jure distinction by requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of the
"intent" of school authorities. t Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice White did not
3 2
participate. Finally, with Milliken v. Bradley (the Detroit case), the unanimous
front ruptured completely-Chief Justice Burger writing for a majority which
included Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun; Justice Stewart
filed a separate concurring opinion; Justice White dissented, joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall; another dissent by Marshall was joined by the
other three dissenters; and Justice Douglas filed a separate dissent.
In attempting to identify the principal issues, it is useful to treat them as
clustered around two separate and distinct categories, although in Milliken v.
26.

CJ'. Justice Powell's comments in the Rodiiguez case:
[T]his case . . . involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,
another area in which his Court's lark oJ specialized knowledge and experience counsels against
On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and
preplatire intefijeme ....
educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the major sources of controversv concerns
the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures
and the quality of education ....
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973) (emphasis added).
27. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
28. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
29. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
30. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
31. 413 U.S. at 214-16.
32. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Bradley, the Supreme Court seems to have merged the two so that there may no
longer be as clear a line between them as before. Thus, there are a number of
issues comprising the first category establishing the violation; i.e., whether a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has occurred, giving rise to the duty to desegregate the school system. The second
category includes issues concerned with remedy; i.e., once it has been determined that the equal protection clause has been violated, what are the permissible remedies which courts can order? This article will examine these two
questions and the context in which they arise in today's school desegregation
cases, as well as the kinds of social science evidence which the courts draw upon
in answering these questions.
I
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
33

FROM Brown TO Swann: A BRIEF REVIEW

In 1954, four separate cases-from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware 3 4-were
consolidated for argument in the Supreme Court. The
Court framed the issue before it as being whether "segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities."

35

The. Court then held that the

fourteenth amendment forbids such state-imposed segregation of races in public schools: "[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
3 6
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.1
7
The Court approved the finding of the Kansas district court which stated:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
33.

The tortuous process of the development of school desegregation law is traced in Read,

Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education. 39 LAW &

1, at 7 (1975).
34. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliott, 103
F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952);
Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (1952).
35. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
36. 347 U.S. at 495.
37. 347 U.S. at 494. The Court went further and suggested that -[a]ny language in Plessy v.
CONTEMP. PROB. 1o.

Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Id. at 494-95. In Ples.y, it will be recalled, Justice

Brown noted that

the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument consist[s] in the assumption that the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.
This finding, suggested the majority, was "amply supported by modern authority," which was named in the now famous footnote eleven of the opinion.
The cases were set down for further argument on the question of appropriate relief. Brown I1 s was decided the following year and the cases were
remanded with the following directions regarding the extent of the equitable
'
remedial powers of lower courts:3 .
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been charactetized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its r-emedies [footnote omitted] and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and pi-ivate needs. [Footnote omitted.] These cases
call for the exeicise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is
the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminator-y basis. To effectuate this interest may call for
elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the tiransition .... Courts of
equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of
such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without
saying that the vitality of these constitutional pirinciples cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them.
The Court said the objective must be "to effectuate a transition to a racially
non-discriminatory school system." (Emphasis added.)4 "
For almost twenty years following the Brown decision, the problem of establishing a constitutional violation rarely presented itself since subsequent cases
arose almost exclusively in southern states in which segregation had been constitutionally or statutorily mandated. 4 This twenty-year struggle to implement
Brown in the South was, in large part, only a struggle with the question of
remedying admitted state-imposed segregation. In the few cases which arose
outside of the South, some courts found only de facto segregation and hence
no state action requiring desegregation, 42 while others reached the opposite
result. No non-southern case, however, reached the Supreme Court until Keyes
(the Denver case) in 1973.
38. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
39. Id. at 300.
40. 349 U.S. at 301.
41.
A few courts expressed the belief that since the constitutional rights of minorities depended on the extent of harm that allegedly stemmed fiom segregation, a showing of the
opposite-that there was no harm-meant that there was no right to be violated. See for example
the Steil v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. oJ Educ. situation at notes 22-24 supra and accompanying
text.
42. Some early lower court cases in which litigants unsuccessfully sought to establish an affirmative right to desegregation without regard to the cause of the existing pattern of segregated schools
are Deal v. Cincinnati, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1963). In Deal, the plaintiffs had argued that black children would be harmed by attending a
racially imbalanced school. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that -[a] finding of educational or
other harm is not essential to strike down enforced segregation." Id. at 59. The court went on to
say, however, that "a showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial powers of the
law." Id.
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A brief review of the kinds of segregatory plans43 which were adopted by
states in the early years of litigation-purportedly to remedy segregation
-provides some insights into some of the issues with which courts are grappling today.
(1) Pupil Placement Laws. Under pupil placement laws, students were initially assigned to the schools maintained for their race. Requests for transfers
were then considered on an individual basis, in light of various "non-racial"
factors. In Alabama, the law set forth the following factors, among others,
which a board of education should consider in granting or denying a request to
44
transfer:
the psychological qualification of the pupil for the type of teaching and associations involved, . . the psychological effect upon the pupil of attendance at a
particular school; the possibility or threat of friction or disorder among pupils
or others; the possibility of breaches of the peace or ill-will
or economic retaliation within the community; . ..the maintenance or severance of established
social and psychological relationships with other pupils and wvith teachers ....
It is obvious that it would be Very difficult, under such a law, to bring about any
significant amount of desegregation.4 At first courts sustained these kinds of
laws, which were constitutional on their face, on the assumption that they were
being constitutionally applied. 46 Finally, however, the courts began to hold that
since the initial assignment was on the basis of race, such measures were
47
unconstitutional.
(2) Freedom-of-choice Plans. School authorities began to replace pupil assignment plans with freedom-of-choice plans. Most of these plans required
every pupil to exercise a choice at the beginning of each school year, thus
eliminating the automatic initial assignment of pupils to the schools of their
race unless a transfer were requested. A pupil's choice could only be denied on
the basis of overcrowding. However, "freedom-of-choice" plans did not work
either. 48 In 1968, with Green v. County School Board,4 9 the Court finally announced that it would no longer permit freedom-of-choice plans where the
43. See Read, supra note 33, for a much more detailed and comprehensive discussion of the
kinds of measures to which the states resorted in attempting to demonstrate that they had moved
to a "racially nondiscriminatory school system."
44. ALA. CODE tits. 52-56, § 61(4) (1960).
45. Note, The Federal Courts and Integration o Southern Schools: Troubled Status oj the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1452-53 (1962).
46. See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957):
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958), afj"d on limited
grounds, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
47. See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491 (1962); Northcross v. Board of
Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
48. United States v.Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 888-94 (5th Cir. 1966), af"d
on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); UNITED STATES COMMISSION
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"freedom" was illusory, and where it produced only token desegregation.5 0
However, it left open the question of what the freedom-of-choice plans it might
permit would resemble."
(3) "All Deliberate Speed Plans." These included grade-a-year plans and other
proposals which brought about-at best-token desegregation. In 1969, the
Court, in a short per curiam opinion, made clear that boards of education
would no longer be allowed to desegregate "with all deliberate speed."-2
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

Having ordered massive inmediate desegregation,- 3 the unanswered questions that remained were: by what means and up to what limits? What is in the
arsenal of equitable remedies which federal judges can draw upon? Are there

limits to the use of certain remedies and if so, what are they? The case in which
the Supreme Court attempted to come to grips with some of these questions is
the now famous Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgCounty Board of Education, 4 de-

cided in 1971.
A.

District-wide De Jire Segregation

Until Keyes v. School District No. 1 (the Denver case) 55 the Supreme Court
had only dealt with cases from school districts in which segregation had been
50. New* Kent County School Board had made no steps to desegregate until 1965 when it
adopted its freedom-of-choice plan. Only 15 pet cent of the black students and none of the white
students had changed schools under the plan. Id. at 441-42.
51.
We do not hold that "freedom of choice" can have no place in [a desegregation] plan.
We do not hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan might of itself be unconstitutional ....
Although the general experience under "freedom of choice" to date has been such as to
indicate itsineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation, [footnote omitted] there may well be
instances in which it can serve as an effective device. Where it offers real promise of aiding
a desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dtual system to a
unitary, nontacial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove
itself in operation. On the other hand. if there are reasonably available other ways, such
for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary,
nonracial school system, "fteedon of choice" must be held unacceptable.
391 U.S. at 439. 440-41.
52. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of ECLc., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
[T]he Court of Appeals shotld have denied all motions for additional time because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing "all deliberate speed"
for desegregation is no longer constitutionall) permissible.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added). See also Carter v.West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
53. In Professor Read's view, while "enormous progress" had been made between Green and
Carter, "it was the Carter reversal that precipitated another quantum leap in school desegregation
activity." Read, supra note 33, at 32. In Cartet, the Fifth Circuit had permitted a delay in implementing court-ordered desegregation plans while cases were being appealed. The Supreme Court
summarily reversed, causing a shift frtom token desegregation to massive affirmative integration.

Id.
54. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Swann's approach to the question of appropriate remedies is discussed
in the text at pp. 81-88 infra.
55. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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required (or at least permitted) by law. Szwann is representative of the category
of cases in which there was an admitted past history of district-wide de jure
segregation. The Court found that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board
had not yet completely disestablished its dual school system and converted it to
the "unitary, nonracial system of public education" dictated by Green. 6 The
school board had argued that the segregated pattern of school attendance was
not due to deliberate assignment by race on the part of school officials but
rather to the nature of residential patterns. In other vords, the board argued,
since there was no longer a statute requiring segregated schools and no deliberate acts on the part of school officials to segregate the schools, there was no
constitutional violation to be remedied. The schools were segregated, but only
fortuitously, as a result of the use of neighborhood attendance zones in a
school district in which the neighborhoods were highly segregated.
The Court seemed to agree with the school authorities that there was no
discrimination practiced by the school district in its present method of assigning pupils. Nevertheless, the Court presumed that there was a causal connection between the school district's admitted past discrimination and the present
pattern of segregated schools. This meant that in a system formerly segregated
by law, the plaintiff could invoke a presumption that the current segregated
patterns were "vestiges" of past state-imposed segregation.5 7 Among the factors
the courts would look to is whether past discriminatory conduct of the school
board might have contributed to the creation and maintenance of segregated
residential patterns which, when coupled with the present use of geographic
proximity as a basis for assignment, would produce segregated patterns of
student attendance.5 8 For example, prior decisions of the school board regarding location and size of schools might explain why assigning students to schools
nearest their homes would result in racially homogeneous schools: a new school
is constructed to be of such a size that it can serve only a racially homogeneous
area or is so situated that it is the closest school to students of only one race.
56. 391 U.S. at 436.
57. 402 U.S. at 26.
58. 402 U.S. at 28.
59. Id. The So'an opinion clearly implies that the location of school facilities can contribute to
the development of a pantern of residential segregation as well as the reverse.
People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the
needs of people. The location of schools ma\ thus influence the patterns of residential
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of innercity neighborhoods. . . It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when
combined with "neighborhood zoning," further lock the school system into the mold of
separation of the races.
402 U.S. at 20-21.

In a later case-the first
school desegregation case outside of the South to be decided by the
SIpreme Court-the Court refierred to the "reciprocal effcct" on the racial composition of residential
neighborhoods caused by school assignment and other policies which "eartmark" schools according to theii racial composition. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973). For
example, in Denver, a small school was constiructed in the midst of other elementary schools
attended predominantly by blacks, allof which were located in the predominantly black section of
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The Court even indicated that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of
a violation of the equal protection clause without evidence of student assignment policies or of neighborhood residential patterns of segregation when " '
it is possible to identify a "white school" or a *Negro school" simply by refereiice to the racial composition of teachers and staff. the liality of school buildings and equipment or the organlization of sports activities ....

Thus, what the Court was saying is that in a school district where there is a past
history of de jure segregation, it is the effect of decisions made by school officials that is important, and not whether those decisions were made with intent to
maintain segregation."
The Court also indicated, however, that at some point in time the relationship between a system's past segregative acts and presen segregation may
become so attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure
segregation warranting judicial intervention.6 2 Consequently, the Court raised,
by implication, the question of how long a period of supervision by the courts
will be required before they determine whether a dual system has been dismantled. Precisely what a defendant school board must show to overcome the
presumption that the segregated pattern is still a "vestige" of previous stateimposed segregation, however, remains unanswered.
Does the Constitution impose on school boards the duty of retarding
district-wide resegregation? Resegregation can be caused by changes in residential patterns as a function of "white flight" whether due to "natural mobility" or
private bias (e.g., discrimination in the sale, rental or financing of housing in
the private market) or to policies and practices of governmental agencies in
locating housing, highways and other public facilities, and in developing and
6
Aie such changes in resiential
naintaining exclusionary land use practices
the city. This new school was then used to accommodate the overflow ftrom the nearby black
schools, and. although a predominantis-white elementary school just eight blocks away was also
overcrowded, no white students were tiansferied to the newly built school. For the facts of this
situation. see 445 F.2d 990, 1000 (10th Cir. 1971) (same case, lower court opinion).
60. 402 U.S. at 18.
61. "Thus we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or mot ivation of a school board's
action . .." Wright v. Council of Cits of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
62. 402 U.S. at 31-32. The Court s restatement of the original proposition is in Kes,'s, 413 U.S.
at 21 1.
63. In Hart \. Conmtnits School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), a federal district
coturt took cognizance of the fact that other governmental agencies were responsible, at least in
part, for segregated residential patterns. Id. at 758. 1 he court ordered city, state, and federal
housing authorities to provide a joint plan for reducing the racial imbalance in the affected neighborhood. Id. at 757. The court suggested that such a plan might include "refertilization" of the
area with new white families who would contribute to stabilization; acceleration of housing construction in various parts of the area; and modification of renting and construction patterns to encourage substantial members of white and middle class families with children to move into buildings constructed with the aid of public funds. The police commissioner was ordered to present a
plan fot adequate protection of children in the vicinity of the school; the Metropolitan Transit Authority was ordered to assist in the planning of adequate transportation to and from the school;
and the Commissioner of Recreation was ordered to become involved in planning for the use of
the public parks by school children. Id. at 757-58. The judge initially joined as additional parties
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patterns which are not the result of actions taken by school authorities
nevertheless their responsibility to correct through school assignment policies
once the school authorities have implemented the desegregation plan and disestablished the heretofore dual school system?
The Swann opinion could be read to imply that a school board has no
obligation to prevent or retard resegregation once it has "cured" the last vestiges of de jure segregation and established itself as a unitary system. Yet
notwithstanding the establishment of a unitary system, there would still be
certain factors within the control of school officials that could affect resegregation: the overall quality of the educational offering, curriculum content and
enrichment; extracurricular activities; improvement of older facilities; and, in
particular, preparation of teachers, students, and the community for the process of desegregation. 64 This suggests that a school board might at least be
required to refrain from those administrative decisions which would precipitate
or accelerate resegregation.
B.

Segregative Actions of School Officials
in a Part of the District
As the first non-southern school desegregation case to come before the
Supreme Court, the Denver case6 5 led to the articulation of the issues involved
in a school system that had never been segregated pursuant to state statutory or
constitutional provisions. There the Court found that certain actions on the
part of school authorities amounted to de jure segregation. 66 However, the
significance of Keyes lies in the manner in which it addressed the fact that while
schools throughout Denver were segregated, the segregative actions in this case
occurred in only part of the school system. 67 Nevertheless, the Court found
district-wide remedies appropriate.
What was needed to find that the pattern of segregation was a result of the
school board's unlawful actions? The difference between de facto and de jure
segregation was first clearly articulated by Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit
in 1966.68 In Swann,6 9 the Supreme Court noted that there was a difference
all government agencies whose programs and policies might have an impact on the stability of a
desegregation plan, but later abandoned this approach, noting that "the decretal tool is poorly de-

signed for restructuring an entire community." 383 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir, 1975).
64. See Orfield, How to Make Desegregation Work: The Adaptation of Schools to Their Newly Integrated
Student Bodies, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 314 (1975).
65. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

66.

Id. at 207-08.

67. The Denver School Board was found to have followed a deliberately segregative policy only
with respect to schools in the northeastern section of the city. attended by 37.7 per cent of Denver's
total black school population. Id. at 199. By contrast, dejure segregation was system-wide in Swan.
68. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 878-79 n. 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
See also Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
There is a well-developed body of legal writing on de facto segregation; see, e.g., Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); Fiss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REV. 564 (1965); Wright,
Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 70 N.Y.U.L. REV. 285 (1965).
69. 402 U.S. at 17-18. There, in the context of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
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between de jure and de facto segregation, but it was not until the Denver case,
in 1973, that the Court actually spelled out the distinction: " [T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
...is purpose or intent to segregate." 70 Thus the plaintiffs "must prove not only
that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action."7 1 Among the factors which were relied upon
as indicators of "purpose" or "intent" to segregate were:
(1) deliberate segregative acts of pupil assignment to schools located in a
non-white residential area of the city of Denver;
(2) racial assignment of faculty and staff;
(3) locating a school "with conlscious knowledge that it would be a segregated
school;- (emphasis added)7 2 and

(4) adopting policies which "have the clear oect of earmarking schools
7
(emphasis added). :
according to their racial composition ....
These indicators were fotInd only in a part of the district rather than
system-wide. The Court held, however, that if these intentional segregative acts
occurred in a "meaningful portion" of the school district, it in some sway tainted
the entire district sutfficiently to trigger a district-wide remedy .7 The Court
suggested two somewhat related grounds for reaching this conclusion,.7 First,
the Court noted that putting all blacks in one school on the basis of racially
drawn attendance zones would necessarily keep other nearby schools all white,
even though the white students were assigned on the basis of geographic proximity rather than race. 76 Also past decisions with respect to the location and size
of one school could have affected the racial composition of nearby schools: if
Court indicated that "de f acto segregation" means tihe Cxistence of racial imbalance in the schools
"but with no showing that [tile racial unbalance] was brought about by disrinuatoryaction of state
authorities." Id. at 18.
70. 413 U.S. at 208. Several of the justices took sharp issue With this distinction. Justice Douglas
ulltsttherefore be struck
contended that all school desegregation is a result of state action and
clown as in violation of tile Constitution. 413 U.S. at 215. Justice Powell argued that it is discriitinatory to presuile continued segregative intent (weuity years after Bau'tn) ill tie South and
not apply the presumption of segregative intent to segregated school distritIs in tile Nortl. If there
is segregation, no matter how caused, the burden Shloild be on the school cistii to showtflat tile
ssterl is aCtutall a unitar.
71.
413 U.S. at 198.

ttondliscrittinator\ sstem . 413 U.S. at 224.

72.
73.
74.

413 U.S. at 201-02 (quotintg ftolt district court opinion, 303 F. Supp. at 285).
413 U.S. at 202.
Justice Rehilquist -ejected tle majolrity's "illealingful portion test. Ill his view, onva ill a1
systeil %%heretotal segregation has been required1bN statute call a clisti ct-wide reiedy be imposed.
413 U.S. it 255. Itt tile absence of such a statute. Just ice Rehuquist would seeu to requir e at factual
determination oil a school-by-school basis as to whether particular minority students were denied
equal protection of tile law, thus placing a heavy burden of proof oil tile plaiiltiffs lather than oil
the defenldant school systemu. 413 U.S. at 256, 263.
75. See Fiss, School Desegegation: The Unceutain Path oj the Lau, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 3,
22-25 (1974).
76. The Court stated:
[lit is obvious that a practice of concentrating Negroes in (certain schools by structuring
attenclance zones or designing "feeder" schools oil tile basis of race has the recipiocal
effect of keeping other nearby schools predominantly white.
413 U.S. at 201 & n. 12.
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the board decided that a new school should be a black school in a black area
and it is sized to serve only the students in that area, other nearby schools
would be white even without deliberately assigning students on the basis of
77
race.
The Denver Court also returned to the theory suggested in Swann-that
there can be a linkage between past discrimination on the part of school authorities and the present pattern of residential segregation by race. 78 It found
that the various segregatory policies used by Denver school authorities tended
7
to "earmark" schools as black or white, .
and this, in turn, together with the elements of student assignment and school
construction, may have a profound reciprocal effect on the racial composition
of residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area, thereby causing
further racial concentration within the schools.
Thus one basis for holding that there was sufficient system-wide dejure desegregation to justify imposing a system-wide remedy was the presumption that
deliberate segregative policies in a "meaningful" or "substantial" part of the
school system taken in the past had a reciprocal effect on the remainder of the
system.
The second, somewhat related ground was:8"
that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system . . .creates a presumption that other segregated
schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes .. .a prima facie
case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts
to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within
the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions.
Thus, to summarize, the Denver case established the following allocation of
the burden of proof for those cases in which segregation has never been mandated by state constitutional or statutory provisions: the plaintiff must first
establish that there were (1) intentional segregative acts on the part of school
authorities, and (2) that such intentional segregative acts were in a "meaningful" or "substantial" portion of the school system. This establishes a prima facie
case that the entire system is unlawfully segregated-therefore requiring a
district-wide remedy-either on the presumption that intentional acts in a por77.

The Court concluded that:

[T]he practice of building a school . . . to a certain size and in a certain location, "with
conscious knowledge that it would be a segregated school," ... has a substantial reciprocal
effect on the racial composition of other nearby schools.

413 U.S. at 201-02.
78. See text accompanying note 58, at p. 60 supra. This tends to weaken the rather categorical statement made by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit)
that residential segregation-particularly that due to the increasing concentration of blacks in
the central cities-is "caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors ..... 418 U.S. at

756 n. 2. See also Bradley v.School Bd. (Richmond), 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972), afj'd by
an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
79. 413 U.S. at 202.
80. 413 U.S. at 208.
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tion of the school system have had a "profound reciprocal effect" on the rest of
the system, or on the presumption that where there are racially imbalanced
schools throughout the system, the intentional segregative acts could not have
been confined to a sub-area of the district.
1
The burden of proof at this point shifts to the school authorities."
They can
rebut the prima facie case by disproving any segregative intent with respect to
the rest of the school district 2 by showing with sufficient specificity "that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions." (Emphasis added.)83 However, disproving a negative---i.e., requiring school authorities to "bear the burden of explaining actions or conditions which appear to
be racially motivated"" 4-is not an easy task. The Court indicated that there
may be cases in which the causal connection could be disproved by school
authorities by showing that "the geographical structure of, or the natural
boundaries within, a school district [have had] the effect of dividing the district
into separate, identifiable and unrelated units ....

85

The Court implied, how-

ever, that such cases would be rare."6
The school district can also "rebut the prima facie case by showing that its
past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition" in the other schools in the district. (Emphasis added.)"7 The Court
made it quite clear, however, that mere "remoteness in time has [no] relevance
to the issue of intent."88 On the other hand, the .Court reaffirmed the dicta in
Swann, that there may be "some point in time [when] the relationship between
past segregative acts and present segregation may become so attenuated as to
be incapable of supporting a finding of dejure segregation warranting judicial
intervention."'8 9 Moreover, where the core city population in a school district
has long been predominantly minority, the Court suggested that reliance on a
"neighborhood school policy" of pupil assignment could not justify segregated
schools where "school authorities have been found to have practiced de jure
segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system .
90
The difference, then, between Swann and Keyes as to the burden of proof is
that in Swann a prima facie case of unconstitutional segregative actions was
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

413
413
413
413
413

U.S. at 209.
U.S. at 210-11.
U.S. at 210.
U.S. at 209.
U.S. at 203.

86. In Keyes, a six-lane major highway was not considered to be a barrier dividing the district
into "separate, identifiable and unrelated units." 413 U.S. at 204-05.
87. 413 U.S. at 211.
88. 413 U.S. at 210.
If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and
the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in
time certainly does not make those actions any less "intentional."
413 U.S. at 210-11.
89. 413 U.S. at 211 (referring to its opinion in Swarm, 402 U.S. at 31-32).
90. 413 U.S. at 212.
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established by the existence of racially identifiable schools, since the case arose
in a jurisdiction formerly segregated by statute. The burden was upon the
school board to refute this prima facie case. In Keyes, on the other hand, where
the school system had never been segregated in accordance with statutory or
constitutional provisions, the burden fell initially upon the plaintiff to prove
that the school authorities had intentionally and purposefully implemented a
system of segregated schools in at least part of the district. Once intent was
proven by the plaintiff, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that the
segregative patterns found throughout the district did not emanate from the
intentional plan to establish a dual school system in that part of the district
where intent had been shown. Thus, the school systems in both Swann and
Keyes were dejure segregated systems, but establishing this fact would be somewhat more difficult for plaintiffs bringing suit in jurisdictions such as Denver
where segregation was never required or permitted by law.
In neither Swann nor Keyes did the Court place any reliance on social science research to support a finding of a constitutional violation. Courts generally have not inquired whether segregation is psychologically or educationally
harmful to black and/or white children, nor have they inquired whether desegregation would "benefit" children in terms of improved pupil performance or
ability to compete in the marketplace. In Swan, the Court reaffirmed the
principle of Brown that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."'1 (Emphasis added.) It would seem, therefore, that although the
question of educational harms and benefits may be relevant to the nature and
extent of the remedies which may be used, it is irrelevant to the determination
of a violation of the equal protection clause. The only social science evidence
usually introduced in such suits is extensive empirical evidence concerning
residential segregation patterns and other demographic trends.
C. Segregated Pattern Resulting From Actions of
School Authorities Without Apparent Segregative Intent
The Supreme Court has not yet been confronted with a case in which a
segregated pattern has resulted from actions taken by school officials in all or a
portion of a school district, with no apparent segregative purpose or intent as
the Court found in the Denver case. In both Swann and Keyes, the Court
attempted to find a linkage between the existence of a segregated pattern of
schooling and deliberate assignment on the basis of race. Since in those cases
the Court was unable to find that the present pattern of segregated schools
resulted from present deliberate segregative acts of school authorities, the
Court permitted the plaintiffs to show that such intentional segregative acts
were undertaken in the past. 2 The Court, in Keyes, further held that the past
discriminatory acts of school authorities need only have been in a portion of the
91.
92.

402 U.S. a 1I1.
See Fiss,-u/na note 75. at 25.
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school district rather than system-wide. This approach, however, stops short of
93
saying that racial imbalance alone is a violation of the equal protection clause.
What must a plaintiff show to establish a prima facie case of de jure segregation where there has been no history of statutorily imposed segregation?
Keyes clearly says that plaintiffs must show that the segregated schooling that
exists "was brought about or maintained by intentional state action. ' ', 4 If, however, there is no direct evidence of intent (in resolutions or minutes of board
meetings, in the assignment of faculty and staff, or even in site selection for the
construction of new schools) and the school district simply has a neighborhood
schools policy of student assignment superimposed on a segregated residential
pattern which itself is not the result of any actions on the part of the school
authorities, is this sufficient to establish "segregative intent"? May segregative
intent be inferred from school board actions which have the foreseeable effect of
fostering segregation? ' 5 Have courts engrafted the tort principle-that a person is responsible for the natural consequences of his actions-onto school
16
desegregation cases in order to establish "intent"?
The Second Circuit has taken the position that specific racial motive need
not be shown to underlie the actions of school authorities-that intentional
action leading foreseeably to discrimination, but taken without racial motivation
also constitutes de jure segregation. 97 The court did note, however, that the
standard by which state action is to be judged "has not been settled authoritatively by the Supreme Court. ' 98 Thus, until the Supreme Court says otherwise,
the standard which the Second Circuit will apply is as follows:" '
[A] finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions taken, coupled
with omissions made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and
foreseeable consequence of causing educational segregation.

A federal district court in Michigan, in holding that the board of education
in Kalamazoo had followed a purposeful pattern of racial discrimination by
intentional acts of commission or omission,1°° applied general principles of tort
93, Professor Fiss suggests, however, that the nature and extent of the remedy in Kees-and
indeed, even in Swann--can be explained only if the segregation itself is viewed as the evil
and the
past discrimination is viewed as the triggering mechanism." Id. at 26.
94, 413 U.S, at 198.
95. Note that one of the factors indicating "intent" in the Denver case is the location of schools
"with conscious knowledge" that they will be segregated. 413 U.S. at 201-02.
96. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In this 1961 decision, the Supreme Court, in
delimiting the elements of a civil
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (imposing civil
liability upon -[e]very person who, under color of any statute ... of an) State .. .subjects . . . any
citizen of the United States .. .to the deprivation of any rights .. .secured by the Constitution
.), refused to include "specific intent" as a necessary element, ruling that § 1983 "should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.' 365 U.S. at 187. See Note. School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory oJ
Governmental Responsibility.' 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 421 (1972).
97. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
98. 512 F.2d at49.
99. 512 F.2d at 50.
100. Oliver v.Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Nlich. 1973). The court found
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law in determining whether there had been a violation: "[Ijt is reasonable to
infer that people intend the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted."10 1 The Sixth Circuit agreed:10'
A presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that
the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of public officials' action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation. The presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively establish that their
action or inaction was a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral
policies.
Plaintiffs in Grand Rapids, Michigan attempted to argue that if there was
reason to believe that school board policies could result in segregated school-

ing, there was an affirmative duty to change such policies for those which
0 4
3
would eliminate racial imbalance.'1 The plaintiffs in that case asserted that'
the school board had sufficient knowledge and forewarning that continued
operation of a neighborhood school system would result in imbalanced schools
and that this alone was enough to place on [the school board] the affirmative
duty to take action to eliminate such imbalance.
05
The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that'

the phenomenal increase in the black population in Grand Rapids was not
clearly foreseeable until the imbalances were so advanced that a far-reaching
reshuffling would have been required to correct them.

But the implication is that school officials would have been responsible for
correcting racial imbalances in the schools had the residential patterns been
foreseeable.
One commentator has recently pointed out that the evidence in the
Kalamazoo and Grand Rapids cases was quite similar, yet one district court
found that there was a purposeful pattern of racial discrimination and the
other court found none.' 0 6 The Sixth Circuit upheld both cases. The Sixth
Circuit, in its opinion in the Grand Rapids case, indicated that the fact that the
Kalamazoo School Board had rescinded a desegregation plan after candidates
the failure to develop or implement
any policy designed to positively confront the problem of racial isolation in the Kalamazoo
public schools ... was itself a deliberate decision to forego [the] opportunity to correct the
existing segregated conditions and itself was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection
of the laws.
Id. at 178-79.
101. 368 F. Supp. at 161.
102. Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1974). Accord,
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1974); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 488 F.2d 579,
585, 588 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
103. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
104. Id. at 789-90.
105. Id. at 790.
106. Marshall, The Standard of Intent: Two Recent Michigan Cases, 4 J.LAW & ED. 227 (1975).
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opposed to desegregation were elected to the board, distinguished Kalamazoo
from Grand Rapids. 10 7 This suggests that the Sixth Circuit might require more
specific actions indicating segregative intent than the Second Circuit.
D.

Segregation Not Attributable to School Board
Policies: The De Facto Dilemma

Both the district and the circuit courts in the Denver case found de jure
segregation in only a portion of the school district. The separation of the races
in the rest of the school district was treated as de facto segregation. 0 Thus the
Supreme Court could have used that case as a vehicle for determining whether
the equal protection clause imposes upon the school board an affirmative duty
to correct de facto segregation or racial imbalance in the schools that results
solely from segregated residential patterns. Instead the Supreme Court found
de jure segregation in a part of the district and extrapolated that to the entire
system. Thus the Supreme Court has yet to review a case of "pure" racial
imbalance or de facto segregation.' 0 9 Nevertheless, with the Keyes case, desegregation could no longer be said to be exclusively a southern problem-dejure,
in other words, means state actions and policies of various kinds which result in
segregated schools, not just compelled separation by statute or constitution. A
purely de facto segregated school district, then, would be one in which there
was neither a history of statutorily-imposed segregation nor intentional segregative acts on the part of school officials. The racial imbalance in the schools
is fortuitous, attributed solely to a neighborhood schools policy superimposed
1
on a pattern of residential segregation. 0
Some commentators and even some courts have suggested that neighborhood schooling coupled with private discrimination should, without more, be
sufficient to establish a violation of the equal protection clause."' One commentator states the argument as follows:

1 12

Residence in the ghetto, and thus membership in the class disadvantaged by
the neighborhood [school] assignment policy, is often the immediate conse107.
108.

508 F.2d at 791.
313 F. Supp. 51, 83 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 990 (1Oth Cir. 1971).

109.

The next major desegregation case to come before the Court was Milliken v. Bradley, 418

U.S. 717 (1974). There the Court upheld the district court's finding that the racial imbalance
within Detroit was clearly dejure.
110. The Keyes majority noted that the case had not presented the Court with an "occasion to
consider . .. whether a 'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure
segregation." 413 U.S. at 212.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 863-64 n. 22 (5th Cir. 1972)
(emphasis added):
Whether or not the residential isolation of whites, blacks, and Mexican-Americans in Austin is ... the result of state action, the acts of the school authorities in taking official action,
including assigning students . . . and drawing zone lines, on the basis of these segregated
housing patterns were violative of the fourteenth amendment.
112. Goodman, supra note 68, at 320.
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quence of racially discriminatory practices in the housing market. Where race
directly determines place-of-residence, grouping students in school by placeof-residence becomes, in effect, racial classification once-removed. It amplifies
the consequences of private discrimination; it lengthens the discriminator's
arm, giving him a veto over admission to the neighborhood public school.
It has also been suggested that in such a case the Court could look to actions
of other governmental agencies which may have contributed to the pattern of
residential segregation in order to find that the pattern of segregated schooling
constitutes de jure segregation. The question of the effect of such actions was
expressly reserved for future decision in Swann;' 3 likewise, in the Denver case
the opinion was confined to actions by the school board alone. t t 4 If the actions
of other government officials are alleged to have caused the patterns of resit 5
dential segregation, should they be parties to the school desegregation suit?
If not, must the school board bear the burden of proving that there was no
segregative intent on the part of these other governmental agencies or that past
segregative acts by these other agencies did not contribute to the present pattern of segregated public schools?
Assuming that plaintiffs could prove that intentional actions by other governmental agencies had caused residential segregation, what then is the duty of
the school board? Could the Court hold the school board responsible for desegregation of the schools because the racial imbalance could have been
reasonably prevented and the board had failed to adopt a "reasonably feasible"
alternative which would have reduced the imbalance? In other words, does the
fourteenth amendment require affirmative action by the school board to prevent or reduce racial imbalance regardless of the cause?
It is unclear whether the Court would find that school authorities had an
affirmative duty to correct de facto racial imbalance in view of the Court's
attempt in the Denver case to articulate the distinction between de jure and de
facto school segregation: "the differentiating factor between dejure segregation
and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or
intent to segregate."' t 6 The necessary implication is that this distinction must be
of constitutional significance.
State courts and lower federal courts have rushed to apply the de facto/de
113.

402 U.S. at 23.

114.

413 U.S. at 191.

115.

In Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), the school board

impleaded city, state, and federal housing and urban development agencies on the theory that they
had fostered residential segregation which resulted in school segregation. But see United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 864 n. 22 (5th Cir. 1972) to the effect that the school authorities might still be liable for the segregated schools: "When the segregated housing patterns are
the result of 'state action' [and the school board uses a neighborhood schools policy of student
assignment], we are faced with double discrimination."
The court in Hart required the other non-school agencies to participate in the relief; however, the claims of the school board against these other governmental agencies were later recommended dismissed. 512 F.2d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1975).
116. 413 U.S. at 208.
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jure distinction articulated in Keyes. In Los Angeles, a trial court ruling in favor
of plaintiffs in a school desegregation case which has been in the courts for
twelve years was reversed by a California court of appeals." 7 Five years earlier
in that case, the trial judge, after a nine month trial, found that the school
district, in selecting school sites and in using neighborhood school assignments

coupled with restrictive transfer policies, had promoted segregated schooling.
The appellate court, however, was unable to find anything in the school
district's acts or omissions which demonstrated "purpose or intent" to segregate. The most that the record of the trial proceedings would establish, the
appellate court maintained, was inaction rather than actions which were inten8
tionally segregative. "
If a case involving a purely de facto segregated school system came before
the Supreme Court, would it be found constitutional per se or can there ever

be an affirmative constitutional duty upon the school board to lessen racial
imbalance? Obviously, for an affirmative duty to arise, it would have to be
shown that de facto segregation is a violation of the equal protection clause.
Conceivably, to find that the constitutional rights of black students are being
impinged, the de facto racial imbalance would have to be shown to be educationally or psychologically harmful. Thus while proof of harm is not relevant in
a de jure situation-unless Brown is to be relitigated, t " the Supreme Court's
articulation of the dichotomy between de jure and de facto segregation suggests that an affirmative duty to overcome pure de facto segregation' 2 ° might

have to be based on a showing that de facto segregation inflicted the same
educational harm as the statutorily-imposed segregation outlawed in Brown.
A district court in New York recently has come to such a conclusion, relying
on social science data to support its finding of "harm" from non-state-imposed
segregation.' 2 ' Similarly, the district court in the Denver case, although con117.

Crawford v. Board of Educ., __

Cal. App. 3d

-,

120 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1975).

118. Id. at 338.
119. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 933 (1964).
120. If pure de facto segregation is defined as that arising solely from residential segregation
that is attributable neither to policies of school authorities nor of other governmental agencies, the
number of city school districts found to be de facto segregated should be very few-if indeed one
exists at all.
121. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 728-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Among the
studies cited were the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's Report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, the
National Advisory Commission's Report on Civil Disorders, and the Fleischmann Commission's
Report on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education in New York
State. Id.
It should be noted, however, that the district judge first concluded that racially segregated
schools violate the equal protection clause absent statutory compulsion and even absent a finding of
"unlawful segregative design." 383 F. Supp. at 739. According to Judge Weinstein, that conclusion
is supported by "reason and authority," including Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1964) (where the finding that 100 per cent of the district's black students attended a
disproportionately small school with only one per cent of the district's white students--coupled
with a rigid no-transfer policy--constituted "state-imposed" segregation); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1965); Fiss, The Charlotte-
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cluding that there was no duty to desegregate the core because there was no
finding of district-wide de jure segregation, 2 2 nevertheless found that "an
equal educational opportunity [was] not being provided at the subject segregated schools within the District .... ,,123 The only remedy for that situation was
desegregation of the minority-race schools. 1 24 In arriving at this conclusion, the
court relied on testimony that a racially integrated setting is critically important
to improving the quality of educational opportunity. Among those who testified were James Coleman (author of the Coleman Report), Neil Sullivan (then
Commissioner of the Massachusetts State Board of Education and previously
Superintendent of the Berkeley School District when that system desegreresearch and evaluation
gated), and Robert O'Reilly (then assistant director 1of
25
Education).
of
Department
State
York
for the New
The judiciary-and others'-have not wholly embraced the argument
that, regardless of the method of pupil assignment used, segregation stigmatizes
blacks and deprives them of an educational opportunity equal to that which
could be assured by contact with middle class white students. The courts' reluctance is probably due to the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether a
segregated pattern of schooling itself means inferior education for blacks; this
uncertainty persists not in spite of, but because of, the present state of social
science research. A number of black parents and community groups are also
beginning to question whether continued efforts to desegregate public schools
is the most effective strategy available for improving the quality of education
for their children.

12 7

Mecklenburg Case-Its Significancefor Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697 (1971);

and Goodman, supra note 68. 383 F. Supp. at 728-35.
122. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 73-77 (D. Colo. 1970).
123. 313 F. Supp. at 83.
124. 313 F. Supp. 90, 96. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on this point, noting
that equal educational opportunity constitutionally requires only that the state refrain from intentionally segregating by race. 445 F.2d 990, 1004-06 (10th Cir. 1971).
125. 313 F. Supp. at 94-97. Professor Coleman had testified that a school fails to provide equal
educational opportunity when its student body is drawn largely from lower socioeconomic groups.
See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REv. 411, 442-43 (1973) for an
excellent analysis of this aspect of the Keyes decision. Professor Yudof suggests that the court's
conclusion-based on the lower achievement scores of blacks-that they must be brought into
contact "with classroom associates who can contribute to the learning process," 313 F. Supp. at
96-97, is faulty inasmuch as Professor Coleman speaks to socioeconomic integration and not racial
integration. Professor Y'udof also notes that resting the case for desegregation on improved
achievement scores could serve to undercut reform if at some future date it were shown that
socioeconomic or racial integration failed to raise test scores. Ytudof, supra at 443. Cf. Cahn, supra
note 20.
126. See, e.g., Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 341
(1975).
127. Id.; Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act
and the Berkeley Expeinent, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 858 (1973). See also comments by Rev. Ralph Abernathy and other black community leaders in Cose, Dr. King's Protest Rose from Desegregation Conflict,

The Chapel Hill Newspaper, June 13, 1975, § A, at 6. See Yudof, supra note 125, at 471. But cf.
Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 742.(E.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the court rejected
the argument that self-imposed segregation in public schools was desirable or constitutional. The
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a°
'
If, in the Denver case, David Armor, 12 Barbara Sizemore,"! Roy Innis,1
or Ronald Edmonds13 ' had testified instead of Coleman, l3 2 Sullivan, and
O'Reilly, would (or should) the result have been different? In other words,
does an affirmative duty to correct de facto racial imbalance arise only when
the evidence shows that "equal educational opportunity" can only be guaranteed to minority children by desegregation? The district court in the Detroit
case raised the question whether educational theory and research-"from the
Coleman report to its many reanalyses"-on the effects of desegregation on
pupil achievement versus increased resource inputs, could "form the basis for
requiring judicial intervention and relief in the absence of a finding of de jure
,133 Judge Roth noted, however, that such evidence is totally
"...
segregation .
beside the point when school segregation is caused in substantial part by gov34
ernmental action.1
Several cases where courts have found school segregation to be de facto
rather than de jure suggest that, under certain circumstances, a school district
is nonetheless legally obligated to correct racial imbalance. In People v. San
l3 5
Diego Unified School District, the principle was stated as follows: 136

[S]chool authorities in California have a constitutional duty to "take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of
its cause" where the imbalance denies the minorilt group equal educational opportunities
The action of school authorities in maintaining de acto racially imbalanced
....
public schools is not a denial of equal protection of the lawv unless the imbalIn each
ance denies the minority group equal educational opportunities ....
case seeking relief from such imbalance the court must determine whether the
imbalance is of such a degree [that] it affects the educational opportunities of
the minority group; wvhether, under the circumstances, the minority group, in
fact, is denied equal educational opportunities; and whether available steps to
alleviate the imbalance are reasonably feasible in light of the degree of the
imbalance and the practical necessities of governmental operation.
judge relied on several articles opposed to self-segregation: Allen, The Politics of Urban Education, in
BLACK MANIFESTO FOR EDUCATION 47 (J. Haskins ed. 1973); Clark, Issues in Urban Education, in
BLACK MANIFESTO FOR EDUCATION 74 (J. Haskins ed. 1973); W.E.B. DuBois, THE CRISIS WRITINGS
(1972). See also studies cited by the district judge on the harmful effects of segregation, supra note
121.
128. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PuB. INTEREST 90 (Summer 1972).
129. Sizemore, Is There a Case for Separate Schools?, 53 PHI DELIA KAPPAN 281 (1972); Sizemore,
Education fo Liberation, 81 SCHOOL REV. 389 (1973).
130. Rising Black Clamor for Black Separatism, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 21, 1970, at
82.
131. Edmonds, Judicial Assumptions on the Value of Integrated Education Jor Blacks, in D. BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 592 (1973).
132. While Dr. James S. Coleman has testified in numerous school desegregation suits as to the
beneficial effects of racial, and particularly, class integration, and the Coleman Report has been cited
in countless more cases in support of desegregation, he has recently cast doubt on the merits of
court-ordered desegregation. J. Coleman, Recent Trends in School Integration, Apr. 2, 1975
(paper presented at American Educational Research Association).
133. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 921-22 n. I (E.D. Mich. 1972).
134. Id.
135. 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
136. Id. at 265-66, 96 Cal Rptr. at 666.
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Language Exclusion: A Constitutional Violation?

A somewhat different problem to be considered with those cases concerning
constitutional violations rather than remedies is the "functional exclusion"
from education of ethnic minorities whose native language is not English.
There are several million such school-age children. Of these, at least three
million have so little proficiency in English that they cannot benefit from regular classes.' 3 7 The failure of the San Francisco school system to overcome the
language deficiencies of some of its students was challenged in a recent law
suit. That case involved 2,856 Chinese-American students who were compelled
to attend schools where subjects were taught only in English-a language they
could not understand. The plaintiffs claimed that the school authorities had
denied those students an equal educational opportunity in contravention to the
equal protection clause. The Ninth Circuit held that in the absence of a finding
of past or present de jure segregation or of other state actions contributing to
the English language deficiencies suffered by the Chinese-American students,
39
these claims could not be upheld. 3 8 The court found that1
[e]very student brings to the starting line of his educational career different
advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic and cultural

backgrounid created and continued completeil apart from any contribution i by
the school system. 1hat some of these may be impediments %hich can be
overcome [by compensator eduLcation] does not amount to a 'denial'... of
educational oppoirtutnity within the meaning of the Fourteeth Amendment
should the [school authorities] fail to give them special attention, this even
though they are characteristic of a particular ethnic grotip.
The court also expressed the view that even if a violation of the fourteenth
amendment were found, the judiciary should play only a very limited role in
4
shaping the ultimate educational remedy.1 0
[T]he determination of' what special eduLcational difficulties faced bV somrne students . . . will be afforded extraordinary cuirative action, and the intensitv of
the measures to be taken, is a complex decision, calling tr sign ificant anmotunts
of executive and legislat ire expertise and non-judicial value judgments .... I-he
courits should not be called upon to make pedagogic judgments.

The Supreme Court reversed, but onlx on the ground that school officials
had violated § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'1' which forbids the denial
to any person, on the basis of race, color or national origin, of the benefits of
any program receiving federal financial assistance. 4 2 The Court also cited
137. Hearigs on H.R. 9840 awd H.R. 10224 BeJire the General Subomm. on Education (?/ the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., I st Sess. 7 (1967).
138. Lan v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th (ii.
1973), iev'd on other grounds. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

139.

Id. at 797.

140.

483 F.2d at 799 & n. 17.

141.
142.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
414 U.S. at 566-69.
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HEW guidelines promulgated tinder the Civil Rights Act
1 44
specifically that

143

which provide

[w]here inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority children front effective participation in the educational
program offered by a school district the district must take affirmative steps to
rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to
these students.
The Court reserved judgment on the equal protection argument,' 45 however, apparently leaving intact the legal conclusion of the court of appeals that
there was no constitutional right to bilingual education. Also, since the Supreme
Court ordered nothing more specific than "appropriate relief,"'146 presumably
the Ninth Circuit will adhere to its original policy and accordingly limit its role
in fashioning a remedy.
In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,'4 7 the district court. held that the
school authorities' failure to establish a meaningful bilingual educational program in itse/f constituted a denial of equal education to Chicano students, and a
violation of the eqtual protection clause.' 4 The finding of inequality was based
on the results of IQ and language expression tests administered to first and
fifth grade students and the testimony of an educational psychologist that
language difficulties accounted for 80 per cent of the achievement difference
49
between Anglo and Chicano children.4'
In arriving at its legal conclusion that the school authorities had a duty to
administer bilingual education, the district court rejected the defendants' argunient that the language deficiencies were not the result of any state action.'15
The Tenth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the holding of the district court,'' but
sidestepped the equal protection issue by holding that the Supreme Court's
decision in Lau v. Nichols 1 2 controlled and that the Portales school system was
in violation of § 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. '5
Of little legal consequence, but of tremendous practical import is the recent
consent decree in Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education,'5 4 in which the
defendants acknowledged the rights of the plaintiff children under the 1964
Civil Rights Act, citing Lau v. Nichols, and agreed to implement a bilingual143.

414 U.S. at 567.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
414 U.S. at 566.
414 U.S. at 569.
351 F.Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). aj/'dwi diJirent g-rounds, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
351 F. Suipp. at1282.

149.

351 F.Supp. at 1281-82.

150.

351 F. Stipp. at 1282-83. Note the contrast with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Lau v.

Nichols, supia note 138 and accompanying iext.
151. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Ci-. 1974).

152.

414 U.S. 563 (1974).

153.
154.

See statuie and regulation at notes 141 & 144 and accompanying text supra.
Consent Deciee (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
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bicultural program of education for "all New York City public school children
whose English language deficiency prevents them from effectively participating
55
in the learning process and who can more effectively participate in Spanish."'
If the Aspira consent decree is any indication of the future, it may well be that
the Lau decision will become the rock upon which bilingual public education is
founded even though the constitutional issue was never decided.
These three cases-Lau v. Nichols, Serna and Aspira-indicate that courts
may be abandoning the xenophobic "melting pot" view of America, in which
ethnic minorities must become assimilated to white Anglo-Saxon values, language and culture. The thrust of these cases is away from the idea many school
administrators have had that the language barrier was a problem which the
student had to overcome, and toward the idea that the schools must adapt to
meet the differing needs of their pupils.
F.

The Segregation of Hispano-Americans:
Proving the Violation

Most of the case law of school desegregation was spawned by the unconstitutional discrimination against blacks in the deep South or the southern
border states. Understandably, therefore, most of the cases referred to in this
article measure the treatment and experience of blacks in public education
vis- -vis whites. It must be understood, however, that the benefits of the equal
protection clause are guaranteed to all identifiable racial or ethnic minorities.
The largest identifiable minority, other than blacks, who have asserted their
rights under the fourteenth amendment are Hispano-Americans. 156 The segregation of Hispano-Americans by school district and by schools within districts
has been well documented.1 57 Nevertheless, only a small percentage of desegregation cases have involved such students, and most of these are in the Southwest. Many of the problems confronting Hispano-Americans in their attempts
to litigate equal educational opportunity are quite similar to those raised in the
context of segregated schooling for blacks, but there are also certain very
important differences both as to determining the constitutional violation and as
158
to special remedies.
155.

Id. at 4.

156.
Hispano-Americans are the second largest minority group in the public schools, constituting about 5 per cent of the total population in the nation. U.S. COIMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY, REPORT I: ETHNIC ISOLATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS IN

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE SOUTHWSEST (1971). The term Hispano-American is used to cover
both Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans. Cubans and other Latin Americans are also included in the term Hispano-American but most of the litigation covers the first two groups. Sevent
per cent of the Hispano-Americans, almost all of whom are Mexican-American, attend school in
five southwestern states. Id. at 59. Another minority currently seeking equal educational opportunity is the Native American, but since Indian education litigation presents some unique factors, discrimination against Native American students will not be dealt with in this article.
157. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 156.
158. The remedies sought by Hispano-Americans are discussed in the text at pp. 114-20 itjia.
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Are Hispano-Americans an Especially Protected Minority?

The first question, in determining whether the isolation of HispanoAmericans is a violation of the equal protection clause, is whether they are a
minority which should be legally treated in the same manner as blacks. The
first case to hold that Brown applies to Hispano-Americans as well as blacks was
159
Cisneros found that the
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District.
160
and that
Mexican-American students in Corpus Christi were segregated
"placing Negroes and Mexican-Americans in the same school does not achieve
16
a unitary system as contemplated by law." '
In the Denver case the district court also found that Hispano-Americans
constituted an identifiable ethnic minority entitled to the benefits of the equal
protection clause but, because of their different ethnic origins, would not
"lump [Negroes and Hispanos] into a single minority category" in order to
62
determine the segregated character of a school.1 The Tenth Circuit approved
3
this classification.16
The Supreme Court held, however, that "the District Court erred in
separating Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defining a segregated
65
'
64
The Keyes majority noted that
school."'
though of different origins, Negroes and Hispanos in Denver suffer identical
discrimination in treatment when compared wvith the treatment afforded Anglo
students. In that circumstance wve think [plaintiffs] are entitled to have schools
with a combined predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the
category of "segregated" schools.
In support for its holding, the Court cited a report published by the United
States Commission on Civil Rights which found that in certain areas of the
166
Southwest, Hispanos suffer from the same educational inequities as blacks.
The cases following Keyes have treated Hispano discrimination in the same
manner as discrimination against blacks and, in tri-ethnic areas as in the
Denver case, the degree of segregation in any given school will depend in a
great many cases on the ratio of whites to the combined number of identifiable
minorify in that school.
159. 324 F. Supp. 599, 604-06 (1970). See Note, Project Report: DeJure Segregation of Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 HARv. Civ. RiGH-Is-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 307, 349 (1972).
160.
161.

324 F. Supp. at 608.
324 F. Supp. at 616.

162.

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D. Colo. 1970).

163. 445 F.2d 990, 1006 (10th Cir. 1971).
164. 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973).
165. 413 U.S. at 198.
166. 413 U.S. at 197 n. 8. To support its finding that "Hispanos constitute an identifiable class
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court cited Hernandez v.Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954), a case which dealt with the exclusion of Hispano-Americans from jury service in Texas in
which the Court required that the plaintiff factually establish that the racial group existed within
the community in order to qualify for special fourteenth amendment protection. 347 U.S. at 478.
Once that fact was established, the group was given the same protection afforded to Negroes in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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Proof of Violation

In Swann, the Court indicated that a prima facie case of unlawful segregation is established if it can be shown that there is segregation in fact and that
the formerly dual school system has not yet been disestablished, the pattern of
segregated schooling being presumed to be a "vestige" of the previously unlawful, state-imposed segregation. The burden is then shifted to the state to show
that the system is now completely unitary and that the segregation that exists is
not a "vestige" of the unlawful dual system, but arose fortuitously (through
shifting residential patterns) after the system had become unitary.
However, in cases involving Hispanos, the lower federal courts seem to be
applying the standard enunciated in the Denver case which places a heavier
burden upon the plaintiff attempting to make a prima facie case of unlawful
segregation. In Keyes, a finding of unlawful segregation was based upon proof
of the school board's intentional segregative acts in a substantial ("meaningful")
portion of the school district. The Hispanic plaintiff, then, in order to make a
prima facie case of unlawful segregation, must show that segregated schools
exist in fact and that their existence is attributable to some intentional action on
the part of school authorities or other state officials. The use of the Keyes
standard where there was no history of statutorily-imposed segregation is due
to the fact that many of the states which required the segregation of blacks and
whites-either by statutory or constitutional provisions or both-did not have a
similar statutory history toward Hispanos.16 7 Nevertheless, courts have found a
167. For example, TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 7 (1876) required that "[s]eparate schools shall be
provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both."
Similarly, in 1905-as part of a bill aimed at improving the public school system-the legislature
provided that "[w]hite and colored children shall not be taught in the same schools .... The terms
'colored race' and 'colored children' as used in the preceding articles, and elsewhere in this title,
include all persons of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry." Ch, 124, §§ 93 & 96, [1905]
Gen. Laws of Texas 263. Both this proviso and art. 7, § 7 of the Constitution were repealed at the
1969 legislative session.
In 1930 when Mexican-Americans first challenged separate schools in Texas, the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals mentioned cursorily that the Mexican race was one of the several white races and
ruled that they could not be segregated solely because they were Mexicans. It was not discriminatory, however, to assign all first through third grade Mexican children to separate schools if, in the
opinion of local school authorities, it was in their best interests in order to remedy their language
difficulties. Independent School Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W. 2d 790, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930),
appealed dismissed and cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580 (1931). It is interesting to note that while the Salvatierra court permitted separate Mexican schools in order to remedy language handicaps, Texas statutes proscribed the remedial use of Spanish by teachers. Indeed, until quite recently, a teacher
who used Spanish to teach Mexican-American children-except in an approved language curriculum-risked criminal conviction:
[E]very teacher . . . employed in the public free schools of this state shall use the English
language exclusively in the conduct of the work of the schools, and all recitations and
exercises of the school shall be conducted in the English language, and the trustees shall
not prescribe any texts fur elementary grades not printed in the English language . ...
Any teacher ... failing to comply with this provision of the law shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof in proper court shall be subject to fine of not
less than Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) and not more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00),
cancellation of certificate, . . . or both fine and cancellation of certificate ....

Ch. 80, §§ 1-2, [1918] Gen. Laws of Texas 170.
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history of dejure segregation toward Hispano-Americans based on the acts and
policies of school officials.
In United States v. Texas Education Agency,

68

a case arising in Austin, the

Fifth Circuit found intentional segregative action on the part of the school
district-particularly in the choice of school site locations, construction of
schools, drawing of attendance zones, student assignment and transfer policies,
and faculty and staff assignments.' 6 9 Thus de jure segregation against Hispanos was found despite the absence of a previous statutory requirement. The
court stated that discrimination in this case was "no different from any other
school desegregation case."170 Similarly, in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
17
School District,'1 7 the court found de jure segregation, noting that the

dejure nature of the existing pattern of segregation within the Corpus Christi
Independent School District has as its basis state action of a non-statutory
variety-that is, the school board's active pursuit of policies that not only do
nothing to counteract the effect of existing patterns of residential segregation
in view of viable alternatives of significant integrative value, but, in fact, increase and exacerbate the district's racial and ethnic imbalance. There has been
a history of official school board acts which have had such a segregative effect.
Thus, once the necessary intentional segregative actions are foundcoupled with the high concentration of Hispanos in certain schools and the low
percentage of Hispano teachers in relation to the Hispano percentage of the

total student population-a prima facie case of unlawful segregation is established. There are cases, however, in which the Denver case principles are applied to reach a finding of no de jure segregation. In Zamora v. New Braunfels
Independent School District,1 73 plaintiffs failed to establish that the actions of
school authorities were taken with segregative intent. The court held that the
existing segregation was "de facto and strictly the result of shifting residential
patterns within the community."' 7 4 Since there was no constitutional violation,
there could be no relief.
In a school desegregation case in California, the district court initially
treated the case as one of de facto segregation but held that the mere existence
of the segregated elementary schools was a denial of equal protection of the
laws and that the school board had an affirmative duty to eliminate the racial
imbalance.' 7 5 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a finding of whether or
not the school board had intentionally pursued a policy of racial segregation. 176
The circuit court stated that it is not until a finding of intentional segregation
168.

467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).

169. Id. at 864-66.
170. 467 F.2d at 873.
171.

324 F. Supp, 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970).

172.
173.

Id. at 620 n. 58.
362 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Tex. 1973).

174.

Id. at 559.

175. Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 328 F. Supp. 155, 159 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
176. 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973). On remand the district court did find intentional segregative
actions on the part of the board, 386 F. Supp, 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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has been made that the affirmative duty of the school board to convert the
system to a "unitary" one attaches.1 7
There are cases, however, which seem to have adopted a more lenient
standard for establishing a prima facie case than that set forth in the Denver
case. In Serna v. PortalesMunicipal Schools 178 the district court did not require a
showing of past, intentional segregative acts. Reliance instead was placed on the
long-standing educational policy of the school district which failed to take into
consideration the specific needs of Spanish-speaking students. The only proof
required was the establishment of the existence of a substantial number of
Hispano children and the nonexistence of a special curriculum tailored to their
needs. The court focused in particular on the district's failure to provide a
bilingual educational program. The Tenth Circuit affirmed but on statutory
17
rather than on constitutional grounds. 9
To sum up, the few cases dealing with the isolation of Hispano-Americans
indicate that proof of a violation of the equal protection clause based on the
existence of predominantly minority schools requires a showing of de jure
segregation attributable to the action of school officials. The same analysis is
used for cases of Hispano segregation as is used in cases involving discrimination against blacks except that, since Hispanos do not always have the "benefit"
of a previous state statute requiring segregation, intent or purpose to segregate
must be read into those actions of school authorities which result in segregated
schools. However, the Serna case may represent a new approach under which
Hispanos will be exempted from having to show past and present intentional
segregative actions.
III
REMEDIAL LIMITS

Except in the case of "pure" de facto segregation, the rules for establishing
a constitutional violation are relatively clear and non-controversial. The real
concern today is not whether, in a de jure segregated school district, the constitutional rights of black children are being violated. Rather, the primary
controversy-once the constitutional violation has been found-is over remedies, i.e., to what extent desegregation will be required, and by which means
such desegregation is to be achieved.
A.

Background

Local school authorities have the primary responsibility for insuring desegregation. In judging whether local authorities have met that responsibility, and
in fashioning remedial decrees where they have not, the federal courts are to
177.

488 F.2d at 585.

178.

351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M.

1972), aff'd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).

179. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
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be guided by traditional principles of equity.'8 0 The objective to be achieved is
"the elimination of... deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain
schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils."''
The local school
authorities and the courts must strive to "eliminate . . . all vestiges of state'
imposed segregation,""82
and "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
8 3
desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.'
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs
is broad, for breadth and flexibility
84
are inherent in equitable remedies.
And finally, "[t]he remedy ... may be administratively awkward, inconvenient,
and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some .... ,,5
B.

Intra-District Remedies

The most detailed discussion of the various equitable remedies available to a
federal district court is found in Swann. There the Court endorsed a range of
possible steps that a lower court could require a school district to take once an
equal protection violation had been established; the Court also clearly indicated
that the use of these remedial steps is limited, depending upon the circumstances.
The major permissible remedies discussed in Swann can be clustered
around four somewhat overlapping subject areas: (1) racial balance;1 86 (2)
one-race schools;' 87 (3) altering of attendance zones and pairing, clustering, or
grouping of schools;' 88 and (4) transportation of students from one part of the
district to schools in another part-i.e., busing.' 89 Minority to majority transfer
plans may also be used if they are effective in achieving a non-racial, unitary
school system. 190
180. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). "Traditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies [footnote omitted] and by a
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974), holding in effect that a federal court's remedial powers stop at the school district
line or "[T]he scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and the extent of the constitutional
violation." Id. at 744.
181. Id. at 737.
182. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 15.
183. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). Desegregation must extend not
only to student assignment policies, but also to the hiring, firing, and treatment of faculty and staff;
the quality of the physical plant; the use of transportation to and from school; and the organization
of extra-curricular activities. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 18-19.
184. 402 U.S. at 15.
185. 402 U.S. at 28.
186. 402 U.S. at 22-25.
187. 402 U.S. at 25-27.
188. 402 U.S. at 27-29.
189. 402 U.S. at 29-30.
190. 402 U.S. at 26-27.
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1.

Racial Balance
Swann raised the question of the degree to which racial balance can be
required in formulating a remedy; that is, to what extent must the proportions
of each race in a school correspond to the proportions of each race in the
system as a whole? The Court held that the use of mathematical ratios as part
of a plan to facilitate the disestablishment of a dual school system is permissible,
but in and of itself, racial balance is not required by the Constitution: 91
The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every
school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the
school system as a whole . .. [although] the use ... of mathematical ratios [and]
...[a]wareness of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to
be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy ....
2.

One-race Schools
In placing limitations on the use of ratios to achieve racial balance, the
Court also indicated that the existence of one-race schools is not constitutionally invalid per se. However, the burden in a previously de jure segregated
school system is on the school officials to justify that assignments to these
9 2
schools are non-discriminatory. 1
[I]t should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or
virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a
system that still practices segregation by law.... Where the school authority's
proposed plan . . . contemplates the continued existence of some schools that
are all or predominantly of one race, they have the burden of showing that
such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory.
If the one-race school is a relict of a previous policy of racial assignment and
the school board has subsequently adopted a neighborhood-schools policy,
presumably-according to language in Swann regarding the elimination of all
"vestiges of state-imposed segregation"-the Court would find assignment
to
that school discriminatory.
3.

Altering Attendance Zones
With regard to the pairing of schools and altering of attendance zones,
Swann indicated that a racially-neutral student assignment plan-such as a
neighborhood school plan or a freedom-of-choice plan-is not acceptable if it is
ineffective in reducing racial imbalance in a previously de jure segregated
school system. 19 3 When would a neighborhood school assignment policy be
191.
402 U.S. at 24, 25; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 740-41 & n. 19. The Court said in
Swann:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substantive
constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach
would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse.
402 U.S. at 24.
192. 402 U.S. at 26.
193. 402 U.S. at 28. Accord, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968).
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permissible? Some members of the Supreme Court seem to place a high priority on neighborhood schools. Chief Justice Burger indicated in Swann that such
a policy might be preferable, under certain circumstances, to any other policy
94
of assignment:1
All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be
desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not
equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to
enforce racial segregation.
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Keyes, strongly
advocated neighborhood schools and sought to curb the use of busing solely
for purposes of maximizing racial balance if it would impact too heavily on
19 5
neighborhood schooling.
In Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction,'9 6 the Fifth Circuit delineated the
elements of a legal neighborhood school plan: each student must be assigned to
attend the school nearest his or her home, limited only by the capacity of the
school, and then to the next nearest school, without variance or exception and
without regard to whether the school was formerly black or white.' 9 7 The plan,
however, must result in desegregation as measured by the six indicia first
outlined in Green: desegregation of student bodies, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 198 On the basis of this holding,
Chief District Judge Frank Johnson later approved the Montgomery school
board's proposal for a neighborhood elementary school plan which left onethird of the thirty-three elementary schools with over 80 per cent black
enrollment' 99-meaning that 55 per cent of black elementary school students
were still enrolled in predominantly black schools. Judge Johnson based his
decision on three grounds: (1) "every black student at some point in his school
career will be exposed to complete desegregation ' 20 0 since in grades 7-12 the
system would be completely desegregated; (2) "the system as a whole will be
desegregated"; 2 ' and (3) there is educational "value in having elementary children attend schools near their homes, ' 20 2 although he cited no empirical or
other evidence to support this statement. He concluded that "[i]f a neighborhood elementary school system can be effected without a sacrifice of constitu20 3
tional standards, then such a plan should be adopted.1
194. 402 U.S. at 28.
195. 413 U.S. at 246-52. Also see discussion at note 204 infra.
196. 423 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
197. 423 F.2d at 207-08.
198. 423 F.2d at 208.
199. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123, 1135-38, 1144 (M.D. Ala.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975).
200. Quoting Judge Wisdom in Hightower v. West, 430 F.2d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
201. 377 F. Supp. at 1138.
202. Id.
203.

Id.
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Busing

The most controversial aspect of school desegregation is busing-the transportation of students from one part of the district to a school in another part of
the district to achieve desegregation. The Supreme Court in Swann approved
busing as a tool to be used in disestablishing a dual school system, although it
indicated that there are limits to the use of the remedy. While suggesting such
limits, however, the Court declined to provide any specific guidelines for
future cases, saying only that busing could be used where "feasible," but its
use was to be limited by considerations of times and distances which would
"either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educa2 0 4°
tional process.
Without explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts in the
post-Swann period have taken different approaches with regard to the extent
of busing that will be permitted. A federal district court in Memphis-where
total desegregation could have been accomplished by a plan involving bus rides
of up to 60 minutes-accepted a plan which left some 25,000 black students in
25 all-black schools, but which reduced the average bus ride to 38 minutes with
no ride more than 45 minutes. 20 5 All of this was done without much apparent
help from the social or medical sciences in determining whether 60 minutes
risks children's health or "significantly impinge[s] on the educational
206
process.
204. 402 U.S. at 29-31. In the Denver case Justice Powell took a strong position against the use
of large-scale busing as a constitutional remedy, particularly with regard to elementary school
children:
[T]he legitimate community interests in neighborhood school systems [should] be accorded far greater respect. In the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just
equitable decree, transportation orders should be applied with special caution to any
proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-and ultimately of education itself-as
extensive transportation of elementary-age children solely for desegregation purposes. As
a minimum, this Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary
transportation away from their neighborhoods of elementary-age children. [Footnote
omitted.] It is at this age level that neighborhood education performs its most vital role. It
is with respect to children of tender years that the greatest concern exists for their physical
and psychological health. It is also here, at the elementary school, that the rights of
parents and children are most sharply implicated.
205. Plans I and II1, as presented to the district court, would have placed 97 per cent of all
students in desegregated units, 48,000 children would have been bused, and a majority of those (75
per cent oi 80 per cent) would have a bus ride of 31 to 45 minutes each way. Of those bused, 9,700
students would have a 46 to 60 minute ride each way, and most of these would be elementary
school students. Plan I1, which the court adopted, leaves 25 all-black or predominantly black units
(19 elementary schools, 4 junior high schools, and 2 high schools), 83 per cent of the students will
attend school in desegregated units, 38,000 children will be bused, and 44 per cent of these will
have a 31 to 45 minutes bus ride each way, with no ride being over 45 minutes. Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1973).
206. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 15
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1973). On first appeal, the circuit court upheld the district
court's finding that more busing was impractical during that school year, 466 F.2d 890, 895 (6th
Cir. 1972). However, the court recognized that further desegregation was necessary and directed
the district court to prepare a timetable for the system's future desegregation. Id. In rejecting the
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In Thompson v. School Board,2 1 7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
an order by the district court that a desegregation plan which would have
involved bus rides of up to two and one-half hours of travel time a day for first
and second graders was not "feasible. ' 20 8 The defense introduced the expert
testimony of a pediatrician concerning the possible harmful effects of busing
20
on young children which the plaintiffs left uncontroverted.
The use of intradistrict busing has also been limited by Congress under the
1974 Education Amendments. 21 0 This education package prohibits a federal
court from ordering busing to remedy dejure segregation unless the court first
makes a finding that all alternative remedies are inadequate. 2t ' And when
defendant's social science evidence as to the ill effects of busing, the circuit court expressly questioned the applicability of the Armor busing study to that case, finding its conclusions to be "inapplicable to the Southern school pattern." 466 F.2d at 894 & n. 4
On remand, the district court, in an unpublished memorandum, approved a final desegregation
plan involving the busing of 38,000 pupils, with no rides over 45 minutes long, even though this
plan left untouched by the order two all-black high schools, four all-black junior high schools and
19 all or predominantly black elementary schools. 489 F.2d at 16-17. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's consideration of the "practicalities" involved in busing, and quoted with approval
from the memorandum decision:
The lesser degree of desegregation in [the plan adopted] is based primarily upon four
factors pertaining to effectiveness, feasibility and pedagogical soundness. Those factors
are time and distance traveled on buses, cost of transportation, preservation of desegregation alteady accomplished, and adaptability.
489 F.2d at 17. Although it had previously rejected the defendant's social science evidence that
busing itself was undesirable, the Sixth Circuit apparently approved of the use of such evidence in
determining how much busing to use, noting that "[t]he one psychological expert was of the
opinion that a shortening of the times and distances of transportation would inure to the benefit of
many school children, especially the younger ones." Id.
207. 498 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1974).
208. Id. at 196-97. The district court's finding does not seem unreasonable and the ruling may
have been prompted by tactical errors on the plaintiffs' part. Their expert witness was unfamiliar
with the local situation in Newport News, and testified that the time and distance to be traveled had
not entered into his considerations w!hen preparing the plaintiff's desegregation plan. 363 F. Supp.
458, 461-62 (E.D. Va. 1973).
209. The pediatrician had testified that young children would be "physically and psychologically affected by compulsory bus transportation for long periods of time ... .- 363 F. Supp. at 460.
This decision was upheld on appeal, 498 F.2d at 197. Judge Winter, in his dissenting opinion,
found reliance on the pediatrician's testimony inappropriate:
I record my suspicion of the basis on which the district court approved retention of a dual
system for grades I and 2. It relied heavily on the testimony of ... a pediatrician, to the
effect that the health of students in kindergarten and the first and second grades would be
adversely affected if they were not permitted to attend neighborhood schools. But as I
read the testimony . . . it was . . . that the effect of transportation on the physical and
mental health of a child depends upon whether he is transported to a school "of his choice
or his parents' choice." If the child is unhappy, i.e., not transported to a school of his
choice or his parents' choice, "then it follows from there, as the night does the day, that
you're just going to have a poot situation." Acceptance of [the pediatrician's] thesis, it
seems to me, would be to require application of the equal protection clause to depend
upon a plebiscite by parents. ...
498 F.2d at 198-99.
210. Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-58 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
211.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . no court of the United States shall
order the implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure segregation which
involves the transportation of students, unless the court first finds that all alternative
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busing is used, the amendments provide that no student should be bused
beyond the school next closest to his home,2" 2 unless the courts determine that
more extensive busing is necessary to ensure the protection of constitutionally
guaranteed civil rights. 3 This important proviso seems to leave intact the
remedies are inadequate.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1755 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
The alternative remedies, which appear to require their application seriatim, are as follows:
In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of the
equal protection of the laws, which may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of
students, a court, department, or agency of the United Slates shall consider and make
specific findings on the efficacy in correcting such denial of the following remedies and
shall require implementation of thefirst of the remedies set out below, or of the first combination
thereof which would remedy such denial:
(a) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide
the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into
account school capacities and natural physical barriers;
(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide
the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into
account only school capacities;
(c) permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of the students
are of their race, color. or national origin to a school in which a minority of the
students are of their race, color, or national origin;
(d) the creation or revision of attendance zones or grade structures without req u iring
transportation beyond that described in section 1714 of this title;
(e) the construction of new schools or the closing of inferior schools;
(f) the construction or establishment of magnet schools; or
(g) the development and implementation of any other plan which is edLicationally
sound and administratively feasible, subject to the prosisions of section 1714 and 1715
of this title.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1713 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
212. (a) No court, department. or agency of the United States shall, pursuant to section
1713 of this title, order the implementation of a plan that woild require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to his place of
residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such
student.
(b) No court, department or agency of the United States shall require directly or indirectly
the transportation of ans student if such transportation poses a risk to the health of such
student or constitutes a significant impingement on the educational progress with respect
to such student.
(c) When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a school system is desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional requirements, or that it is a unitary system, or
that it has no vestiges of a dtual system, and thereafter residential shifts in population occur
which result in school population changes in any school wNithin such a desegregated school
system, no educational agency because of such shifts shall be required by ans court, department. or agencs of the United States to formulate. or implement an\ newc lesegregation plan. or modif) or implement an modification of the court approved desegregation plan, which would require transportation of students to compensate wholly or in part
for such shifts in school poptilaion so occurring.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
213. Any court order requiring. directly or indirectly, the transportation of students for
the purpose of remedying a denial of the equal protection of the laws may. to the extent
Of such transportation. be terminated if the court finds the defendant educational agency
has satisfied the requirements of the fifth ot fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the requirements
thereof. . . . No additional order requiring such educational agency to transport students
for such purpose shall he entered unless such agency is found rot to have satisfied the
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remedial powers of the federal courts already judicially defined in cases such as
Green and Swann. The law also allows parents and educational agencies to seek
to reopen a busing order but-using language fiom the Swann decision-only
if the time or distance traveled is so great as to endanger the health of the
student or impinge on the educational process. 14
The courts may well take a restrictive view of congressional efforts to impose limits on school desegregation. In Darville v. Dade County School Board,2 1 "
the plaintiffs challenged the authority of the school district to continue to use
pupil assignment and transportation plans "to ensure the continued existence
of the unitary system.12 1

1

Plaintiffs alleged that the following provisions of the

Education Amendments of 1972 were violated by the actions of the school
board: 217
No provision of this Act shall be construed to reqtiire the assignment or transportation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbalance.
No coutt or official of the United States shall be empowered to issue any order
seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students ftrom one school to another or one school district to
another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to ensure compliance xwith constitutional standards shall
apply to all public school pupils and to ev7ery public school system, public school
and public school board

.

.. 21

The court noted that school boards are vested with broad discretion in
pupil assignments and that there is nothing in the above-quoted amendments
which would restrict the actions of public school boards as nothing in either of
the amendments applies to voluntary action by local school boards. Moreover, §
2t
1656 can only be read as applying to federal officials and agencies. .
5.

Summary o Permissible IntradistrictRemedial Tools

To summarize, the constitutional objective of the courts is "to eliminate
from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.

' ' 22

0

To achieve

requirements of the fifth or footrteenth anendments to the Constitution, whichever is

applicable.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1718

(Cume. Supp. 1975).

214. A parent . . .of a (hild . .. transported to a public school in accordance wtth a court
order, or an educational agency subject to a court order or a desegregation plan tinder
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in effect on [the date of the enactment of this
section] and intended to end segregation of students on the basis of race, color, or national
origin, niay seek to reopen or intervene in the further implementation of such court order
• . .if the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk the health of the student or
significantly impinge on his or her educational process.
20 U.S.C. § 1717 (Cume. Supp. 1975).
215. 497 F.2cd 1002 (5th Cir. 1974).
216. 1d. at 1003.
217. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1651-56 (1974).
218. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (1974).
219. 497 F.2d at 1004-05.
220. Swann v.Charotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 15.
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this objective, Swann says that an "[a]wareness of the racial composition of the
whole school system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy
to correct past constitutional violations"; 221 thus, "the very limited use ...of
mathematical ratios [is] within the equitable remedial discretion of the District
Court. ' 222 Nevertheless, "[t]he constitutional command to desegregate schools

does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the
racial composition of the school system as a whole. '223 While there is a presumption against "one-race" schools, it can be overcome if school authorities
can show that the racial composition of "some small number of one-race, or
virtually one-race, schools" is "not the result of present or past discriminatory
action" on the part of school officials. 2 24 The pairing or clustering of schools,
the altering of attendance zones, and majority-minority transfer plans also are
permissible remedial tools to achieve the objective. Busing is a permissible tool
as well, but it is limited by time and distance according to the age of the
students involved.
C.
1.

Black Backlash and White Flight

Black Opposition

There is another important issue in the remedial area: what recourse is
there when a specific remedy disproportionately burdens minorities? This issue
has arisen in two overlapping contexts: where there is "one-way" busing (only
minority students are bused out of their neighborhoods to attend schools in
white neighborhoods) and where a formerly all-black school is closed but white
schools are not. The first issue was raised in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of

Education, which held that one-way busing was within the discretion of the
school board absent a finding of either de jure segregation or a lack of good
2
faith on the part of the board.

5

In some of the more recent decisions, courts have been readier to acknowledge the problem of imposing a disproportionate burden on minorities in any
desegregation plan, but in most of these cases-after the court has made the
token statement that the burdens of desegregation can not be imposed on only
one group--the result is the same. In Hart v. Communitly School Board,226 for
example, the district judge's amended order called for the school'in question to
be turned into a "magnet" school in order to attract more whites. 227 The plaintiffs objected, in part because substantially more minority students (1050) than
221.

Id. at 25.

222.

Id.

223.
224.
225.

402 U.S. at 24.
402 U.S. at 26.
298 F. Supp. 213, 224-26 (D. Conn. 1969), (jf'd, 423 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1970). Auord, Moss

v.Stamford Bd. of Educ., 356 F. Supp. 675 (D. Conn. 1973).
226. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
227.

383 F. Supp. 769. 770-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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white students (650) were to be bused. 228 The Second Circuit held, however,
that

229

the "burden" of busing cast upon minority students is only a "somewhat
heavier burden" ....A "somewhat heavier burden" has to fall somewhere,
either on white or minority students as a class.
In Higgins v. Board of Education,'" the plaintiffs alleged that the Grand
Rapids school board's affirmative desegregation plan was illegal in providing
for "one-way" busing from the central city (where blacks were concentrated) to
the peripheral areas-because the school board thought that any other plan
would result in white flight to the suburbs.22 1 The Sixth Circuit, while recognizing that the "burdens and inconveniences of integration should not be placed
23 2
discriminatorily" stated that

the authority of school officials to formulate plans for achieving an improved
racial balance should not be as restrictive in the case of a school system which
has not been found to have engaged in purposeful segregation as for a system
which has practiced dejure segregation.

With regard to the "white flight" justification of the school board, the circuit
court emphasized that there was a233
valid distinction between using the defense of white flight as a smokescreen to
avoid integration and realistically considering and dealing with the practical
problems involved in making voluntary efforts to achieve integration.
Despite the often expressed concern over busing particularly young children, courts have not seen fit to regard plans which call for busing only black

children in the earliest years as being a disproportionate burden on one race.
In Nashville, the school board devised a plan which called for busing black
students in grades one to four to outlying schools while white students were not
bused unless they were in grades five and six. 2 3

4

The circuit court approved,

stating that "We do not believe ...that we can appropriately hold the District
Judge abused his discretion .. ,,235
3.. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit considered
acceptable a plan whereby black students in grades three through five were
to be bused out of their neighborhoods to attend schools in white neighborhoods, while white students in grades six and seven were bused to formerly
black schools. 2 6 The plaintiffs had argued that "such assignments placed an
7
undue and discriminatory burden on black students" inasmuch as23
228. 512 F.2d at 53.
229. Id.
230. 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
231. Id. at 793.
232. Id.
233. 508 F.2d at 794.
234. Kelley v.Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972).

235.

463 F.2d at 746.

236.

Thompson v.School Bd., 465 F.2d 83, 84 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).

237.

465 F.2d at 84-85.
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the white school child would attend for his first five school years a school
fortmerly identified as a white school and located in a white neighborhood.
whereas the black child would be in a school located in a black neighborhood
only in his first two grades and in his 6th and 7th grades.
The courts have also held that it is permissible to close formerly all-black
schools if the closing is not based on "racial considerations. ' 23 But what set of
facts leads to the conclusion that the closing was due to non-racial reasons? For
example, the closing of five formerly black schools in Jacksonville, Florida, was
approved on these grounds: all were deteriorated; one was surrounded by a
slaughter house, a polluted creek, and a city incinerator; and in three other

schools the "[i]ncidences of vandalism and intrusion [were so frequent and
serious] that teachers and children [were] locked in their rooms for safe ty.'23
It is clear, however, that there is a heavy burden on the school board to
show that the closing of formerly black schools is not for racial reasons. With
regard to the desegregation of Austin schools, the district court ordered two
all-black schools to be closed. The Fifth Circuit found "the closing of two
all-black schools and the transfer of the students from those schools to other
schools in the system . . . unacceptable . . . %%here there was no showing that
these schools were closed for non-racial reasons" and where a similarly situated
white school was not closed. 4 0 The fact that the possibility of white flight "was
the real reason for the closing of the two schools" was not a legitimate
justification.2 4 '
In Arvizu v. Waco Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit went even

further.2

42

The school board had given reasons for the closing of minority

schools-the facilities were outmoded, they operated at under capacity or the
capacity was so limited that the costs of operation were prohibitive, and the
physical plant was too small.2 43 The court held, however, that the board must
do more than give "facially legitimate" justifications. It "must adduce evidence
sufficient to support" the conclusion that "their actions were not in fact motivated by racial reasons" 2 44 sufficient to support the conclusion. The district
court, on remand, was to re-examine the justifications for closing the minority
schools "in light of the characteristics of the schools permitted to remain in
.
operation ... and . . . the timing of the proposed school closings ...
238.

Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction. 465 F.2d 878, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), ceit. denied, 410 U.S.

966 (1973); Lee %. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1971); Minis v.
Duval County School Bd., 447 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1971): Car v. lontgomery County
Bd. of Educ.. 429 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cii. 1970).
239. Minis v. Duval Count School Bd., 447 F.2d at 1332-33. Several of these schools have now
reopened. Letter from Norman Chachkin. Siaff Attorney. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. Inc., to the senior author, November 1974. on file at Law and Coitempairy P r ob l em s office.
240. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1972).
241. 467 F.2d ai 872.
242. 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974).
243. Id. at 505.
244. Id.
245. 495 F.2d at 506.
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Of what relevance is minority opposition-to the extent that it exists-to
desegregation?. 46 There have been only a few cases so far even to acknowledge
the existence of this possibility. In Hart v. Community School Board, the district
court noted that some commentators have "urged that self-imposed segregation in the public schools is desirable and therefore constitutional, ' 2 47 citing,
among others, Mosteller and Moynihan's review and reanalysis of the Coleman
Report findings. 248 Responding to this argument, the District Judge noted
that24
[t]his position would have to be rejected even were there basis in fact for the
proposition that segregated schools improved the education of black
students-a proposition belied by data available to date.
Judge Weick of the Sixth Circuit, dissenting in Mapp v. Board o] Education 250 took a different position. He opposed the court-ordered integration

through busing as resulting "in the violation of the constitutional rights of
innocent black children and white children," 5 1 primarily the right of freedom
of association. In support of this, he stated that "[m]any black people [oppose]
forced bussing of their children," citing statements made at the National Black
Political Convention held in Gary, Indiana in 197225 2 to the effect that mandatory busing is racist and preserves a black minority structure.
As part of its Experimental Schools program, funded by HEW, the Berkeley school system recently experimented with optional schools offering alternative educational environments for black and Chicano students-schools whose
enrollments, although not expressly limited to these minority students, were
racially exclusive by choice. The debate over the constitutionality of such
schools fostering voluntary segregation seems to pit the Brown decision and the
fourteenth amendment against the first amendment's fr-eedom of association.
Is there a point at which Brown's demand for integration becomes satisfied so
that resegregation by choice becomes constitutionally permissible?2 5 3 Inasmuch
246. See, e.g., Bell, supia note 126; Epps, Assimilation, Pluralism, and Separation, in AMERICAN
IN RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY 49 (A. Kopan and H. Walberg eds. 1974);
Sizemore, Is There a CasefJot Separate Schools?, supra note 129.
247. 383 F. Supp. 699, 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
248. ON EQUALIT Y OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORIUNITNV (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
Judge Weinstein also cited Robinson, Preparationfot Life: The Black Classroom. in BLACK MANIFESTrO
FOR EDUCATION 3 (J. Haskins ed. 1973) and R. CRARY & L. PETRONE, FOUNDATION OF MODERN
EDUCATION (197 1).
249. 383 F. Supp. at 742. The court later notes that "the evidence supports neither the argument that desegregated public school education is not helpful to the minorities, not that it adversely affects whites," 383 F. Supp. at 744. further noting, however. that "much of the current
research replies to precise policy based questions with the ambiguity of' a Delphic oracle ....
IId.
250. 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.). cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1022 (1973).
251.
477 F.2d at 856.
252. 477 F.2d at 856 n. 4.
253. See Comment, Alternative Schools for Alinority Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act
and the Berkelev Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 858 (1973). Cf. Comment. Separate Black Facilities on
Campus: A Legal and PracticalEvaluation, 7 CoLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROB. 107 (1971).
It should be noted that Berkeley had become a fully unitary. integrated system and that the two
EDUCATION
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as the Court in Green said that freedom-of-choice plans are not unconstitutional
per se,2 5 4 the Berkeley situation-where the system is unitary and where any
minority student may choose to remain in an integrated school in the
system-may be the appropriate one for a freedom-of-choice pupil assignment
plan.
Somewhat related to these examples is the so-called "Atlanta Compromise."
The Atlanta school system had an enrollment that was 70 per cent white and 30
per cent black at the time the first desegregation suit was filed in 1958.255 By
1973, the enrollment was 79 per cent black and 21 per cent white. 25 6 Some (but
not all) of the plaintiffs who filed the original desegregation suit, seeing that
the school system was rapidly resegregating and believing that further efforts
to integrate the few remaining white students would be futile, opted instead for
an agreement with the school board for the allocation of more administrative
positions to blacks-including a black superintendent. The district court approved the plan in Calhoun v. Cook 25 7 with some modifications, noting that it
satisfied "the overwhelming majority of the plaintiff class" and the plan was
"fair, adequate, and reasonable. '

25

8

The plan left 59,000 black students-about

60 per cent of the school system-in schools 90 per cent black. 2 9 Enough
students were transferred to ensure that there were no schools 90 per cent
white. 260 The Fifth Circuit remanded the cases, however, for further findings,
saying that the adoption of the compromise was improper since the facts as to
26 1
the compromise agreement were in dispute.

In an earlier phase of this case, the district court had noted that in viewx of
demographic patterns within Atlanta, the only device which could effect racial
balance in each school (70 per cent black to 30 per cent white pupil enrollment)
was mass busing. However, the court found that the time and distances involved would make it impractical. The court had considered the possibility of
schools-Black House and Casa de laRaza-served a very small proportion of the total number of
minority students enrolled in the district. Black House served a student body of 75 high school
students, while over 1400 blacks attended integrated high schools in Berkeley. Casa de laRaza
served 125 Chicano students of a total of 427.
Under pressure from HEW, the Berkeley public school system withdrew its support for these
two schools. HEW's Office of Civil Rights eventually accepted a plan whereby students would be
permitted to spend 20 per cent of their school time attending Black House or Casa de laRaza.
Black House, however, closed down and has never been revived. Casa de la Raza did submit a
skeletal plan to the Berkeley school district last fall, but was told there were no more funds from
HEW for the Experimental Schools Program. Communication from David L. Kirp, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy and Lecturer, School of Law, University of California at
Berkeley, and consultant to the Berkeley School System, June 19, 1975.
254. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
255. Calhoun v.Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See also Bell, supa note 126.
256. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
257. 362 F. Supp. at 1249.
258. 362 F. Supp. at 1252.
259. Id.
260. Atlanta Constitution, April 5, 1973, § A, at 1, col. I.
261. 487 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1973). Following remand, the district court issued an unreported opinion which is now on appeal. The case is now in its seventeenth year.
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requiring the transportation of black students from the center of the city to the
white periphery, but noted, without further explanation, that such a move
would be "opposed by a large group of blacks except on a voluntary basis
....
"262 Therefore, the remedy of "mass" busing was rejected.
2.

White Flight

One potential limit to consider in shaping a desegregation remedy is the
phenomenon of "white flight." Should a desegregation plan take into account
the "tipping point" beyond which "white flight" accelerates precipitously? If a
court order seemed likely to induce "white flight" from the community or from
the public school system to such a degree that desegregation would become
impossible, is it constitutionally permissible to substitute a lesser remedy?
The question of the effect of a court order on "white flight," or vice versa,
has arisen several times in the Fourth Circuit. In Beckett v. School Board,"6 3 the
district court approved an interim "desegregation" plan consisting only of a
limited freedom-of-choice option in the elementary schools. The court took the
position that

264

[a]ny attempt to radically desegregate schools of Norfolk lying readily adjacent
to [predominantly white] Virginia Beach will lead to white-flight, a fact that is
certainly not desirable from the stand-point of sound educoionaol principles....
In this respect the court relied on a number of social science research
studies, 2 1 5 quoting at length from that of Professor Pettigrew regarding the
266
advantages of retaining a white majority in schools:
Negroes in predominantly white classrooms score higher on the average, but
those Negroes in classrooms with less than one-half whites do no better than
those in all Negro classrooms.
The Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed the decision without specifically
268
26 7
In Brunson v. Board of Trustees,
addressing itself to the "white flight" issue.
however, the Fourth Circuit did confront the issue directly. In separate opinions by Judges Craven and Sobeloff, the relevance of such testimony as that of
262. 332 F. Supp. at 807-08. The court does not indicate how it obtained the opinion of "a large
group of blacks."
263. 302 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Va. 1969), rev'd sub nora. Brewer v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
264. 302 F. Supp. at 30 (emphasis added).
265. 302 F. Supp. at 29-30 n. 15.
266. 302 F. Supp. at 30. The Norfolk School Board had followed Professor Pettigrew's "principles" and drew its zones so that each integrated school would have a 60 to 70 per cent white majority. To do this, however, the Board had to leave 19 all-black elementary schools untouched. Approximately 76 per cent of the black elementary students would continue to attend these schools.
434 F.2d 408, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1970).
267. 434 F.2d 408 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970). In reversing, the circuit court
indicated that it did not need to discuss the sociological data because where "[w]hite schools remain
predominantly white . . . black schools remain black," there is a violation requiring an appropriate
remedy. The "quota" was "the antithesis of a racially unitary system." Id. at 411.
2A 429 F 2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970.
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Professor Pettigrew was hotly debated. Judge Craven's position was that in view
of the serious threat of white flight-and, indeed, substantial white flight had
already taken place-"some degree of moderation in selecting a remedy" was
needed.2 69 Professor Pettigrew's testimony in Brewer v. Norfolk City School Board
that the optimum ratio was 30 per cent black to 70 per cent white was cited
with favor by Judge Craven.

2 70

269. Id. at 822. Judge Craven noted that in 1969, when there were 2,408 black students and
256 white students enrolled in the schools of Clarendon County, S.C., 110 white students "fled the
public school system in favor of a parochial private school," and 100 more applied for admission
for the following fall. Id. Judge Craven stated that:
judges in fashioning remedies cannot successfully ignore reality. . . . [S]ome degree of
moderation in selecting a remedy is more likely to accomplish the desired result, a unitary,
non-racial public school system, than is unyielding fidelity to the arithmetic of race....
The threat of flight from the public school system ordinarily should not be allowed to
influence the selection of the plan or its judicial approval. It is relevant here only because
the whites constitute such a small minority....
...[A] practical approach to the problem would . . . greatly diminish the temptation to
flee the system....
429 F.2d at 821-22.
Judge Sobeloff, in a separate concurring opinion, responded:
The dissenters agree that the Board's freedom of choice plan is deficient, but they consider the remedy too strong. As they point out, we are threatened in this case with an exodus of white students that tends to convert the court-ordered integration into an exercise
in futility ....
It would . . . astonish the Brown court to learn that 16 years later . . . it was seriously

being contended that desegregation might not be required insofar as it threatened to
impair majority white situations....
White Flight" is one expression of resistance to integration, but the Supreme Court has
held over and over that courts must not permit community hostility to intrude on the
application of constitutional principles .... [D]issidents who threaten to leave the system
may not be enticed to stay by the promise of an unconstitutional though palatable plan.
...[T]he road to integration is served neither by covert capitulation nor by overt compromise . . . . The purported restriction of the thesis to extreme white minority-white flight
situations is really no limitation at all. Rather it offers a premium for community resis-

tance. More to be feared than white flight in Clarendon County would be any judicial
countenancing of the suggestion that abandoning or qualifying a desegregation program
is a legally acceptable way to discourage flight....
429 F.2d at 824, 827. See also Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal
Comment, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 1,at 150, 154-55 (1975).
270. 429 F.2d at 821 n. I.
R. CRAIN & C. ROSSELL, EVALUATING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS STATISTICALLs 18 (1973)
proffer a similar thesis:
(1) That blacks benefit from attending schools which are over 50% white, but there is no
additional benefit as the % white increases beyond 70%.
(2) That whites benefit from interracial contact and a school must be at least 5% black to
provide these benefits.

(3) Social and Political constraints make it inadvisable to bring black students into allwhite schools in excess of 30% of the enrollment .. . [although] no educational research

which demonstrates that a 70% white school is superior to a 50% white school.
A number of districts have developed desegregation plans providing for a 70 to 30 per cent whiteblack mix, leaving behind in all-black schools what Professor Gordon Foster has referred to as

"surplus" blacks. He notes that this has become known as the "warehousing" technique, because
the remaining all-black schools are often warehouse-like structures in the middle of the ghetto.
G. Foster, November 9, 1974 (paper prepared for conference sponsored by United States Com-
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The federal courts, when plunged into sociology and educational theory,
are into something they know very little about. Dr. Thomas F. Pettigrew of
Harvard University, who has a respectable social-psychology pedigree and who
is a recognized expert in school integration, testified at great length about
integration and desegregation in Brewer v. Norfolk City School Board....
Dr. Pettigrew . . . testified that "there does seem to be some optimum level
for the achievement of both white and black children that drops after 35 or 40
[percent black students in the school is surpassed]." Dr. Pettigrew has concluded that little advantage is gained for children of either race, and some
harm may result, from placing children in a school where they are in a distinct
racial minority....
Judge Sobeloff responded by saying that "short shrift" should be given to Dr.
27
Pettigrew's testimony. ,
[The] central proposition [of Pettigrew's thesis] is that the valte of a school
depends on the characteristics of a majority of its students and superiority is
related to whiteness, inferiority to blackness. Although the theory is couched in
terms of -socio-economic class" and the necessity for the creation of a "middleclass milieu," nevertheless, at bottom, it rests on the generalization that, educationally speaking, white pupils are somehow better or more desirable than
black pupils. This premise leads to the next proposition, that association with

white pupils helps the blacks and so long as whites predominate does not harm
the white children. But once the number of whites approaches minority, then
association with the inferior black children hurts the whites and, because there
are not enough of the superior whites to go around, does not appreciably help
the blacks.
The inventors and proponents of this theory grossly misapprehend the
philosophical basis for desegregation. It is not foinded upon the concept that
white children are a precious resource which should be fairly apportioned. It is
not, as Pettigrew suggests, because black children will be improved by association with their betters. . . . [S]chool segregation is forbidden simply because its
perpetuation is a living insult to the black children and immeasurably taints the
education they receive. This is the precise lesson of Brown. Were a court to
adopt the Pettigrew rationale it would do explicitly what compulsory segregation laws did implicitly.

In United States v. Board of School Commissioners, the district court has noted
that in Indianapolis, a city where the majority of the black population was
already confined to the inner city, "white flight" would become accelerated and
irreversible when the percentage of black pupils in a particular school apmission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.). See, e.g., Niorthcross v. Board of Cic.. 489 F.2d 15
(6th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974).
271. 429 F.2d 820, 824, 826 (4th Cir. 1970). Judge Sobeloff suggests that the Pettigrew plan
is just as invidious when considered from the class rather than the racial aspect:
[E]ven apart from its racial aspect, the Pettigrew plan would be constitutionally illegitimate ....
The goal of social class segregation is scarcely more defensible than that of racial
segregation . . . . Viewing the matter on a policy level, a country as sadly riven as ours
stands in no need of additional polarizing projects. From a constitutional standpoint, a
program of apartheid according to social class is as impermissible as avowed racial separation-and as repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. Our constitution does not permit the insulation of whites f-tom blacks, rich from poor, high class from low class.
429 F.2d at 826.
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proached 40 per cent, thus leaving a nearly all-black school system. 2 7 2 The
court-citing the situation in Atlanta as an example-cautioned that a school
board, by implementing a desegregation plan that failed to take this "tipping
factor" into account, could become indirectly responsible for pushing the racial
balance past the "tipping point," resulting in the rapid resegregation of the
schools. 273 However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit responded that "[s]o-called
'white flight' is not an acceptable reason for failing to dismantle a dual school
system.

2 74

In Calhoun v. Cook, the district court noted the precipitous speed of the

"tipping process. ' 2

7.,

The white students remaining are concentrated at the extreme northern
and southern ends of the district, while the vast middle is a broad belt of
industry and high-density solid black housing. The line between these areas is
steadily creeping towards the ends, with increased black housing and diminished white housing. Since 1961, [the school board] has annually achieved
substantial temporary integration by the establishment or construction of "line
schools." However, 34 of those schools have gone from all-white to 90% or
more black during the period. This "tipping process" is so rapid that it sometimes occurs by the time a facility deliberately located to increase integration
can be completed and occupied. Seldom does it last longer than two years....
Thus, according to the court, wholesale busing was "unworkable."

The court observed that "Atlanta now stands on the brink of becoming an
all-black city. A fruit-basket turnover through busing to create a 30%
white-70% black uniformity throughout the system would unquestionably cause
76
such a result in a few months time.
The question of whether and when there is a tipping point has been raised
most often in connection with racial discrimination in housing. Most of the
literature indicates that the tipping point will vary-from as low as 6 per cent to
272. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 676-77 (S.D. Ind. 1971),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). District Court Judge Dillin noted in
his opinion only that evidence in the case as to the existence of a "tipping point" of 40 per cent
black pupils was "undisputed." 332 F. Supp. at 676. Judge Dillin again addressed himself to
"tipping," citing evidence showing that in the Indianapolis schools, white flight had become problematical as the percentage of black pupils reached 25-30 per cent. 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1197-99
(S.D. Ind. 1973). It was partially this concern with the possibility of resegregation that led the
district court to include the Greater Indianapolis area in its remedy. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
reversed that part of the district court's decision relating to a metropolitan remedy beyond the
boundaries of the county in which Indianapolis is located, and vacated and remanded that part of
the remedy that ran to the county boundaries for further findings. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974).
See also the textual discussion at p. 110 infra.
273. 332 F. Supp. at 677.
274. 503 F.2d 68, 80 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968),
involving a "free transfer" option-defended by the school board on the ground that it would
prevent "white flight." The Court found that the plan acted to resegregate the system and, in
striking down the free transfer option plan, responded to the "white flight" argument by quoting
from Brown II:"[l]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles
cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." Id. at 459.
275. 332 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
276. 332 F. Supp. at 808.
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as high as 50 per cent, depending upon many factors, including the "intensity
of prejudicial feeling in the community. '277 The use of the "tipping point" as
the upper limit for a "benign" quota system has been proposed on occasion
-the justification being that minorities would benefit in that their feelings of
rejection, prompted by their living in separation from the rest of the commu2 78

nity, would be eliminated.

The Supreme Court, in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia,27 ' recognized
the phenomenon of "white flight," but not in the context of minimizing the
impact of a desegregation plan by compromising it in an effort to retain whites
who might flee if there were total desegregation. Instead, the Court prohibited a
city from withdrawing from an existing county school district when the combined system was still under a federal court order to desegregate. The dual
school system which had been found to violate the constitution was the single
city-county unit and therefore it was proper to treat it as a single unit for the
purpose of dismantling that system.28 The possibility of "white flight" from
the county system to the proposed city school system was one of the factors the
Court felt "would actually impede the process of dismantling the existing dual
system.

'

281

And in United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, the

Supreme Court reiterated its stand that "while [white flight] may be cause for
deep concern to the [school boards], it cannot . . .be accepted as a reason for

achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school
277. See, e.g., Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public Housing, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 163, 175-78
(1962) (6 to 50 per cent depending upon "the intensity of prejudicial feeling in the community, the
extent of private housing to which white tenants can escape and the racial composition of the
neighborhood"); LeBlanc, Race, Housing, and the Government, 26 VAND. L. REV. 487, 502-04 (1973)
(tipping point 40 per cent); Note, Racial Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 538-39
(1959) (6 to 50 per cent depending upon differing opinions of "guestimators" and the fact that
individual tipping points willvary among housing projects).
As to school desegregation and tipping points, see R. Wegmann, Neighborhoods and Schools in
Racial Transition, April 1, 1975 (paper presented at American Educational Research Association,
Washington, D.C.). Wegmann, a sociologist, states that desegregating any urban school system
where the total black enrollment runs much above 30 per cent will be futile because of
"tipping"-white families move out when blacks in the neighborhood school reach some point
between 30 and 50 per cent of the student population.
See also, J. Coleman, Trends in Racial Segregation in Schools, 1968-73, April 2, 1975 (paper
presented at American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C.). Professor Coleman
argues for more research into white reaction and other indirect effects of desegregation in order to
develop alternative strategies. He notes that in refusing to recognize white flight, the courts in the
long run will be responsible for separating whites and blacks even more than at present. But see
the statement by state Superior Court Judge Max F. Deutz of California that the "tipping" in
Inglewood-a suburb of Los Angeles whose enrollment had gone from 60 per cent European
American to 80 per cent minority-had begun before his integration order, issued five years ago:
"Some people say the plan caused it, and it might have been a factor, but certainly not the
predominant factor." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1975, § 1,at 26, col. 1.
278. Mulvihill, supra note 277, at 177.
279. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). See also United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S.
484 (1972); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
280. 407 U.S. at 459-60.
281. 407 U.S. at 466.
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system.1 28 2 Although this language has been picked up by the circuits as indicating that white flight cannot under any circumstances be a consideration in
formulating a remedy,28 the Supreme Court has not yet addressed itself to this
issue in any broad sense.
D.

Metropolitan Area Remedies

When, if ever, may school district lines be disregarded in devising remedies

to disestablish an unconstitutional dual school system? Metropolitan areas in
which the central city loses total population to the suburban ring while the
minority population within the central city increases, are becoming more and
more the typical situation. The proportion of minority students in the central
city school district is increasing even more rapidly than the total minority population. Thus, the "growing core of Negro schools [is] surrounded by a receding
ring of white schools."28' 4 As the proportion of blacks in the central cities increases, it becomes more and more futile to order a desegregation plan which
is confined to the city limits inasmuch as there is or will be no one left with
whom to integrate.2 8 5 Thus a number of school desegregation suits have sought
a metropolitan area remedy.
There are three types of cross-district or interdistrict organizational arrangements which have come before the courts. One involves the formation of
a single "super district" by consolidating contiguous districts in the metropolitan area-the remedy proposed by the district court in Bradley v. School Board,
the Richmond case. 28 The second involves redistricting the metropolitan area
into new units which facilitate the reduction of racial imbalance-represented
by what the district court and the Sixth Circuit attempted to do in Milliken v.
Bradley, the Detroit case. 28 7 Finally, what may be yet another type is represented by the proposed merger of the city of Louisville and its suburban
countv288
282.

407 U.S. 484. 491 (1972).

283.
284.
285.

United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 80 (7th Cir. 1974).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 799 (1974) (Maishall, J., dissenting).
Judge Deutz of the Los Angeles Superior Court has recently permitted a five-year old

desegregation busing plan for Inglewood to be discarded because "As a practical matter we are
now

busing black children

from predominantly

black schools to other predominantly black

schools." N.Y. Times, May 11. 1975, § 1. at 26, col. 1.
286. 338 F. Supp. 67 E.D. Va.). iev'd. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aJfd b'yan equal divided
Court. 412 U.S. 92 (1973). The remecdy sought here would have joined two counties (Henrico and
Chesterfield) a ith the Ciix of Richmond. Distrit J udge Merhige adopted Richmond's metropolitan
plan, prepared undei the diretion of Dr. Thomas Little, Associate Superintendent of the Richniond Cits Schools, 338 F. Supp. at 186,

w0hich provided for a single school board of no more than

nine members or less than six to preside over the three-countx "super district." Id. at 245. For
administrative purposes, however. the consolidated sstem was to be divided into six sub-units.
Administration and curriculum decisions would be delegated to the subdivision heads. Id. at 191.
287. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afl'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir, 1973), ev'd, 418 U.S. 717
(1974). In this case, 53 school districts or parts of school districts were to be joined with sections of
the De oit school district so as to foi m fifteen ness "usters." 345 F. Supp. at 928-29.
288. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Elud., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973). vacated and
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"Super Districts"

Under what circumstances may one of the above interdistrict arrangements
be ordered? In formulating a desegregation plan for Richmond, the district
court was concerned with maintaining a "viable racial mix" ' 28 9 in the schools,

and therefore desired a plan that would not accelerate white flight from the
largely (over 70 per cent) black Richmond schools to the predominantly (over
90 per cent) white schools in the two neighboring counties. 29 0 The district court
concluded that these circumstances justified the joinder of the two outlying
counties in its desegregation decree, without requiring proof either that the
county boundaries had been drawn with intent to segregate or that the counties
had acted in such a way so as to render them responsible for the city's
segregation.

29t

The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the decision, holding that the district
court could not consolidate school districts without proof that the actions of
authorities in the outlying counties were taken with segregative intent and
effect.2 92 There was no proof that "the [outlying] counties were ...keeping
blacks in Richmond schools while allowing whites to flee .... 29
The Fourth Circuit admitted evidence of housing discrimination as relevant
to the case, but required greater evidence of complicity among the three
units-for the purpose of keeping blacks in Richmond and out of the
suburbs-before it would find such discrimination sufficiently related to
schools as to support a finding of a unified three-county violation of the fourteenth amendment.2 9 '

4

Thus the circuit court appears to accept the finding that

all three units had participated in massive housing segregation, Net each unit
was seen to have segregated independently of the other two for the general
purpose of racial discrimination and not for the specific purpose of discrimination against Richmond blacks to keep them in Richmond schools. The court
went on, however, to say that2 9'5
the root causeS of the concentration of blacks in the inner cities of America are
simply not kno%'n ....
[Any action] the counties may seem to have taken to
keep blacks out is slight indeed compared to the myriad reasons, economic,
political and social, for the concentration of blacks in Richmond and does not
support the conclusion that it has been invidious state action wvhich has resulted
in the racial composition of the three school disticts....

The court, in taking the position that "economic, political and social"
reasons can explain the concentration of blacks in Richmond, was flying in the
remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1974), on rerad,510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 1658
(1975).

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

338
338
338
462
462
462
462

F. Stipp. at 184.
F. Supp. at 184-86.
F. Stpp. at 100.
F.2d 1058. 1069 (4th Ci-. 1972).
F.2d at 1065.
F.2d at 1065-66.
F.2d at 1066.
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face of much of the evidence in the record with regard to the widespread
existence of racial residential discrimination .29z 6 For example, Dr. Karl
Taeuber, professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, testified that his
analysis of the census data led him to conclude that about 85 per cent of the
pervasive segregation extant in metropolitan areas, including Richmond, was
caused by publicly and privately enforced racial discrimination rather than low
income.2'7 Martin Sloane, then acting deputy staff director of the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission, with broad experience in federal housing policies, testified
that much of the urban and, consequently, public school segregation, could be
attributed to federal housing policies, e.g., FHA insurance or racially-restricted
developments. 2 9

I

The testimony of the executive directors of the Richmond

Redevelopment and Housing Authority and of the Richmond Regional Planning District Commission supported Mr. Sloane's testimony. 29 Yet, to the
Fourth Circuit, this type of evidence was deemed insufficient to establish the
requisite intentional segregative actions by other governmental agencies. The
300
circuit court noted that
[w ]hatevci the basic causes [of the concentration of blacks in the inner city] it
has not been school assignments. and school assignments cannot r-everse the
trend. That theie has been housing discrimination in all thiee units is deplorable, but a school case, like a vehicle, can caitrry
only a limited amount of baggage.
And whatever may have been the situation in the past with regard to school
desegregation, the three districts were now seen as operating unitary school
3
systems. 0t
The circuit court further noted that the county boundaries had not

changed significantly for over one hundred years and stated that this history
was not to be ignored. 3 2 Since the majority saw no constitutional violation
(treating each of the three systems separately and finding each unitary), clearly
the district court could not override the "states' near plenary power over its
political subdivisions. ' 3a1 On appeal to the Supreme Court 3 4 Justice Powell
did not participate in the case and the remaining justices divided evenly. This

4-4 stalemate meant that the Fourth Circuit's decision was allowed to stand.
2.

Redistrictingthe Metropolitan Area

The first interdistrict case actually to be decided by the Supreme Court was
Milliken v. Bradley (the Detroit case).3 0 5 This case was the first instance in which
296.

338 F. Supp. at 212-29.

297.
298.
299.
300.

338
338
338
462

301.

462 F.2d at 1065.

302.
303.
304.
305.

462
462
412
418

F. Supp. at 213.
F.Supp. at217-18.
F. Stpp. at 220, 221.
F.2d at 1066.
F.2d
F.2d
U.S.
U.S.

at 1064, 1066.
at 1068.
92 (1973).
717 (1974). Actually. the Supreme Couit had had before it as early as 1972 a
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the Supreme Court reversed a lower court order which, after having found
30 6
unconstitutional segregation, had sought to bring about greater integration.
The Court gave its endorsement to the position taken by the Fourth Circuit in
the Richmond case-that plaintiffs would have to prove, before interdistrict
remedies could be ordered, that actions were taken with deliberate segregative
intent by the outlying, predominantly white districts, and that these actions had
30 7
an effect on the segregation within the city.
a.

The Finding of De Jure Segregation

It should be noted that the situation involved in the Detroit case is somewhat different from that involved in the Richmond case. In the latter case, the
Fourth Circuit found that each of the three school districts involved in the
proposed interdistrict remedy had previously dismantled their former dual
systems and were operating unitary systems.3 0 8 In the Detroit case, the district
court found that the Detroit School District was de jure segregated,3 0 9 and this
3 0
aspect of the case was not questioned by the Supreme Court.
The district court's holding with respect to dejure segregation was based on
its finding that Detroit school officials had engaged in de jure acts of discrimination, including the drawing of attendance zones to minimize integration and
the maintenance of optional attendance zones, the busing of black pupils
beyond closer white schools with available space, and the selection of sites for
desegregation case in which an interdistrict remedy was sought. In Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp.
1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd mer., 404 U.S. 1027 (1972), which arose in New Jersey, the plaintiffs
alleged that segregation of the school system was attributable to New Jersey statutes which made
school district boundaries coterminous with municipal boundaries. 326 F. Supp. at 1240-41. The
three-judge district court, however, found this coterminality was "reasonable" in light of the municipal taxing authority. 326 F. Supp. at 1241. The system was unitary and any racial imbalance within a local school district resulted from an imbalance in the population of that district. Id. at 1243.
The court also pointed to the fact that the Supreme Court, in Swann, had distinguished
between those states which have a history of dual school systems and a separation of the
races continued through the use of "freedom-of-choice" and "geographical zoning" plans
which create the illusion of conforming to the law, and those wherein so-called "de-facto"
segregation results from housing patterns and conventional drawing of school district
zones.
326 F. Supp. at 1242.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed without oral argument, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972), with
Justice Douglas dissenting on the ground that redistricting of school districts, by analogy to the
reapportionment cases, should be an available remedy %%here there is racial imbalance-citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
306. As noted in note 78 supra, the Supreme Court split evenly on the Richmond case, thus
letting the Fourth Circuit decision stand.
307. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
308. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
412 U.S. 92 (1973).
309. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich.), supplemented by 345 F. Supp. 914
(E.D. Mich. 1971), affld, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
310. The Supreme Court opinion merely noted that the findings of the district court as to de
jure segregation appeared correct. 418 U.S. at 738 n. 18. Thus, in the Detroit case-the second
northern case to come before the Supreme Courti-the Court was unanimous in finding intradistricr discrimination. This is a clear indication that as far as intradistrict discrimination is concerned,
the Detroit decision has done nothing to utndermine Swann or Ke'es.
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school buildings. 3 11 The district court also found state involvement in actions
which maintained segregation in the Detroit school system, looking to a
3 12
number of factors, including the pattern of residential segregation:
Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have
combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and
real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area.

The court then found that "[t]he State and its agencies, in addition to their
general responsibility for the supervision of public education, have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of segregation in the Detroit
schools. '3' 3t

3
To support this finding the court noted that:

14

(1) state transportation services were lesser in quality and quantity in Detroit than in white suburbs, thus limiting pupils' choices to attend other
schools.
(2) "other financial limitations, such as those on bonding and the working
3 15
of the state aid formula" perpetuated segregated schools.
(3) the passage of Act 48 acted to "impede, delay and minimize racial
integration."

31 6

As to this last factor, the Detroit Board of Education had adopted a plan on
April 7, 1970 which provided for changes in some of the high school attendance zones, designed to effect a more balanced ratio of black and white
students at the senior high school level. 3 1 7 Following the adoption of the plan,
the Michigan legislature enacted a statute which provided that the Detroit plan
be suspended and that a neighborhood school policy be instituted.3 1 8 The Sixth
Circuit had previously held this section of the act unconstitutional.3 1 ' The Sixth
Circuit concluded twenty-one pages of discussion of the evidence supporting
3 2
the district court's findings of constitutional violations by noting that 0
[t]his record contains a substantial volume of testimony concerning local and
State action and policies which helped produce residential segregation in Detroit and in the metropolitan area of Detroit. In affirming the District Judge's
findings of constitutional violations by the Detroit Board of Education and by
the State defendants resulting in segregated schools in Detroit, Xwe have not
311. 338 F. Supp. at 592.
312. 338 F. Supp. at 587.
313. 338 F. Supp. at 589.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See testimony of Dr. Norman Drachler. Superintendent of the Detroit Public Schools.
quoted in Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 898-99 (6th Cir. 1970).
318. No. 48, § 12, [1970] Mich. Public Acts 139-40. The antithesis of local control would seem
to be the state legislature telling the local district how to assign its pupils. See discussion in the text
at pp. 1 11-14 infra.
319. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1970).
320. 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973).
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relied at all upon testimony pertaining to segregated housing except as school
construction programs helped cause or maintain such segregation.
The circuit court found that "[t]he discriminatory practices on the part of the
Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan revealed by this record are
significant, pervasive and causally related to the substantial amount of segrega2t
tion found in the Detroit School System by the District Judge."
b.

The Metropolitan-wide Remedy

After the first Detroit decision, in which the district judge found de jure
segregation to exist, the court issued a directive to city and state defendants to
submit desegregation plans, both Detroit-only (to be submitted by the city) and
metropolitan (to be submitted by the state).3 2 2 When the plans were presented,
the district judge rejected all three Detroit-only plans, noting that "relief of
segregation in the public schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished
within the corporate geographical limits of the city." 2 ' Thus the district court's
finding that the state was involved in maintaining segregation in Detroit's
schools coupled with the fact that any Detroit-only plan would lead very shortly
to an all-black Detroit School District, led the judge to the conclusion that only
324
The Sixth Circuit agreed. 25
a metropolitan remedy would be appropriate.
But the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence that the acts of
suburban school districts had brought about the segregation in the Detroit
School District ,326 and therefore reversed. Thus an interdistrict violation is
necessary before an interdistrict remedy can be ordered.3 27 Chief Justice
Burger articulated the principle as follows: "the scope of the remedy is deter32 8
mined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.
The basic standards which are to govern the use of cross-district remedies
3 29
are as follows:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing
a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect
in another district. Specifically it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or ol a single school district have been a substantial cause of
321. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
322. Unreported directive (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 1974), discussed at 345 F. Supp. 914, 916,
920-21. See also 484 F.2d 215, 218, 220-21; 418 U.S. 717, at 729-33.
323. Unreported findings of fact and conclusions of law (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 1972), quoted at
484 F.2d at 244.
324. Id., quoted at 484 F.2d at 243-44.
325. 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973).
326. 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974). In fact, the district court had explicitly stated that it had not
even considered any evidence as to the actions of the suburban school districts. 345 F. Supp. 914,
920 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
327. 418 U.S. at 752.
328. 418 U.S. at 744.
329. 418 U.S. at 744-45, 749 (emphasis added).
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inter-district seg-regation .... [W]ithout an inter-district violation and inter-district
effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district remedy.
•..Where the schools of only one district have been affected, there is no
constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial composition of that district's schools with those of the surrounding districts.
330
The Court left the door only slightly ajar on interdistrict remedies:

[A]n interdistnict renedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory
acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent
district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of
race.
There was evidence that a predominantly black suburb, which had no high
school, sent its high school age students to schools in Detroit-with the "tacit"
approval of the State Board of Education-because the nearby white suburbs
refused to accept these students. 3 3t While this would appear to come within the
above guidelines, the Court said that this was only an "isolated instance" which
could not justify a broad metropolitan-wide remedy.3 3 2 The Court thus found
that evidence of state involvement, such as the discriminatory provision of
transportation costs, state legislation rescinding a voluntary desegregation plan
drawn up by the Detroit school board, cooperation with Detroit officials in
school construction policies which fostered segregation, and approval of the
busing of black suburban students to Detroit schools was insufficient for a
metropolitan-wide remedy.
There would seem to be no established principle of constitutional law requiring the Court to reject the notion that the state, which draws the boundary
lines, has no responsibility for the segregated pattern of housing and schooling.
Not- is there settled constitutional law which dictates that there is no affirmative
duty to correct interdistrict segregation. But it seems clear that to the Milliken
majority, a "unitary" system can be an all-black system contained within its
state-created borders. The Court noted that it has only been in the context of a
single "geographic and administrative school system" serving both white and
black students that the terms "unitary," "dual," and "racially identifiable"
schools have had meaning.3 3 3 But nothing in those earlier cases suggested that
a stricter test or standard would be required to cross district lines than to cross
attendance zones or neighborhoods. The Court failed to explain why the standard articulated in Davis3 3 4 had to be restricted to the boundaries of a school
district:335
Having once found a violation, the disttict judge ...should make every effort
to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into
330.
331.
332.
333.

418
418
418
418

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at

745 (emphasis added).
749-50. See also 484 F.2d 215. 231 (6th Cir. 1973).
450.
746.

334. Davis v. Board of School Commi'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971). Davis was the companion case to
SaLnn 0t.

335.

Id. at 37.
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account the practicalities of the situation. A district court may and should
consider the use of all available techniques .... The measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.

Nor does the Court explain why remedies which could be "administratively
awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre" within a district, could not run past
the district line. " ' In Justice White's view, the Court had33 7 "fashion[ed] out
of whole cloth an arbitrary rule that remedies for constitutional violations
occurring in a single Michigan school district must stop at the school district
line."
Neither the majority nor Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion ex-

plained why the standards used in the Denver case for determining the violation and its remedy did not apply in Detroit. In the Denver case, the Court
presumed that de jure segregation in one area spread to or infected other
33 8
contiguous areas, shifting the burden to the defendants to prove it did not.
Using the same approach in the Detroit case, the finding of dejure segregation
in a "meaningful portion" of the metropolitan area (the central city) should
trigger a presumption either that there is a reciprocal segregative effect in the
suburbs or that (State) school authorities have engaged in intentional segrega33 '
tive actions throughout the metropolitan area. .
In the Detroit case, however, the burden was upon the plaintiffs to prove
that de jure acts of (a significant number?) of suburbs have had a segregative
effect on Detroit, or that the state drew district boundary lines to contain
Detroit.3 41 ) But not only the burden of proof had shifted. As has already been
noted, in the Denver case the remedy was not limited to that part of the district
where the past segregative acts were shown to have occurred; a district-wide
remedy-"all-out desegregation" 3 4 '-was triggered.
The remedy and the violation thus appear to have become entangled in the
Detroit case, and are no longer separate concepts. The Court seems to be
adopting a "culpability" theory; that is, there is no interdistrict violation unless
the suburban districts engaged in deliberate segregative acts affecting the degree of segregation in Detroit or the state was involved in deliberately containing Detroit's blacks above and beyond just being responsible for acts of its
agent-the Detroit School Board-or even for maintaining existing boundaries
where the natural and foreseeable consequence was the isolation of blacks in
3 42

Detroit.

Pursuing the "culpability" theory a little further, however, it becomes evident that the Court believed that since the suburban white residents and their
336. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
337. 418 U.S. at 768 (White, J., dissenting).
338. 413 U.S. 189, 201-03, 208-12 (1973). Cf. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d
848, 888 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). ("Infection at one school infects all schools.")
339. See notes 74-80 and accompanying text at pp. 63-64 supra.
340. 418 U.S. at 746.
341. Keyes ,. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973).
342.

See text at pp. 66-69 supra.
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children were not "guilty" or responsible for the "growing core of Negro
schools," they should not be "punished" by forcing them to become part of the
remedy. This does not explain, however, why white parents and their children
are any more deserving of "punishment" because they live in Denver or in
Charlotte rather than in the suburbs of those cities. The approach taken by the
Court' 4 3 in this case may serve to increase white flight from the cities by

indicating that the suburbs will be a "safe haven" for those who otherwise
would be caught up in a desegregation decree. Although having previously
prevented a new school district from forming "where its effect would be to
impede the process of dismantling a dual system" by encouraging white
flight, 344 the Court has now ensured that white flight will proceed even more

rapidly from Detroit than heretofore has been the case.
c.

Proving Racial Containment

After the Detroit case, what must plaintiffs be able to demonstrate for a
metropolitan area remedy? It is not sufficient that dejure segregation exists in
one district and that no effective plan for desegregation could be devised
without going beyond the borders of that district. It is not sufficient to show
that for certain purposes, the metropolitan area should be treated as a unit. It
is not sufficient to show that there is a de jure violation in only one other
district in the metropolitan area as that would only be an "isolated instance." It
may not even be sufficient to show de jure segregation in several districts as it
appears that plaintiffs will have to show that segregation in one district resulted
from discriminatory actions by officials in other-the suburban-school districts
or by state education officials.
If plaintiffs cannot readily show that the actions of state or suburban school
officials contributed to the segregation of the schools within the central city,
can plaintiffs establish a prima facie case for interdistrict relief by proving
segregative actions by other governmental agencies? In other words, if plaintiffs
could show that governmental policies in housing and zoning, employment,
and welfare in one district produced a significant segregative effect in another
district, would this justify an interdistrict remedy?
The majority opinion in the Detroit case seems to suggest that suburban
districts could be included in a court-ordered desegregation plan only if school
officials have been responsible for the de jure segregation in Detroit. If that is
true, plaintiffs have an almost impossible burden. In a footnote, however, the
majority notes that since the circuit court expressly noted that its decision did
not rest on any of the testimony with regard to segregated housing, "the case
343. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, expressed somewhat the same view-that the
proposed remedial decree approved by the Sixth Circuit would "include schools and school children in many other school districts that have presumptively been administered in complete accord
with the Constitution." 418 U.S. at 755.
344. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 470 (1972).
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345
does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations.
Thus the door may be open to future plaintiffs to show that "the State, along
with private persons, [has] caused, in part, the housing patterns of the . ..
metropolitan area which, in turn, produced . . . [segregated] neighborhoods
"346

For the majority, then, there was no need to examine the trial record to
determine whether governmental policies in housing acted to contain blacks in
Detroit. Justice Stewart, however, did examine the record, and found that it
did not show that "the racial composition of the Detroit school population or
that residential patterns within Detroit and in the surrounding areas were in
any significant measure caused by governmental activity .... -a47 But it is clear
that, to Justice Stewart, proof of such actions by other governmental agencies
34 8
would, in certain circumstances permit an interdistrict remedy:
Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the
separation of the races ... by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state
housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for transfer of pupils across
district lines or for restructuring of district lines might well be appropriate.
Justice Stewart asserts that in the Detroit case, no evidence was introduced
concerning the actions of suburban school districts other than that they had a
much larger proportion of white students than did Detroit. This alone was not,
in his view, sufficient to justify an interdistrict remedy. The plaintiffs must
show "that such disparity was imposed, fostered, or encouraged by the state or
its political subdivisions .... "49 Thus, in Justice Stewart's view, there was no
evidence of a constitutional violation (outside of Detroit) and Justice Marshall,
in his dissent, was incorrect in saying that black children in Detroit had been
35 0
confined by (external) intentional acts of segregation.
[S]egregative acts within the city alone cannot be presumed to have produced-and no factual showing was made that they did produce-an increase
in the number of Negro students in the city as a whole. It is this essential fact of
a predominantly Negro school population in Detroit-caused by unknown and
perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, birth rates, economic
changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears-that accounts for the "growing core of Negro schools," a "core" that has grown to include virtually the
entire city. The Constitution simply does not allow federal courts to attempt to
change that situation unless and until it is shown that the State, or its political
subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist.
The problem is that Justice Stewart does not make very clear what evidence
of other governmental activities would be sufficient. In the Richmond case,
plaintiffs had presented extensive evidence of governmental actions which had
345.

418 U.S. at 728 n. 7.

346.

Id.

347.
348.
349.

418 U.S. at 756 n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
418 U.S. at 755.
Id.

350.

418 U.S. at 756 n. 2. But see 418 U.S. at 799 n. 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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contributed to the "growing core of Negro schools,

that Justice Stewart was one of the four
case.3 5 2 Moreover, a respectable number
that the causes of the "growing core of
perhaps unknowable." They could readily
demographic patterns which give rise to a
3.

' 35
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' yet it seems probable

votes against the plaintiffs in that
of social scientists would not agree
Negro schools" are "unknown and
point out factors which explain the
"growing core of Negro schools." 35 3

City-County Consolidations

The most significant case to deal with interdistrict remedies to date, in view
of the fact that it was decided after the Supreme Court decision in the Detroit
case is Newburg Area Council v. Board oj Education.35 4 Indeed, the initial decision
in that case was appealed to the Supreme Court just as the Detroit case was
being decided. 355 Rather than overturn the Louisville decision at that time, the
Supreme Court remanded it to the Sixth Circuit, asking it to reconsider the
case in light of Milliken v. Bradley.3 56 The Sixth Circuit did reconsider the case
and concluded that the problem in Milliken had been that the remedy "was
broader than the constitutional violation. '357 By contrast, in the Louisville
case-where the city school district has a pupil population that is 50 per cent
black and Jefferson County (in which Louisville is located) has a pupil population only 4 per cent black-"the situation presented is that of two districts in
351.

Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67, 84-100 (E.D. Va. 1972); Taylor, The Supreme Court

and Urban Reality.: A Tactical Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAN"NF L. REV. 751, 765-69 (1975).

352. The decision was affirmed by an equally divided Court, Justice Powell not participating,
412 U.S. 92 (1973). The four votesfor plaintiffs Were probably the same four who dissented in the
Detroit case.
353. See, e.g., NATIONAL CoMMsi. AGAINsT DISCRIMINAriON IN HOUSING AND THE URBAN LAND
INSTIrurE,

USE (1974); U.S. CO.MISSION ON CIVIL
M. Sloan, Milliken v. Bradley and Residential
Segregation, October 22, 1974 (paper available front National Comm. Against Discrimination
in Housing); Farley, Residential Segregation and Its ImplicationsJorSchool Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 1, at 164 (1975); Pettigrew. A Sociological View oJ the Post-BradleyEra, 21 WAYNE L.
REV. 813 (1975); Taylor, supra note 351.
Professor Karl Taeuber, who testified as an expert witness in Milliken v. Bradley, has reviewed the
causes of residential segregation in a recent article. Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing
and School Segregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 833, 836-41 (1975). He concludes the discussion by noting
that "the prime cause of residential segregation by race has been discrimination, both public and
private." Taeuber, supra at 840. In the same issue, Professor Farley, after a review of the available
data, reaches similar conclusions. Farley, Population Trends and School Segregation in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 867, 882-89 (1975). Professor Farley examines the question of the
absence of blacks front the Detroit suburbs, and finds that "[o]pening the suburbs of Detroit to
blacks is not a problem of opening them to low or middle income families; rather it is very specifically a question of opening them to blacks." Farley, supra at 884-85.
354. 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1658 (1975).
355. 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 918 (1974).
356. 418 U.S. 918 (1974).
357. 510 F.2d at 1361.
358. Id. Note the culpability or "guilt" language. See text accompanying note 342, at p. 105
supra.
FAIR

HOUSING

AND

EXCLUSIONARY

LAND

RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY' IN SUBURBIA (1974);
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the same county of the state being equally guilty in failing to eliminate all
Also, the cross-district effect was present:
"538
vestiges of segregation ....
have
been ignored in the past for the purin
Kentucky
lines
district
[S]chool
pose of aiding and implementing continued segregation. Such disregarding
of school district lines continues to have an effect on racial imbalance in the
Thus, on remand of the case to the district court, the
county's schools .... ,,35.9
circuit court noted that the desegregation order could, if needed, include an
36 1
interdistrict remedy.
A second decision since the Detroit case has also found sufficient distinguishing factors to permit an interdistrict remedy. In United States v.Missouri,a
the plaintiffs were seeking the annexation of two districts-one of which was all
black-by a third district to create a new district out of the three. The district

court found sufficient evidence to show that there was'an arra gement of school districts which has caulsed substantial segr egation and
which is both a vestige of the previously impiiiosed dual school system and a
continuing effect of racially discriminalotry state actiols oil the part of the

defendants in this case.

The other two districts were "responsible for the maintenance of [the all black
district] as a segregated district.'-3 6 3 The court found the opposition of the

electorate to reorganizing the districts in 1949 to be grounded in racial
4

considerations.36
This is an illstance iwhere the tailue to act to tesistance for discriitinatory
reasons to ac(iolls tending to (ot1ect segregation allulnted t a t constlitional
w lon1g.

The final factor differentiating the Detroit case from the Missouri case was that
in the latter, "only three districts, not fifty-two districts, are involved. " a
j.efferson Cotlnyti had no black
359. 5 10 F.2d at 1360. For example. for a Cotcsiderahc. period,
high school and had sent its black students to a black high s hool in Louisville.
360. 510 F.2d at 1361. The case was appealed to tie SupteCle Coort once again. bitt the petition for certiorari was denied, 95 S.Ct. 1658 (1975). For discict cooluts order see 8 ED. DAILY ,
Atg. 5, 1975, at 1.
361. 388 F. Stpp. 1058 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
362. 388 F. Stpp. at 1059.
363. 388 F. Supp. at 1060.
364. Id.
365. Id. It is interesting to note that the clistict colut in (his case was more awate than most
couts of the disproportionate burden that tends to fall otnblack students it aln desegtegation
order. See text at pp. 88-90 supra.
The primary burden (if desegregation Under the Revised Plan unavoidably falls on black
students because of the educational necessity. recognized b\ all the parties, of terminating
the present use of three school facilities located in the Kinloch [all-black] School Distric.
In order to minimize this burden as mitch as possible, the following steps shall be taken:
(1) Kinloch Elementary [formerly all-black] shall be assigned lower elementary grades
instead of grades five and six.
(4) School athorities shall take steps to inscttre that black students transferred to
formerl white schools are made to feel a part of such schools. To this end, considera-
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Finally, the Indianapolis case 3 66 also indicates that city-county consolidations may be easier to accomplish than the other two metropolitan arrangements previously discussed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings that state officials had "promoted segregation and inhibited desegregation ' 3 67 within the Indianapolis School District, thus placing upon the
state as well as the school district an affirmative duty to desegregate within the
368
boundaries of Indianapolis.
The district court had sought to impose a metropolitan area remedy-to
include all of Marion County (the county in which Indianapolis is situated), as
well as two school districts beyond the county line. Relying upon the Supreme
Court's opinion in the Detroit case, the circuit court reversed the district court's
opinion with regard to the areas beyond Marion County.1 I The court did not
reverse, but vacated and remanded for further findings, that part of the district court's remedy which included school districts within the county
37t
boundaries.
There may well be unique circumstances in the Indianapolis case which
could trigger a finding of deliberate segregative intent and effect on the part of
the county as well as the city and thus support a city-county consolidation. In
1971, the Uni-Gov Act was passed which consolidated the governments of
37
Indianapolis and Marion County into one metropolitan governmental unit. '
However, the Act specifically excepted from such consolidation "any [preexisting] school corporation, all or a part of which is in the consolidated city or
county."'' a 2 This meant that, in addition to Indianapolis, there were "eight
township school systems operating independently within the purportedly unOn remand, the circuit court asked the district court to
ified City . . . .,,.37
determine whether "the establishment of the Uni-Gov boundaries without a
like reestablishment of [the Indianapolis school district] boundaries warrants an
4
inter-district remedy within Uni-Gov in accordance with Milliken .'a
There are still a few metropolitan area suits pending. At least two of these
could be resolved by a city-county consolidation and thus appear to have a
better chance of success than a Detroit-type of case. And in one of these
and the
tion should be given to renaming such schools, changing school colors, etc.,
preservation of Kinloch High School trophies and awards. Non-discriminatory regulation and procedures shall be developed concerning disciplinary measures.
388 F. Supp. at 1061-62.
366. United States v.Board of School Comnu'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973). aff'd in
denied, 95 S.Ct. 1655 (1975).
part and rev'd inpart. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
367. 503 F.2d at 80.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 503 F.2d at 86.
371. IND. CODE 18-4-1-1 to 18-4-15-2 (1971).
372. IND. CoDE 18-4-3-14 (1971).
373. United Statesv. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655. 676 (S.D. Ind. 1971),aJJd,
477 F.2d 81 (7th (i-. 1972). erl. deiiied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
374. 503 F.2d at 86. The disirict court, then, ordered cross busing. 8 ED. DAni , Aug. 7, 1975,
: l I.
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pending suitsa75-inv'olving Wilmington, Delaware and its predominantly white
suburban county-there is evidence that a state statute adopted in 1968, reorganizing and consolidating all school districts with the exception of the city of
Wilmington,37 6 with its over 80 per cent black student enrollment, acted to
77
Another po
"contain" minority students within the boundaries of the city.
8
tential metropolitan-area suit is Armour v. Nix, 3 involving Atlanta and its predominantly white suburban county. In one of its (many) Calhoun v. Cook decisions, the district court raised the question of consolidation of the Atlanta
3 7a9
school system with the Fulton County system .
In terns of efficiency, taxes, and quality education, such consolidations notnmally produce long-range imnprovements. In le rms of thre current problem such
consolidation might well produce partial, even though not perfect, solutions.
The court of appeals, at various phases of the Calhoun case, has also expressed
3 8a
its interest in a consideration of a metropolitan solution.
4. Local Control: The Making oj a Myth
What considerations might militate against the granting of relief as drastic
as desegregation across district lines even if interdistrict intentional segregative
acts can be proved? Is the interest in "local control" of schools a relevant factor?
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has begun to acknowledge that local
control or local autonomy in public education is a very substantial interest: first,
in the school financing case--San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez3st -and now in the Detroit case.3 8 2 In an earlier opinion, Justice
Stewart, speaking for the Court, had said that "[d]irect control over decisions
vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in
out society . . . . 8 In his dissent in that same opinion, Chief Justice Burger
agreed, stating that local control was of "overriding importance,' 3 8 4 and he
38 5
continued this line of thought in his majority opinion in Milliken v. Bradley:
375.
376.

Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974).
Ch. 292, § 6, [1967] Del. Laws 979.

377. After the Detroit decision was handed dwmn, the thtce-judge disttrict Court in DelawNare
ruled that the statute xwas unconstitutional in its exclusion of the Wilmington school district. The
court found the statute to be an "interdistrict violation" that "pla yed a significant part in maintaining the racial identifiability of Wilmington and the suburban New Castle County school districts."
_
F. Supp.
(D. Del. Mar. 23, 1975). See discussion itt Taylor, supra note 351, at
759-60.
378. Armour v. Nix, Civil No. 16708 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 1972).
379. 332 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
380. 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971); 487 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 1973).
381. 411 U.S. 1,49-50 (1973).
382. 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
383. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451. 469 (1973).
384. Id. at 478 (emphasis added). "Local control is not only vital to continued public support of
the schools, but is of overriding importance front an educational standpoint as well.- This statement was subsequentls quoted with approval b the majotrity in Rodiguez, 411 U.S. at 49.
385. 418 U.S. at 741-42 (emnphasis added).
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Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation
calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be
casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to
the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process.
Perhaps the most outstanding feature of these repeated statements sanctifying
local control is the dearth of authority cited by way of support.
In the Detroit case, 3 86 the Sixth Circuit devoted three and one-quarter
pages to a review of the evidence of state control over education in
38 7
Michigan:
As held by the District Court, it is well established under the Constitution
and laws of Michigan that the public school systen is a State function and that
local school districts are instrumentalities of the State created for administrative
convenience.
The circuit court cited constitutional and statutory provisions and Michigan
Supreme Court interpretations in support of this statement,3 8 8 and concluded
89
that
the record [has] establish[ed] that the State has committed de jure acts of
segregation and. that the State controls the instrumentalities whose action is
necessary to remedy the harmful effects of the State acts.
The Supreme Court ignored this treatment, stating only that Michigan, "in
common with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, ' " 0 and
citing statutes giving the local school district the power to determine "the dayto-day affairs of the school district ..
,19.. Justice Douglas vigorously dissented
from this view: "[e]ducation in Michigan is a state project with very little completely local control . . . . [T]he school districts by state law are agencies of the
State. "3.2
Michigan does provide a large measure of local control, yet it has been held
repeatedly that a school district is merely a subordinate arm of the state agency.
386. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245-49 (6th Cir. 1973). ev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
387. 484 F.2d at 246.
388. E.g., id., citing Child Welfare Soc) v. Kennedy School Dist., 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N.W.
1002, 1004 (1922):
The Legislature has entire control over the schools of the state subject only to the
provisions above referred to. The division of the territory of the state into districts, the
conduct of the school, the qualifications of teachers, the subjects to be taught therein, are
all within its control.
389. 484 F.2d at 249.
390. 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974).
391. Id. at 742 n. 20.
392. 418 U.S. at 758-59. See also id. at 770 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 786, 793-97 (Marshall,J
dissenting).
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A school district has no inherent power, only power expressly delegated or
necessarily implied. Under Michigan law, as is true of most states, 39 3 the state
legislature can consolidate, merge, or eliminate school districts at will, regard394
less of the local district's opposition to such moves.
A recent study of ten states and the degree to which there was state control
over local education decision-making in the areas of curricular requirements,
budgetary and taxing restrictions, regulations affecting personnel, and district
formation, dissolution, annexation and consolidation, showed that state statutes
and regulations sharply limited the degree of local district autonomy in the
majority of the ten states studied.3 9 5 Michigan was found to rank fifth in the
degree of state-level controls on local district decision making; 396 in the area of
district formation and consolidation, however, Michigan was grouped with
those states which have the strongest degree of state-level control.3 97 Such
research casts significant doubt on the Court's developing theory of "local
control" as a barrier to otherwise valid remedies for violations of the equal
protection clause.
The Court's concern for preserving "local control," as with its concern regarding the administrative and financing (including the validity of long-term
bonds) problems presented by consolidating 54 school districts, 398 arguably
393. The standard education law textbooks indicate how much of this power is located in the
state rather than in the local school district. See, e.g., E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION 61, 108 (1970).
School districts are governmental agencies of the state created by the state as instrumentalities through which the legislature carries out the state constitutional mandate to provide for a system of public education. At any time the legislature may abolish all local
school units and redistrict the state irrespective of the boundaries of the old districts.
Unless the constitution of the state requires it, it is not necessary to procure the consent of
the inhabitants of the territory as a condition to redistricting. Indeed, even though local
inhabitants have voted against a boundary alteration, the legislature can still proceed to
effect the consolidation of districts.
The powers of local boards, since they are granted by the legislature, may be changed at
any time ....
When in doubt, the courts, under common law, are inclined to find against
an implied power. There are no inherent powers in school boards.
This textbook uses a Michigan case, Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233
(1905), to illustrate the subchapter entitled "Power of State Legislature to Change District Boundaries." E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, supra at 86.
See also M. SORGEN, P. DUFFY, W. KAPLIN, & E. MARGOLIN, STATE, SCHOOL, AND FAMILY ch. 2, at

10 (1973).
394. "[T]he State has wide-ranging powers to consolidate and merge school districts, even
without the consent of the districts themselves or of the local citizenry." 418 U.S. at 796 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall points out, id., there has been a substantial effort in the sixties
-largely initiated at the state level-to consolidate, annex, and merge school districts. Between
1964 and 1972, the number of school districts dropped from 1,438 to 608. Some of these mergers
were state-mandated; others were stimulated by fiscal incentives provided by the state legislature.
See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.401-.415, 340.431-.449 (1967).
395. B. LEVIN & M. COHEN, LEVELS OF STATE AID RELATED TO STATE RESrRICTIONS ON LOCAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT DECISION-MAKING (1973).

396.
397.
398.

Id. at 18, Table 3.
Id. at 17, Table 2.
418 U.S. at 743.
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would not be relevant had the Court determined that there was an interdistrict
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The majority notes that 99
School district lines and the present laws with respect to local control are not
sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts
have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies.
This suggests, again, that the Court has entangled questions of remedy with
questions of constitutional violation.
E.

Special Remedies in Cases Involving
Hispano-Americans

School desegregation law, as it has developed, in large measure has benefitted Hispano-Americans. Having evolved in the context of the segregation of
blacks in the states of the deep South, however, it is not always completely

transferable from one group of litigants to the other. School desegregation
litigation, by and large, seeks to win for black pupils the right to be treated as
others are. For many Hispano-Americans, this seems to be too narrow a focus
and a potentially self-defeating objective in view of the desire to retain their
language and culture. Does the legal system have the capacity to explore alternatives and broaden the range of issues? And in so doing, what social science
evidence can aid in such an endeavor?
Clearly much of the relief sought by the two minority groups is the same.
As do blacks, Hispano-Americans seek desegregation of school faculties, staffs,
and student populations. And as do blacks, Hispano-Americans seek to chal-

lenge the disproportionate assignment of Hispano-American students to classes
for the Educable Mentally Retarded (EMR), and their over-representation in
"low ability" classes in elementary schools and in noncollege-bound tracks in
40 0
junior and senior high schools.
But Hispano-Americans also seek special programs-not generally sought
by black litigants-which are designed to enhance the educational process.

Since much of the learning deficiencies found in Hispano children are attributable to language and culture differences, questions of remedy therefore
include-but by no means are limited

to--whether

and when

bilingual-

bicultural education can be required.
The difficulty of devising remedies to meet the demands of litigants with
somewhat differing needs is most apparent in tri-ethnic school districts. This
399. 418 U.S. at 744.
[W]hatever difficulties [in managing a desegregation plan which includes suburban
districts] there might be, they are surmountable; for the Court itself concedes that had
there been sufficient evidence of an interdistrict violation, the District Court could have
fashioned a single remedy ot- the districts implicated rather than a different remedy fot
each district in which the violation had occurred or had an impact.
418 U.S. at 769-70 (White, J., dissenting).
400. Ability grouping and the assignment to classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR)
are discussed in the text at pp. 120-29 infra.
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problem was dealt with in the Denver case-where the student enrollment in
the elementary schools in the fall of 1973 was 17.6 per cent black, 27 per cent
Spanish surnamed, and 54.1 per cent Anglo 4°-by adopting a separate remedial plan for Mexican-American students. Following the Supreme Court's
remand, 40 2 the district court heard testimony on various proposed desegregation plans. The Congress of Hispanic Educators, which intervened in the suit,
put forward a separate remedial plan which would establish a bilingualbicultural educational program for Hispano-Americans. The plan was prepared by an educator, Dr. Jose Cardenas, and was said to be designed to
resolve the incompatibilities faced by Spanish-speaking school children who are
"expected not only to learn a language with which they are unfamiliar, but also
to acquire normal basic learning skills which are taught through the medium of
that unfamiliar language.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
As the

4 3

40
Such a program, it was argued, should include:

4

development of the child's knowledge of English,
instruction in any substantive subject in the child's native language,
promulgation of minimum educational standards,
distribution of appropriate materials,
recruitment of bilingual educators, and
establishment of pilot schools.
40 5
district court viewed the Cirdenas plan, it

recommend[ed] adjustments in the Denver educational system . .. which ...
will make that system more compatible to Ihe minority child's economic circum-

stances, his cultural and language orientation, his high degree of mobility, and
his perceptions of himself and the world around him. Dr. Cardenas' plan is at
heart based on the conviction that minority youngsters often fail or perform
poorly in the typical American school system today, because the school the
child attends. whether integrated or segregated, is largely an alien world to
him, where classes, including the most basic of skills, are taught in a language
which the child often does not comprehend or lacks facility in, where he is
asked to relate to experiences which have no relevance to him outside the
schools, and where he is often taught to regard negatively his own background,
culture and personal abilities.
4
The court found 1

6

the Cardenas or bilingual-bicultutal approach to the education of [Mexican-Armericans to be] a very sensible method and to the extent that itcan be
useful to building bridges between the Spanish and Anglo cultures, it is to be
fully utilized.
A number of other courts have also considered bilingual-bicultural approaches as part of the relief in desegregation cases involving Hispano401.
402.
403.

404.
1,Civil
405.
406.

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,380 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Colo. 1974).
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
380 F. Supp. at 695.

Brief for Congress of Hispanic Educators as Plaintiff-Inervenor, Keyes v. School Dist. No.
Nos. 74-1349 to 50 (10th Cir. June 25, 1974).
380 F. Supp. at 694-95.
380 F.Supp. at 692.
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Americans. In United States v. Texas Education Agency, 40 7 the district court, having concluded that bilingual education was the only means of achieving "true
integration as opposed to mere desegregation,"4 8 ordered a comprehensive
bilingual and bicultural educational program to be instituted, covering not only
standard classroom instruction, but also professional staff treatment, assignment, and development; student assignment and classroom organization; parent and community involvement; special education; and extra-curricular
40 9
activities.
In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 4 10 the predominantly Hispano school
in that district was already operating a bilingual-bicultural program; however,
such a program was not available at the other elementary schools in the district
even though these schools were attended by a number of Hispano children.
The district court required the establishment of a bilingual-bicultural program
at all elementary schools in the district as well as the hiring of more Spanishspeaking teachers. 411 The Tenth Circuit 1 2 followed Lau v. Nichols 4 13 in finding
a statutoy violation of the students' Title VI rights rather than a constitutional
violation, 41 4 but the result was the same. In discussing the question of relief, the
41 5
circuit court stated:
The evidence shows unequivocally that appellants had failed to provide appellees with a meaningful education.... [T]he trial court had a duty to fashion a
program which would provide adequate relief for Spanish surnamed children.
• ..Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 appellees have a right to
bilingual education .... [T]he trial court under its inherent equitable power,
can properly fashion a bilingual-bicultural program which will assure that
Spanish surnamed children receive a meaningful education.
The court thus indicated that under certain circumstances it is not an unwarranted intrusion for the federal district court, using its equitable powers, to
choose among educational programs.
Another illustration of a situation in which a mechanical application to
Hispano-Americans of desegregation law developed in the context of southern
blacks is inappropriate is that of assignment of minority teachers. Under the
407. 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971). reV'd 0 othe g-r7ods, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
408. Id. at 28.
409. Id. at 29-38. In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circulit, while "congratulating" the
school district's plan for its bilingual prograins. cautioned that "[t]hese techniques ...may not be
used as a substitute for adequate desegregation." 467 F.2d 848, 873 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Arvizu
v.Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aef"d it part, rev'd as to other
issues,
495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974). Theire the court ouidcred a bilingual-bicultural progriam to be
developed with the assistance of "available Mexican-American educational consultants." Id. at 1280.
(J'.
Aspira v.Board of Educ.. Consent Decree (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
410.

351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.-M. 1971), aff'd on othetgroutids, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).

411.

Id. at1282-83.

412.

499 F.2d 1147(10th (ii. 1974).

413.
414.

414 U.S. 563 (1974).
499 F.2dat 1152-53.

415.

499 F.2d at 1154.
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principle of the Singleton ratio, 4 16 minority teachers are to be distributed
throughout the system so that the staff of each school reflects the proportion of
minority teachers in the system as a whole. The difficulty with applying this to
Hispano-American teachers is that, compared to blacks, there are relatively few
trained in teaching. Thus assigning minority teachers so that there is an even
distribution throughout a given school district is an inadequate remedy as far
as Hispano-American desegregation law suits are concerned. Judge Wisdom, in
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 41 7 recognizing this, concluded that the
school district should strive for parity hiring rather than distribution of an
unrepresentative number of Mexican-American teachers throughout the school
41
district. 8
In the Denver case, the district court judge also rejected the Singleton ratio
as an appropriate desegregation remedy for Mexican-Americans due to the
fact that while Mexican-Americans comprised 26 per cent of the elementary
41 9
school population they comprised less than 4 per cent of the teaching staff.
The district judge extended Judge Wisdom's logic to require the immediate
implementation of an affirmative action plan with goals and a timetable for
hiring minority teachers. 42 " And the Serna court went even further, adding that
a good faith effort to recruit Spanish-speaking teachers would not be enough if
42
that effort were unsuccessful. 1
Substantial numbers of Hispano-American students are excluded from effective participation in the educational process because of language and cultural characteristics. In a study of school districts in the Southwest, undertaken
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 16 per cent of the MexicanAmerican students repeated the first grade while only 6 per cent of the Anglo
416. Faculty and staff are to be assigned to schools
so that the ratio of Negro to white teachers in each school, and the ratio of other staff in
each, are substantially the same as each such ratio is to the teachers and other staff,
respectively, in the entire school system.
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211. 1218 (5th Cir.), revid on other
grounds per
Cartet V. West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970). See also United
States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1969).
417. 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
418.
Rigid adherence to . .. [the Singleton ratio] principle would be inequitable in this
case . . . since there are so few Mexican-Arierican teachers, 3 percent of the total faculty

as against a Mexican-Anierican school population of 20 percent.
When tle figures speak so eloquently, a
case of discrimination is established.
.The school board therefore should attempt to employ more Mexican-American
teachers with the goal of attaining a ratio of Mexican-American teachers within the faculty
that reflects more tlsv the ratio of Mexican-Anserican students to the total population.
A showing of a good faith effort to find sufficietr qualified Mexican-American
teachers to achieve an equitable ratio, will rebut any inference of discrimination....
at 873. See also Cisneros v.Corpus Christi Idependent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 152 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
419. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Stipp. 673, at 674, 680, 688 (D. Colo. 1974).
420. 380 F. Strpp. at 688.
421. 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1283, aff'd othergrounds, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
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students and 8.9 per cent of the black students had to repeat this grade.4 22 In
Texas, 80 per cent of the Mexican-American children who enter the first grade
are not promoted.

42 3

Until recently, many states added impediments to the child's ability to learn
rather than facilitating their removal. The language barrier was looked upon as
the child's burden which he had to overcome, rather than as the school's
responsibility.42 4 Most states no longer have laws prohibiting foreign languages
from being used in schools.42 Nevertheless a substantial number of school
districts in the Southwest still have an official written policy of prohibiting the
use of Spanish either on the school grounds or in the classroom. And there is
some evidence that children are still subject to corporal punishment, to daily
fines, or to suspension and expulsion for using Spanish in violation of this
policy. 426 Until recently, Texas made it a crime for a teacher to speak Spanish

in the course of ordinary school activities. 42 7 As late as 1970, a MexicanAmerican teacher in that state was indicted for conducting a high school history class in Spanish, although the case was subsequently dismissed. 428 One
state still provides criminal penalties for violation of the requirement that
42
English be the exclusive language of instruction. 9
Today, however, man), states have adopted laws permitting bilingual
instruction, 4 0 and two states have laws requiring bilingual instruction where
43 1
there are a certain number of students whose native tongue is not English.
And, as previously noted, there are now a number of judicial decisions in which
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY, REPORT II:

422.

TOWARD QUALITY EDUCATION FOR MEXICAN AMERICANS 35 (1971).

T. ANDERSON & M. BOYER, BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES 108 (1970).
CJ note 139 and accompanying text at p. 74 supra.
However, eight states still require English as the exclusive language of instruction in
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1605 (1960); IDAHO CODE § 33-1601 (1963); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
158.080 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 126.07 (1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-7503 to
7504 (1971); NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 27; OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 11-102 (Supp.
423.
424.
425.
schools.

1972);
426.

WIS. STAT. ANN.

U.S.

§ 40.46(1) (1966).

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY. REPORT

TOWARD QUALITY EDUCATION FOR MEXICAN AMERICANS

427.
supra.

ILL

(1971).

See Ch. 80, [1918] Tex. Gen. Laws, 4th Called Sess. 170 (repealed 1971); text at note 161

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 426. at 15.
429. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1605 (1960). Three other states only very recently amended similar
laws with criminal penalties. Ch. 166, [1923] Conn. Pub. Acts. 3591, as amended CONN. GEN. STAT.

428.

ANN.

§ 10.17 (Supp. 1975); ch. 198. [1919] Iowa Acts 219, as amended ch. 1168, § 6. [1974] Iowa

Acts 540; ch. 138, §§ 265-66, [1931] S.D. Laws 175-76, as amended S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN.
13-33-11 (Supp. 1974).
430. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-202, 15-1097 to 1099 (Supp. 1974); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
71, 5766-69, 6457, 13273.5 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-103 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10.17 (Supp. 1975): ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 10-22.28a. 34-18.2 (Supp. 1975): KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 62-1101 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 102(16) (Stipp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 77-23-1 to 7 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(2a) (McKinney 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §
336.074-.079 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. til. 24. § 15-1511 (Supp. 1974): TEX. EDuC. CODE ANN. §

11.11 (1972).
431. ALASKA
1974).

STAT. §

14.08.160 (Curn. Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAW-S

ANN.

ch. 71A (Supp.
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bilingual education has been found to be at least a statutory 432 if not a constitutional right.

433

Many school districts currently offer Spanish speaking students either
434
segregated bilingual education or integration without bilingual education.
Neither of these "Hobson's Choice" alternatives are acceptable to many Hispano-Americans. The district court in United States v. Texas recognized the
43 5
problem of seemingly conflicting objectives:
[There is] ...the need . ..
special educational consideration to be given to
the Mexican-American students in assisting them in adjusting to those parts of
their new school environment which present a cultural and linguistic shock.
Equally cleat, howrever, is the need to avoid the creation of a stigma of inferiority akin to the "badges and indicia of slavery. . .. .To avoid this result the
Anglo-American students too must be called upon to adjust to their MexicanAmerican classmates, and to learn to understand and appreciate their different
linguistic and cultural attributes.
In the Denver case, however, the district court recognized a desire not to be
desegregated if that meant giving up bilingual education.4 3 6 In one of the
schools, a pilot bilingual-bicultural program was already underway. The court
43 7
noted that some "representatives of the Mexican-American community"
asked that the school not be desegregated during the period the program was
developing. The court therefore held that "desegregation is not in its best
43 8
interests.

Theoretically, bilingual-bicultural education and integration are not incompatible. Federal regulations under the Bilingual Education Act require school
districts to make good faith efforts to integrate their federally funded bilingual
programs. 4 3 ' By and large, however, they are neither integrated nor truly
432. Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1974); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974).
433. For legal arguments on behalf of a constitutional right to bilingual education, see Note,
The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV.

943 (1974).
434. Cardenas, Bilingual Education, Segregation, and a Third Alternative, 1975 INEQUALITY IN ED.
no. 19, at 20.
435. 342 F. Supp. 24, 28 (E.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972). The court,
therefore, ordered the creation of a unitary school system in which "neither English nor Spanish is
presented as a more Valued language .....Id. at 30. The court also ordered the implementation of
a "bilingual-bicultural in)str uctional program which utilizes the child's language system (English,
Spanish, or a blend of both) as the medium of instruction as proficiency in one or more additional
language systems is developed." Id. at 31.
436. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 692 (D. Colo. 1974).

437.
438.
439.

Id.
Id.

20 U.S.C.A. § 880b et seq. (1975).
A program assisted under this Part shall include such provisions as are necessary to
prevent the separation of children by language or ethnic background in any activity included in such programs, unless the applicant demonstrates that such separation for a
portion of the school day for specific language learning activities is essential to the achievement of the purpose of this part.
40 Fed. Reg. 26517-18 (1975) (emphasis added).
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bilingual; rather, the English as a Second Language (ESL) program is what is
usually provided. Such programs rely exclusively on the use of the English
language; the child is compelled to learn a new language and at the same time
to learn course material in the new language. Thus Hispano-American children, not surprisingly, fall behind Anglo children in such substantive curricular
areas as math, geography, history, etc.
The principal use of social science in cases involving Hispano students has
been through the introduction of expert witnesses-educators or psychologists-who portray the incompatibility between the characteristics of the
non-Anglo-Saxon child and the characteristics of the white, middle class educational program being offered. Studies have also been cited which show that
large numbers of Hispano students-through the use of IQ or other standardized intelligence and achievement tests that tend to measure the students'
ability to read and understand English rather than their actual intelligence
-have been improperly assigned to classes for the educable mentally retarded
(EMR) or low track or ability groupings.4 4
In sum, that Hispano-Americans may require, as part of any desegregation
decree, special remedies not sought by black litigants is a principle gradually
being developed by the courts. Coupled with this is the growing recognition of,
at the least, a statutory right to bilingual education and of the inappropriateness
of using tests based on English language skills to determine a child's placement
in special classes or tracks.
IV
SECOND GENERATION PROBLEMS

A school system may in some respects remain segregated even after a
court-ordered desegregation plan has been fully implemented. Through various practices such as ability grouping and the selective use of disciplinary
measures, minority children may continue to receive different and apparently
unequal treatment. These practices may bring about resegregation of the
school system in frustration of the court-ordered plan. Do these practices, even
when they are educationally valid and racially neutral, violate the fourteenth
amendment? If so, to what extent may inexpert judges intervene in the educational process to fashion an appropriate remedy to protect the rights and
interests of minority children? And when the courts do intervene, what social
science evidence may they turn to for guidance?
A.

Tracking and Ability Grouping

One of the most frequently used practices responsible for bringing about
resegregation is the use of tracking or ability grouping following the adoption
of a desegregation plan. The courts have been fairly consistent in holding that
440.

These cases are discussed in the text at pp. 126-27 infra.

Page 50: Winter 1975]

P DESEGREGATION LITIGATION

when a formerly dual, segregated school system is in the process of being or
has just recently been dismantled, pupil assignment by standardized achievement or IQ test scores is prohibited when the intended and actual result is the
perpetuation of the dual system. This is so whether the continuing segregation
exists within the system as a whole, 441 within individual schools, 442 or even
443
within individual classrooms.
Ability groupings or the so-called "track method" may have academic justifica-

tion and may be an educational rather than a constititional issue, bur the track
system or "ability grouping" is suspect
when it first begins to flourish on the eve
444

of or during a desegregation suit.

Apart from the blatant, racially-motivated

misuse of such measures, is

racially-neutral ability grouping a valid educational practice? It has been argued, in behalf of ability grouping, that the teacher can adjust his or her

teaching methods and materials and reach most, if not all, of the students in a
given classroom. In a heterogeneous classroom, on the other hand, the teacher
would have to aim for the average range of ability, and thus would lose both

those students significantly below and those above the average, as the material
would either be too difficult or insufficiently challenging. Where the class has a
narrower range of ability, the teacher

should have more time for indi-

vidualized, personal instruction.
In addition to improved student achievement, it has been argued that abil-

ity grouping promotes self-esteem. The child who does not have to compete
with children who are significantly brighter or duller than he, can develop a
healthy self-image as he works with children at his own level. 4"
While there is substantial social science research on these issues, the research is so contradictory that it cannot be said with any sense of conviction

whether ability grouping does or does not lead to increased achievement and
improved self-esteem in children.4 4 6 Some have termed ability grouping a sys441. See, e.g.. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd.. 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Sunflower Count School Dist.. 430 F.2d 839. 841 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970);
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and
remanded in part on other grounds sub noam.Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd.. 396 U.S. 290
(1970).
442. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1013 (1972).
443. See, e.g., Acree v. Couni\ Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.), (er. denied, 409
U.S. 1006 (1972).
444. Singleton v. Anson County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 2259 (W.D.N.C. July 3, 1967).
445. Goldberg & Passow, The EJfects of Ability Grouping in the Elementary Schools, in GROUPING IN
THE ELEMENTARY ScHOOLS 22-23 (A. Morgenstern ed. 1966). The arguments that have been made,

both for and against ability grouping, are sutmmarized in

NATIONAL EDUCATION

ASSOCIATION,

ABILITY GROUPING 8-10 (Research Summary No. 53, 1968).
446. See, e.g., Esposito, Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Abilityv Grouping: Principal Findings and
Implications for Evaluating and Designing More Effective Educational Environments, 43 REv. ED. RES.
163, 167-68 (1973); Goodlad, Classroom Organization, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
221 (C. Harris ed. 1960); Passow, The Maze of Research on Ability Grouping, 26 ED. FORuM 281 (1962).
A brief review of two relatively large-scale studies illustrates the differing results obtainable:
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tem of "maximizing stigma and minimizing exposure. ' 447 Even if social science
research more clearly indicated that ability grouping is a valid educational
practice, is its continued use constitutionally permissible when the result, in a
448
system otherwise adjudged to be unitary, is a clear separation of the races?
Does Brown require racial balance in spite of educationally valid reasons for
separation? May segregative intent be inferred from tracking and ability groupThe first of these studies was begun in 1956 in New York City: approximately 3,000 fifth grade
students were separated into five ability levels on the basis of IQ tests. The children were followed
through the end of the sixth grade. The researchers reported that the effects of ability grouping
on academic achievement were minimal at best. Goldberg & Passow. supra note 445, at 31. In fact,
in not a single instance could the size of a child's -achievement increment" be attributed to his
status at the beginning of the school year. Id. at 33. Student achievement was correlated, rot with a
child's previously meastured achievement, but with whether or not the particular teacher was
interested in the particular subject being taught, regardless of the range of student ability in that
subject. Moreover, the greatest academic gains for all students were attained in classrooms with the
broadest range of abilities. Id. at 31-39. The more heterogeneous the classroom, the more all the
children learned; and what they learned best was what the teacher liked best and consequently
taught best.
Goldberg and Passow also found that teachers did not adjust their teaching methods and materials to the level of their students in homogeneous classes. The only adjustments that were ever made
were in the lower ability classrooms, where teachers taught less of certain subjects than in the
classrooms where brighter children were also present. Id. at 32. The result was that the children in
the lower ability homogeneous classes learned less than pupils of comparable ability who were
placed in heterogeneous classes, especially in the areas of science and vocabulary. Thus "slower"
children made greater academic gains when they, were placed in heterogeneous classrooms and
were exposed to the teaching aimed at the brighter children. Id. at 35.
Of the three non-academic Variables studied (self-attittide, social perceptions, and interest of
pupils), only self-attitudes were sensitive to ability grouping. Id. at 34. Ability grouping raised the
self-image of the slower children (who were no longer forced to compete with the brightest children) and lowered the high self-ratings of the brightest children (who no longer stood out academically).
The second large-scale studs-of 4,000 students in two homogeneous socioeconomic school
districts in Utah-conducted in the mid-1960's, reached somewhat different conclusions. W. BORG.
ABILIrV GROUPING IN iHE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A FIELD STunY (1966). The superior students achieved
greater academic gains when grouped homogeneously, although their studs skills improved in the
heterogeneous environment. There were some similarities with the New York study. however: the
self-concept of the academic high achievers declined as a result of placement in homogeneous
classes. For the slow students, achievement increased significantly and consistently when the students were in heterogeneous groups. Again as in the New York study, these students showed a gain
in self-concept and self-esteem when grouped homogeneotisly. Id. at 91.
447. M. McClung, Ability Grouping: The Practice of Maxinizing Stigma and Minimizing Exposure in Public Schools, April 19, 1972 (mnimeo on file at Harvard Center for Law & Education).
448. The courts have thus far not reached this qtrestion. See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson MLunicipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir-. 1970). "We pretermit a discission of the Validity
per se of a [tracking or ability grouping] plan based oir testing except to hold that testing cannot be
employed in any' evenit until unitars [i.e., desegregated] school systems have been established." Id. at
1219. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th (it-.
1971). "We decline once
again . . . the invitation to rule on the validity of testing [to determine ability groupings] per se."
Id. at 1401.
Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aJffd sub nora. Smuck v. Hobson. 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) comes closest to finding the use of tracking a constitutional Violation per se.
The best and by far the most comprehensivC disctissiorn of tracking and ability grotping-covering the social science research and methodology as wel as current legal doctrinc-is Kirp,
Schools as Sorters: The Constitutionialand Policy Implications (I Student Classilication, 121 U. PA. I.. REV.
705 (1973).
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ing practices which result in segregation in all or part of a school system? Who
should bear the evidentiary burden? Might such practices which result in segregation require state authorities to bear the burden of showing that such
actions are not racially motivated? 44" Should plaintiffs be required to show that
there are educationally feasible alternatives to ability grouping? Or should the
burden be shifted to the school authorities to show that there is no other way of
educating children effectively?
In Hobson v. Hansen45 0 the court held that a system of tracking which places
minority students in lower levels of standard curricula is unconstitutional when
it inhibits movement between tracks, thereby rendering the initial assignment
to a lower track a permanent assignment. In theory, the track system was
established to enable the school system to provide compensatory and remedial
education for students in the lowest tracks in order to help those students move
into higher tracks. In practice, however, such education was woefully lacking. 45 1 When coupled with the court's discussion of the serious harm caused by
segregation, however it is brought about, 452 these findings suggest that the
Hobson court might have abolished the tracking system even without the showing that the classifying tests were biased. 453 The court did not reach this precise
issue, however, leaving it open for future litigation.
On appeal, the circuit court expressly refused to "plunge into a sea of...
difficult issues of educational policy" such as the appropriate balance between
the "practical need" to group students by ability and the need to ensure equal
educational opportunity to every student; the extent to which verbal skills tests
can be used without adversely affecting the minority student's educational advancement, and the extent to which verbal tests must be adjusted to reflect
available indicators of ability not dependent on verbal skills. 454 The circuit
court, therefore, interpreted Judge Wright's decree as abolishing the particular
tracking system in existence in the District of Columbia school system at the
time of the trial rather than abolishing all forms of ability grouping or tracking
45 5
in the future.
Attorneys in student classification cases face a number of practical difficulties: what patterns should they look for in order to determine whether grouping, tracking, str eaming, or some form of instructional separation is being
practiced; what are the weaknesses of each program; what are the available
alternative teaching methods-with less of a segregative effect-which can
readily be adapted to a particular school district? The sharp and unresolved
449. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1973); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1971).
450. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aJf'd sub nom. Smuck %.Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
451. 269 F. Supp. at 469-70.
452.

269 F. Supp. at 503-06.

453. See discussion at notes 431 & 432 supra and accompanying text.
454. 408 F.2d at 188.
455. 408 F.2d at 189-90.
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controversy over heterogeneous versus homogeneous grouping makes it difficult if not impossible for courts to adjudicate issues surrounding the use of
these practices; moreover, given the present state of the art, the feasibility of
educational alternatives cannot even be shown.45 6
B.

Use of Tests

When ability grouping or tracking is practiced, the decisions as to which
children are to be placed in which track are usually based on IQ or standardized achievement test scores, sometimes accompanied by the recommendations
of teachers. Several law suits have challenged the tests themselves as being
culturally biased, claiming that such tests lead to the misclassification of minority students. The use of untrained school officials in interpreting the tests has
45

7

also been challenged.
In Hobson v. Hansen ,458 the court abolished the tracking system used in the

public schools of the District of Columbia which assigned students to a particular curriculum track on the basis of standardized ability test scores. Relying on
extensive social science evidence regarding the testing of disadvantaged
children, 45 9 the court found that the tests used were biased against black and
other low-income students:

40

When standard aptitude tests are given to low income Negro children, or
the tests are less precise and less accurate-so
disadvantaged children, ...
much so that test scores become practically meaningless. Because of the impoverished circumstances that characterize the disadvantaged child, it is virtually impossible to tell whether the test score reflects lack of ability-or simply
lack of opportunity. Moreover, the probability that test scores of the Negro child
or the disadvantaged child Will be depressed because of somewhat unique
psychological influences further compounds the risk of inaccuracy.
456. See Orfield, supra note 64, at 327-28.
457. In Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 1971). plaintiffs (black and
poor students placed in special classes) asserted that the tests are "biased-standardized to a white,
middle class norm" and that the single score "fail[s] to distinguish among a wide range of learning
disabilities-emotional, perceptual, linguistic, and cultural." CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION,
CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS 283 (rex. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS].
Plaintiffs also claimed that -[m]any of the school psychologists administering and interpreting the
tests are . . . unqualified." Id.
458. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smruck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
459. 269 F. Supp. at 479-88. In support, Judge Wright cited the Lorton Study, N. BURKE & A.
SIMONS,

A MEASURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF A GROUP OF INCARCERATED CULTURALLY

DISADVANTAGED AND EDUCATIONALLY DEPRIVED DROPOUTS (1965), in which results of one of the
standard verbal IQ tests were compared to the results of a non-verbal IQ test. The results from the
latter test were, on average, 29 points higher. 269 F. Supp. at 485-87 & n. 136. The judge also
cited, without discussion, a number of other social science writings on testing disadvantaged children, such as AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, TESTING PROBLEMS IN PERSPECTIVE (A. Anastasi
ed. 1967); K. EELS, INTELLIGENCE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1951); F. RIESSMAN, THE
CULTURALLY DEPRIVED CHILD (1962); P. SEXTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME (1961); Deutsch &
Brown, Social Influences in Negro-While Intelligence Differences, 20 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 24 (1964); and D.
GOSLIN, CRITICISM OF STANDARDIZED TESTS AND TESTING (1967). 269 F. Supp. at 479-80 n. 130.
460. 269 F. Supp. at 485.
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One difficulty with the Hobson decision is that by abolishing the use of standardized tests without suggesting guidelines for procedures which would be
constitutional, the court has left the school system without anything to fall back
on.461 There is some doubt as to whether "culture-free" tests can be developed
462
which would fill the gap.

Although the district court in Hobson concluded that there had been de jure
segregative practices on the part of the school authorities, 46 3 it blurred the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, 464 suggesting that the
Hobson case might be applicable to tracking situations where there has been no
showing of dejure segregation.
A number of recent cases have challenged the use of tests to assign minority
students to classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR). The plaintiffs in
such suits have alleged that the use of culturally biased tests has resulted in the
misassignment of "normal" students to EMR classes.

465
.

In one recent misclas-

sification case, the use of IQ tests was successfully attacked even though not
even inferred segregative intent was shown. In Larry P. v. Riles, 46 6 a federal
district court enjoined the San Francisco Unified School District from assigning
black students to classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR) on the basis
of IQ tests, when the result was a disproportionate number of black students in
such classes. 461 Plaintiffs were required to show (1) that a significant racial
imbalance existed in the EMR classes, and (2) that the primary determinant of
the assignment to an EMR class was the child's IQ test score. After these two
things were shown, the burden of proof shifted to defendants to justify the use
of the IQ tests. The defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs' evidence that the
tests were culturally biased (e.g., when black psychologists administered the
same IQ test with slight modifications to take into account the students' cultural
background, the test scores were significantly higher). They merely argued that
the tests were not the cause of the racial imbalance in the EMR classes, or, in the
alternative, the tests, although racially biased, were rationally related to a valid
state purpose.4 68 The plaintiffs, however, introduced evidence of alternative
methods of determining assignment to EMR classes used by other school systems, which minimized reliance on IQ tests. 46'" Thus the defendants failed to
meet their burden of proof.
Lar y P. v. Riles, however, was only a nominal victory for the plaintiffs. The
461. See Note. Hobson v. Hansen:JudicialSupervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1521 (1968).
462. Charters, Social Class and Intelligence Tests, in SCHOOL CHILDREN IN r[HE URBAN SLUMS 75 (J.

Roberts ed. 1967).
463. 269 F. Supp. at 515.
464.

269 F. StIpp. at 508 & 515.

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

See, e.g., Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 1971).
343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 1314-15.
343 F. Supp. at 1313.
343 F. Supp. at 1313-14.
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court refused to order the immediate testing of all black students then in EMR
classes; refused to order affirmative action to compensate black students who
had been wrongfully placed in EMR classes in the past; and refused to order
the hiring of minority group psychologists and consultants for the administration of tests to minority students, and evaluation of the test scores. 470 The court
was also extremely wary of, and refused to grant plaintiffs' request for an EMR
class-quota system (whereby the percentage of black students could exceed the
percentage of black students in the school district as a whole by no more than
fifteen per cent), because

471

it [would leave] fulfillment of the needs of retarded black students at the mercy
of white parents who may decline to consent to placement of their own retarded children in EMR classes and thereby reduce the nutmrber of retarded
black children who may be placed in them.

And the battle continues. The Portsmouth, Virginia School Board is currently under legal attack in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia because of its use of IQ tests for placement of children in special
classes and in schools for the mentally retarded. The plaintiffs claim that black
students have been misclassified and wrongly assigned to such classes. The
plaintiffs are not seeking to abolish all IQ testing, but only those tests which do
not take into account the socioeconomic background of the students being
tested. In addition, plaintiffs are seeking testing which assesses "sensitivity,
vocational, technical and mechanical skills, styles of analysis and the ability to
express one's self through oral, non-verbal or graphic means.

47 2

Testifying for

the plaintiffs was Dr. Jonas Chenault, an educational psychologist at the University of Michigan.
Defendants, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the IQ tests in
determining which students need special help, and expressed concern that the
Supreme Court might abolish the use of IQ tests altogether. The school board
also strongly objected to the plaintiffs' allusion to a recent study which allegedly
showed that while white students who score below 70 on the IQ tests are
4 7
generally retarded, blacks who score below 70 are not necessarily retarded. 1
A number of similar cases which have been brought have been settled.
Stipulations in some of these cases acknowledge that large groups of Spanishspeaking children have been inappropriately placed in EMR classes after being
tested in English. Perhaps the most significant of these is Diana v. State Board of
Education47 4 which undoubtedly influenced the California legislature's substantial revision of the testing and classification procedures for EMR classes then in
470.

343 F.Supp. at 1314.

471. 343 F. Supp. at 1315.
472. Washington Post, April 19, 1974, § D, at I, col. I. The case was filed in the Federal District
court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
473. Id.
474. Civil No. C-70-37-RFR (N.D. Cal. Jun. 18, 1973). See CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS 199-207,
224-29, 429.
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use by the California school system. 47 5 The plaintiffs in that case brought a
class action challenging the use of IQ tests to place Mexican-American children
in EMR classes,47 alleging that the nine named children were not mentally
retarded; rather, their low test scores resulted from their unfamiliarity with the
English language. Each of the nine named plaintiffs was retested, and the
children were allowed to answer either in English or in Spanish. All performed
significantly better, averaging, as a group, a fifteen point increase in IQ. Seven
scored higher than the maximum score used for assigning children to EMR
classes. Less than a month after the suit was filed, a stipulation order was
entered requiring that children be tested in their primary language and interpreters be used in the absence of a bilingual examiner; that Mexican-American
and other foreign language children then in educable mentally retarded classes
in the county be retested and reevaluated; that assistance be provided to misplaced children to enable them to readjust to regular classes; and that the state
develop and standardize an IQ test on a Mexican-American population living
47 7
in California.
475. CAt. EDUC. CODE § 6902.06 (West Supp. 1972). The Director of the Office of Civil Rights
of the Departmelnt of Health, Education and Welfare, issued a departmental nienltorandunl noting
that schools were not to assign students whose predoninant language was other than English to
EMR classes on the basis of tests which measured English language skills. 35 Fed. Reg. t I, 595
(1970). Subseqtuently, OCR cited twenty-eight districts in the Southwest for noncompliance with
Title VI; of these, fourteen assigned Mtexican-American students to EIMR classes on tie basis of
criteria measir ing English language skills. U.S. CoMMissSIox oN Civit RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN
EDUCATION FOR MEXICAN AMtERICANs 58-59
FDUCATION STUDY, REPORT VI: TOWARD QUALitF
1974).
476. 1The IQ test used by the school system, which was challenged by the plaintiffs was the
verbal Stanlord-Binet test, which was standardized in 1937 on 3,184 white native-born Americans
and has never been restandardized. Plaintiffs asserted that the cutural bias of the test \\as selfevident when such questions are asked as "Why is it better to pay bills b\ check than by cash?"
(PlaintiffIs point out that this is a difficuht question Io a child whose parents have never had a bank
account) and "Who w rote Romeo and Juliet.-" The vocabular section incItidles the words utbrella," and not "sombrero," and -chattel," not "slave." The children are also asked to identify such
items as -C.O.D.- and "hieroglyphic." Id. at 202.
477. The stipulation order also required the California State Department of' Education to
maintain data on the racial and ethnic composition of all EMR classes in each school district; if
there is a higher proportion of racial or ethnic children in the EMtR classes than thei proportion in
the district as i whole, the school district Will he ie qtired to explain the difference.
One commentator notes that as a resut of Diana and the new California law, supra note 475.
,
thousands of children have been returned to regullr classes. The conunenstator notes, htowever
that the needs of these childi en are not being adequately provided for:
[A] closer look at the situation presents a dismal picture. Children being returned to the
regular classes are provided little of the rnecessary additional support, enrichnient, and
remedial services which iwill redress the effects of their prior educational experiences and
permit then to function at the level of other students in the regular classes. Apparently,
they are not expected to do well, and many will not. It seems certain that the blane for
theit failure will be placed oi the children, rather than on a system that oitt not modify
itself and its resources to meet theit particular needs.
Cohen & DeYoung, The Role oj Litigation in the Impovement o] Ptogrammttgjot the Handicapped, in
THE FIRst" REVIEW or SPECIAL EDUcATox 270 (L. Mann & D. Sabatino eds. 1973).
See also Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist., Civil No. 71-435 (D.
Ariz. May 9, 1972). The complaint in that case states that Spanish-stirnaned children comprised
67.5 per cent of the enrollment in EMR classes and 46.34 pet cent of tile enrolsent in classes for
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If legal rights in fact do accrue to minority children who have been wrongly
assigned to a lower track or an EMR class on the basis of such tests, what
remedies are available? Reassignment to a higher track or into "mainstream"
classes? Compensatory education? Monetary damages for a diminished future
earning capacity?

47 8

Assuming, however, that the tests used to identify mentally retarded students are racially neutral, culturally fair, and educationally valid, should the
tests or the assignment to special classes on the basis of those tests be open to
legal challenge if the result is a disproportionate number of minority children
being placed in special classes or schools for the educable mentally retarded?
Social science has not yet resolved the question of whether it is educationally
wiser to remove educable mentally retarded students fiom the "mainstream" of

education by placement either in special classes or schools or to keep these
students in regular classrooms while providing supplemental supportive training both in and out of class. It has been argued that such "mainstreaming"
would reduce any stigma attached to placement in special education, as Well as
prevent the psychological and educational harm arising from misclassification,
but there are equally valid educational arguments for separating such children
from the others. 47' 9 In view of the uncertainty as to which educational procetrainable mentally handicapped, although they comprised only 17.78 per cent of the total student
population. This case was also terminated by a stipulated settlement.
Covarrubius v. San Diego Unified School Dist.. Civil No. 70-394-5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1972), also
resulted in a settlement agreement. The plaintiffs in that case not only asked for injunctive relief
against the continued use of the tests as devices for student assignment-enjoining defendants
from administering tests to students who may do poorly on them because of theit cultural background and enJoining defendants from placing any child in a special education class before age
10-but also for S400,000 in punitive damages otr the period they had spent in mentally retarded
classes because of mislabeling. As a result of the settlement agreement, no punitive damages were
awarded.
In Ruiz v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 218294 (Super. Ct.. Sacramento County, filed Dec. 16.
1971). plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from administering and recording
in the plaintiffs' permanent cumulative school records the results of group intelligence tests, which
California law requires be given to all sixth and twelfth grade students. The complaint alleges that
the tests are designed with reference to middle-class white cultural norms and have no validity in
measuring plaintiffs' ability. Despite this, the scores are placed in the permanent records and "are
relied upon by teachers, counselors, and school administrators to develop low ability expectations
for them and to track, teach, place. evaluate and encourage them accordingly." CLASSIFICATION
IATERIALs 289.
478. Cf. Peter Doe \. San Francisco Unified Shool Dist.. Civil No. 653-312 (Super. Ct.. San
Francisco County, filed Nov. 20. 1972). Plaintiff. an 18-year old high school graduate. filed an
action seeking general and punitive damages of one million dollars ftrom the school authorities on
the ground that he could neither read nor write above fifth-grade level despite having received his
high school diploma and despite the school system's repeated reasstrances to his mother that he
was progressing at a normal grade-level rate.
479. Comspare Dunn, Spetial Education fin the Mentalt Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?. 35
EXCEPTIONAL CHtILDREN 5 (1968) with Maci\lillan, Special Educationjor the MildN Retatded: Servcant W
Savant?. 2 Focus ON EXCEPTI'IONAL (HItDREN no. 9, at 1 (1971). A summary of some of the
arguments for and against special classes for the retaided is provided in Fink & Gass, ('ontempora
Lsues i the Eduation (j the BehaViotall ' Dsordered, in THE FIRsT REVIEW OF SPECIAtL EIUCAl ION 137
(L. Mann & I). Sabatino eds. 1973).
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dure is more appropriate, should courts intervene? It is at least arguable that
once a court has determined that the tests being administered are racially
neutral and otherwise valid, and that there are procedural and substantive
safeguards to circumscribe the classification process to avoid even unintentional
misclassification, there is no basis for a court to intervene further. The difficulty courts face here is in developing remedies that will cure the civil rights
violations without interferring with legitimate educational judgments about the
need to group children by ability.
C.

Student Discipline

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that within "integrated"
schools and school systems a disproportionate number of black students are
suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined. 4 8 ' This systematic exclusion is
now being attacked in the federal courts. In Hawkins v. Coleman, 481 it was found
that blacks in the Dallas school system were systematically suspended more
frequently, endured longer suspensions, and were also subjected to corporal
punishment much more often than whites-particularly in schools where
whites were a majority.482 The Dallas superintendent testified that this was
attributable to "institutional racism. 4 83 Testimony from a psychologist indicated that black students would become "more frustrated as the institution
continue[d] to refuse to respond to their needs and ambitions" and that "[t]his
frustration [would] be reflected either in increased passivity or increased hos484
tility," the latter, of course, resulting in increased "suspendable behavior.1
As with ability grouping practices, it is not clear in this area when actions
are taken for valid educational reasons and when a court should intervene to
protect the rights of minority students. If the actions are taken without intent
to discriminate and with adequate procedural safeguards, but the result is a
disproportionate number of minority children being disciplined, the same
question must be asked: is it appropriate for courts to intervene?4 85 And if it is
appropriate, what remedies can the courts fashion which will safeguard the
rights of minority students, yet leave school officials unfettered to pursue
legitimate disciplinary goals? The case law on these points at present is, at best,
rudimentary. In the coming years, these "second generation" problems will
undoubtedly be a principal focus of attention.
480. See generall CHILDRREN'S DEFNSE FUND, CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA (1974);
Hearings on Equal Educational Opportunity BeJre the Select Senate Comm. on Equal Educational
Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3-B, at 1311 (1970).

481.
482.

376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
Id. at 1333-35. See generally YudOf, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students From the Public
Schools: Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 374
(1975).
483. 376 F. Supp. at 1336.
484. Id.
485. See YXudof. supia note 482, for an excellent discussion of the complexity of the problem of
black exclusion front
public schools.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A summary of the development of school desegregation law-spanning the
nineteen year period from Brown to Keyes-reveals the following principles for
court-ordered school desegregation:
1) Immediate desegregation is required; delays will no longer be tolerated.""
2) All-out desegregation must be accomplished and segregation eliminated
"root and branch." 487
3) In designing a desegregation plan for a formerly dual school system,
federal district courts have broad equitable remedial powers-whatever
tools are necessary; "[olnce a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."4 8
4) Remedies "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even
bizarre in some situations ... .,;489 thus noncontiguous and noncompact
attendance zones-even zones which "may be on opposite ends of the
city"-can be drawn by the district cout?491
5) There are limits on the extent to which some remedial measures can be
used:
a) Racial balance-there is no substantive constitutional right to racial balance in and of itself,491 but as a remedy for an already determined constitutional violation, mathematical ratios may be used as a
"starting point. 4112
b) Busing-may be used where feasible, limited only "when the time
or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the
children or significantly impinge on the educational process."4 '
6) In an area where no prior statutory or constitutional provision has compelled segregation, dejure actions of school officials (e.g., manipulating
attendance zones or selection of sites for new school construction) in
one part of the district (albeit a "meaningful" part) leads to the presumption that the "infection" has pervaded the entire district or that
de jure actions must have occurred throughout the district.494 The de
facto/de jure distinction is still alie. 4 '1 However, it is probable that
plaintiffs can with relative ease prove intentional segregative acts on the
486.

Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). See also Carter v. West

Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).

487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
Swan v. Charlote-Meckleiburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971),
402 U.S. at 28.
402 U.S. at 27.
402 U.S. at 24.
402 U.S. at 25.
402 U.S. at 30-31.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973).

495.

413 U.S. at 208.
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part of school officials or actions "which have the natural and foresee4 96
of a school
able consequences of causing educational segregation,"

district. This coupled with the presumptions that are triggered by such
a finding, 497 suggest that Justice Powell's demand-that there be a "uniform national rule" 498 for school segregation-would very likely be met.
Thus in the nineteenth year after the Brown decision, it seemed clear that
de jure segregation could be found in school districts outside of the South; that
the burden of proof, once a prima facie case was made by plaintiffs, would be
on the defendant school system to prove either that the pattern of segregated
4'9
or was not
schools was not a "vestige" of a formerly dual state-imposed system
00
and that there were
the result of racially motivated actions of school officials
no limits on the equitable remedial powers of federal district courts in providing for all-out desegregation other than those noted above with regard to
busing and racial imbalance. There was little indication that the remedial
measures which a court could impose could run only to the school district line.
But some cracks had begun to appear in the unanimous front heretofore
presented by the Court, as indicated in various concurring and dissenting
opinions:
1) "Local control," it was suggested, was desirable and of "overriding im-

portance from an educational standpoint" and weighed heavily against
any remedial measure which would interfere with the independence of
l
already defined separate school districts.5
2) Deviations in racial balance percentages should not prevent a school
system from withdrawing from a larger unit and setting itself up as a
'
separate district to provide "quality education. 502
3) "In the balancing of interests," busing should be curtailed when it is at
5
the expense of a neighborhood schools policy. 0
4) Racial gerrymandering of attendance zones or other deliberate segregative actions in a part of the school district is a constitutional violation
only as to the minorities within that zone; unless factual inquiry reveals
that invidious discrimination has taken place in every zone, the district as
a whole can not be treated as a "dual" school system requiring a district5 t' 4
wide remedy.
Twenty years after Brown, Milliken v. Bradley-the Detroit case-was
Hart v. ComniMunity School Bd. of Educ.. 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
496.
497. See notes 74-80 accompanying text at pp. 63-64 supra.
498. 413 U.S. at 232.
499. Swann v. Charlotte-Nlecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 15.
500. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.413 U.S. at 208.
501.
Wright V. CitV of Empotia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (Burger. C.J.. dissenting).
502. See 407 U.S. at 478-82 (Burget. C.. dissenting).
503. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. at 189, 251-52 (1973) (Powell,,J., concutrtring in part
and dissenting in part).
504. 413 U.S. at 256-58 (Rehnqtuist. J., dissenting).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 39: No. I

decided.5 1 5 The immediate reaction among many was that this was the end of
the line. The burden of proof was shifted from the defendants to the plaintiffs
to prove the actions of suburban school officials or of state education officials
were racially motivated and had a segregative effect on the central city district.
But the decision need not necessarily be seen-as Justice Marshall suggests-as
"a giant step backwards. 50 6 The door was left slightly ajar to permit proof of
intentional actions of state or suburban non-school governmental agencies to
establish or maintain residential segregation)'5 7 Moreover, the admission by the
majority that the segregation in Detroit was clearly dejure indicates that school
desegregation litigation can continue unabated in the North and West as long
as relief is sought on an intra-district basis. There seems to be no withdrawal
from Swaim and Kees.

What function has social science research served in the foregoing legal
development and of what relevance will it be in future litigation? First, social
science research since Brown has not generally been used by the courts to
ascertain some degree of "harm" as a predicate to a constitutional violation,
although to some extent demographic and other studies have been used to
determine whether segregation is attributable to actions of school officials,
other officials, or is fortuitous.
There are at least three significant areas in which social science research has
been and can be useful to courts. The first area is that left open by the Detroit
decision-proof of racial containment in the central city schools by actions of
suburban or state agencies. Clearly demographers, sociologists, political scientists and others can aid in determining the factors leading to the "growing core
of Negro schools" in the central city, surrounded by nearly all white suburban
school districts.
The second area is that of the desegregation plan itself-social scientists and
social science data can be and are used to help the court translate from desegregation as simply a "body count" to effective integration. The development of
a separate remedial plan for Hispano-Americans in Keyes to reflect the unique
bilingual-bicultural needs is such an example?0 8 Thus, educators, psychologists, sociologists and others are useful in tailoring remedies to the particular
needs of litigants.
The third area concerns the problem of resegregation within the school or
classroom even though the school system is unitary . Social science data have
firequently been drawn upon to show the misclassification, as mentally retarded, of a disproportionate number of minority children and the inappropriateness of the tests used in the classification process. Social science also
505.
506.
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suggests, however, that in the absence of clear racial motive, it may not be
appropriate for courts to intervene in various educational policy questions such
as ability grouping and tracking, the "mainstreaming" or separation of children
who are mentally retarded, and the use of disciplinary measures. The courts
more appropriately should intervene only to determine whether otherwise
valid educational policies actually are used to resegregate and to ensure that
minimal due process requirements are met.
To conclude, the legal issues in the field of public school desegregation
have become considerably more complex since the focus shifted away from the
southern states to the rest of the country. The question of whether the constitution has been violated now involves a search for unobtrusive and racially benign actions which might have contributed-directly and indirectly-to the perpetuation of a dual school system. Once a violation has been established, an
even more perplexing question becomes how can segregation effectively and
fairly be remedied. This increasing complexity requires and will continue to
require that courts work from a more solid foundation of fact than ever before
in deciding questions of law. Judges will find it increasingly necessary to consider and rely on the testimony of demographers, educators, psychologists,
sociologists, and political scientists simply in order to fully understand the
nature of the legal issues that are being presented and the likely impact various
remedies will have. It is this legal development which places increasing importance on the research of social scientists.
As was stated in the introduction, this article has not attempted to outline
the agenda for cooperation between the law and the social sciences. But in
delineating the complex unresolved issues in the law of public school desegregation, we recognize the vast potential of social science research as a valuable
evidentiary means to realize the promise of Brown. The quality of constitutional
justice will be enhanced as social scientists and jurists strive to discover and
understand the "unknown and perhaps unknowable."

